Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Mich. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich.

• Decision Date: 14 November 2022
• Docket Number: 1:16-cv-10317
• Parties: SAGINAW CHIPPEWA INDIAN TRIBE OF MICHIGAN and WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN, Plaintiffs, v. BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF MICHIGAN, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

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SAGINAW CHIPPEWA INDIAN TRIBE OF MICHIGAN and WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN, Plaintiffs,
v.
BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF MICHIGAN, Defendant.

No. 1:16-cv-10317

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Northern Division

November 14, 2022

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE WITNESS DISCLOSURE

THOMAS L. LUDINGTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This matter is before this Court upon Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel and Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure. Plaintiffs' Motion will be granted, and Defendant's Motion will be denied.

I.

In January 2016, Plaintiffs Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan and its Welfare Benefit Plan sued Defendant Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan under federal and state law, alleging it failed to fulfill its fiduciary duties in administering the Plaintiffs' health-insurance plans.

Four years ago, the Sixth Circuit reversed this Court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims based on Defendant's alleged failure to insist on “Medicare-like rates” for care that was both authorized by Plaintiffs' Contract Health Services^[1] program and provided to tribal members by

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Medicare-participating hospitals. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Mich. v. BCBS of Mich., 200 F.Supp.3d 697 (E.D. Mich. 2016), vacated in part on recons., No. 16-CV-10317, 2016 WL 6276911 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 27, 2016), rev'd in part, 748 Fed.Appx. 12 (6th Cir. 2018), aff'g No. 16-CV-10317, 2017 WL 3007074 (E.D. Mich. July 14, 2017).

On remand, this Court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that Plaintiffs' payments for qualified CHS care through the Blue Cross plans were not eligible for Medicare-like rates. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Mich. v. BCBS of Mich., 477 F.Supp.3d 598 (E.D. Mich. 2020). This Court interpreted the relevant federal regulations as limiting the requirement of Medicare-like rates to care that was authorized by CHS, provided to tribal members by Medicare-participating hospitals, and directly paid for with CHS funds. Id.

The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the case again, this time based on its interpretation of the applicable regulations. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Mich. v. BCBS of Mich., 32 F.4th 548 (6th Cir. 2022), en banc reh'g denied, No. 21-1226, 2022 WL 2286404, at *1 (6th Cir. June 7, 2022).

The parties have since engaged in months of substantial discovery and have repeatedly mentioned the possibility of settlement. See ECF Nos. 209-224. The instant motions are discovery disputes: one to compel discovery and one to strike a witness disclosure.

II.

Plaintiffs have filed a motion to compel discovery. Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(e) and 37, they seek an order directing Defendant to supplement its prior disclosures with “(1) claims data production with the Health Insurance Claim Forms 1500s for the underlying healthcare claims at issue,” (2) “the claims data fields identifying that the healthcare claims were referred/authorized by the Tribe's Contract Health Services Program,” and (3) “the missing

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invoices and reports” from “the invoices and reports Defendant issued to Plaintiff and previously produced in this case.” ECF No. 225 at PageID.13314.

In contest, Defendant argues Plaintiffs' motion (1) is untimely and (2) seeks irrelevant information that (3) is not proportionate to the needs of the case. ECF No. 229 at PageID.13670.

“[I]t is well established that the scope of discovery is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Coleman v. Am. Red Cross, 23 F.3d 1091, 1096 (6th Cir. 1994). Generally, discovery entails all nonprivileged matters that are “relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). This rule is “broadly read[] to encompass matters that might bear on[] or might lead to matters that could bear on ‘any issue that is or may be in the case.'” Knop v. Johnson, No. G84-651, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17974, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 23, 1988) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)). Simply put, evidence is discoverable if there is even a remote possibility that it is or could become relevant.

First, Defendant's timeliness argument is misplaced. Although true that discovery has ended, this Court granted the parties' stipulation to reopen discovery for limited purposes on August 2, 2022. See ECF No. 222. In that Order, Defendant consented to provide Plaintiffs with, among other things, (1) “the claims data relative to the Member Plan going back to July 2007, consistent with the claims data produced by [Defendant] in the Grand Traverse Band litigation,” (2) “the Tribal Members that participated in the Employee Plan,” and (3) “the claims data relative to those individuals, consistent with the claims data produced by [Defendant] in the Grand Traverse Band litigation.” Id. at PageID.13297. Obviously, this placed a duty on Defendant to supplement those disclosures. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii), (e)(1)(A). And to the extent that it might not have, it will. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(1)(B) (requiring parties to “supplement or correct” disclosures “as ordered by the court”).

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Second, the information that Plaintiffs seek is relevant. Granted, Plaintiffs' motion sought Health...