Sager v. Blanco
| Decision Date | 12 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3D20-1194 |
| Parties | Arthur Sager, Appellant, v. Madalina Blanco and Ricardo F. Blanco, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Monroe County Lower Tribunal No. 15-641-K, Timothy J. Koenig, Judge.
Robert C. Tilghman, P.A., Robert C. Tilghman, Nathan E. Eden, P.A. and Nathan E. Eden, for appellant.
Cooney Trybus Kwavnick Peets, Warren Kwavnick, and David F. Cooney (Fort Lauderdale), for appellees.
Before SCALES, LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
We deny appellees' motion for rehearing but grant clarification. We withdraw our prior opinion and substitute the following in its stead.
This appeal involves the application of vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine first adopted by the Florida Supreme Court over a century ago in Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629 (Fla. 1920).[1] The primary issue is whether an injured party is precluded from pursuing a claim for vicarious liability against a vehicle owner when the driver has weaponized the vehicle with the intent to cause bodily harm. Adhering to an expansive body of cogent legal authority, we conclude that only where such misconduct is reasonably foreseeable may liability be imputed under the doctrine.
Appellant Arthur Sager, responded to a domestic dispute at the residence of his neighbor, appellee, Madalina Blanco. Having just assaulted his girlfriend, Ricardo Blanco, Ms Blanco's son, fled from the scene driving his mother's vehicle. He then shifted the vehicle into reverse and accelerated backward, striking Mr. Sager and dragging him under the vehicle. As a result, Mr. Sager sustained significant injuries.
Mr. Blanco was arrested and charged with aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, a charge for which he was later convicted. Mr. Sager subsequently filed suit against both mother and son. The complaint alleged negligent entrustment and vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine against Ms. Blanco, along with negligence against her son.
Shortly before trial, Ms. Blanco filed a motion to strike or dismiss or, alternatively, for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. In the motion, she argued that because she had admitted to ownership of the vehicle for purposes of vicarious liability, the negligent entrustment claim was redundant and should not be used as a conduit for admitting evidence of Mr. Blanco's driving history. In opposition, Mr. Sager argued he was entitled to advance alternative legal theories, and, given the statutory limitation on damages associated with vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, negligent entrustment potentially exposed Ms. Blanco to greater liability. He further sought to estop both Blancos from denying the essential allegations of aggravated battery during the civil trial. Ms. Blanco then offered to waive the statutory limitation on damages for vicarious liability, but Mr. Sager rejected the offer, asserting he was entitled to enforce the parties' written stipulation to submit the negligent entrustment claim to the jury.
The trial court ultimately rendered judgment in favor of Ms. Blanco on the negligent entrustment claim and granted the motion to estop the Blancos from denying the essential elements of aggravated battery. Then, acting on its own volition, the court entered judgment on the vicarious liability claim in favor of Ms. Blanco. In so ruling, the court cited sections 772.14 and 775.089, Florida Statutes (2020), for the proposition that because Mr. Blanco had been criminally convicted of intentionally using the motor vehicle in a weapon-like manner, Mr. Sager was foreclosed from arguing any lesser degree of culpability during the civil trial. Relying upon certain language in Burch v. Sun State Ford, Inc., 864 So.2d 466 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), the court further concluded the weapon-like use of the vehicle precluded a vicarious liability claim under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Mr. Sager, timely but unsuccessfully, sought reconsideration. The instant appeal ensued.
Over one hundred years ago, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the dangerous instrumentality doctrine in the seminal case of Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629 (Fla. 1920). There, the court merged common law concepts governing master-servant relationships and strict liability for ultrahazardous activities to impose strict vicarious liability on an automobile owner for the negligent acts of the driver. Analogizing the entrustment of a motor vehicle to that of a locomotive, the court articulated the dangerous instrumentality doctrine as follows:
[O]ne who authorizes and permits an instrumentality that is peculiarly dangerous in its operation to be used by another on the public highway is liable in damages for injuries to third persons caused by the negligent operation of such instrumentality on the highway by one so authorized by the owner.
S. Cotton, 86 So. at 638; see also Phila. & Reading R.R. Co. v. Derby, 55 U.S. 468, 487 (1852).
Importantly, under the doctrine, strict liability is not absolute. Instead, an injured party "must prove some fault, albeit on the part of the operator, which is then imputed to the owner." Burch, 864 So.2d at 470. Liability is ascribed "to an owner even when the operator disobeys restrictions on the use of the vehicle." Id. Thus, the entrusting owner is rendered liable "no matter where the driver goes, stops, or starts." Boggs v. Butler, 176 So. 174, 176 (Fla. 1937).
Although the dangerous instrumentality doctrine "has drawn its fair share of criticism," in the progeny of Southern Cotton, our high court has reiterated the viability of the doctrine. Fischer v. Alessandrini, 907 So.2d 569, 570 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
Writing for the court in Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So.2d 1363, 1365 (Fla. 1990), Justice Grimes justified its continuing application in the following manner:
The dangerous instrumentality doctrine seeks to provide greater financial responsibility to pay for the carnage on our roads. It is premised upon the theory that the one who originates the danger by entrusting the automobile to another is in the best position to make certain that there will be adequate resources with which to pay the damages caused by its negligent operation.
While the contours of the doctrine have since been refined, the essential articulation remains unchanged. The owner of a dangerous instrumentality who entrusts its use to another is liable for damages caused by the negligence of the operator. As noted by Justice Grimes, this rule "has been applied with very few exceptions." Id. Indeed, reported Florida Supreme Court decisions expressly identify but three. One who voluntarily entrusts his or her vehicle to a repair service is not liable for injuries caused by the negligence of an employee of the service, so long as the owner does not exercise control over the injury-causing operation of the vehicle and is not otherwise negligent. See Castillo v. Bickley, 363 So.2d 792, 793 (Fla. 1978). Similarly, a breach of custody amounting to a species of conversion or theft will relieve the owner of liability. See Hertz Corp. v. Jackson, 617 So.2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 1993). Lastly, where a vehicle owner possesses bare naked title while another party holds beneficial ownership, vicarious liability will not lie. See Palmer v. R.S. Evans, Jacksonville, Inc., 81 So.2d 635, 637 (Fla. 1955).
The Florida Legislature has further diminished the reach of the doctrine by declaring that a powered shopping cart in a retail establishment is not a dangerous instrumentality, § 768.093(2), Fla. Stat. (2022), limiting liability to a vessel operator unless the owner is present, § 327.32, Fla. Stat. (2022), limiting the liability of a lessor of an automobile subject to registration for operation on public roads, depending on the duration of the lease, § 324.021(9)(b)1., 2., Fla. Stat. (2022), and, finally, limiting the liability of owners who are natural persons and lend their car to any permissive user, § 324.021(9)(b)3., Fla. Stat. Additionally, in 2005, Congress enacted the Graves Amendment, prohibiting states from imposing vicarious liability on car rental companies. See 49 U.S.C. § 30106.
Against these settled principles, we review the ruling on appeal. In determining the doctrine was unavailable under the factual circumstances at hand, the trial court engaged in a two-fold analysis. The court first determined that certain statutory provisions designed to insulate crime victims from "further damage from the criminal conduct and maximize the potential for recovery," Bd. of Regents v. Taborsky, 648 So.2d 748, 754 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), estopped Mr. Sager from arguing his injuries were the result of negligence and then concluded that the weapon-like use of the motor vehicle shielded Ms. Blanco from vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. We examine the respective findings, in turn.
Section 772.14, Florida Statutes, located within the Civil Remedies for Criminal Practices Act, provides, in relevant part:
A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the state in any criminal proceeding concerning the conduct of the defendant which forms the basis for a civil cause of action under this chapter . . . shall estop the defendant in any action brought pursuant to this chapter as to all matters as to which such judgment or decree would be an estoppel as if the plaintiff had been a party in the criminal action.
Section 775.089(8), Florida Statutes, which is part of the Florida Criminal Code, similarly reads:
The conviction of a defendant for...
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