Saiz v. State
| Decision Date | 06 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 123,612 |
| Citation | 508 P.3d 1290 (Table) |
| Parties | Isaac D. SAIZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Kansas, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Richard Ney, of Ney & Adams, of Wichita, for appellant.
Lance J. Gillett, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before Powell, P.J., Atcheson, J., and Walker, S.J.
Isaac D. Saiz challenges the denial of his habeas corpus motion under K.S.A. 60-1507, asserting his sentences for first-degree murder and various other crimes, which he committed at 16 years old, violate the Eighth Amendment under Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012). We stayed his appeal pending the Kansas Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. State , 314 Kan. 466, 500 P.3d 1182 (2021), petition for cert. filed March 16, 2022. Following publication of that decision, we requested and received additional briefing from the parties regarding Williams ’ impact on Saiz’ sentence.
After careful review we find, under the criteria set out in Miller , Williams , and related cases, that Saiz’ sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment. In sentencing him, the district court did not impose a mandatory sentence. And Saiz has not shown that the sentencing court failed to consider his youth and attendant circumstances when sentencing him. Thus, his habeas corpus challenge must fail, and the district court was correct in denying his motion.
The underlying facts of Saiz’ convictions are set forth in his direct appeal. State v. Saiz , 269 Kan. 657, 658-60, 7 P.3d 1214 (2000). Briefly, in 1998, at 16 years old, Saiz killed a child while shooting at two teenagers during a gang-related, drive-by shooting. He was prosecuted as an adult and found guilty of premeditated first-degree murder, two counts of attempted murder, and criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied building. When Saiz committed his crimes, premeditated first-degree murder carried a minimum sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 25 years—a hard-25 sentence. K.S.A. 21-3401(a) (Furse) ; K.S.A. 1998 Supp. 22-3717(b)(1). However, if the court determined that aggravating circumstances existed that outweighed any mitigating circumstances, it could impose a hard-40 sentence—life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 40 years. K.S.A. 21-4633 (Furse) ; K.S.A. 21-4635(a)-(c) (Furse).
At sentencing, the district court found the aggravating factor that Saiz knowingly or intentionally created a risk of death to multiple people outweighed the mitigating factor of his age. The court imposed a hard-40 sentence for first-degree murder. And for the remaining convictions, the district court sentenced Saiz to a consecutive 437-month prison term—194 months for each attempted murder conviction and 49 months for criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied building, meaning his aggregated controlling sentence is 917 months. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Saiz , 269 Kan. at 666-70.
Prior to his current K.S.A. 60-1507 motion before us, Saiz had filed two other habeas corpus motions challenging, among other claims, his sentences. In 2001, he filed a federal habeas corpus action, which was ultimately denied. Saiz v. McKune , No. 01-3185-RDR, 2004 WL 291167 (D. Kan. 2004) (unpublished opinion). In 2009, Saiz filed a habeas corpus motion under K.S.A. 60-1507 challenging the assistance of his trial defense attorney and direct appeal counsel. The district court denied the motion as untimely, and a panel of our court affirmed. Saiz v. State , No. 103,141, 2011 WL 767969 (Kan. App. 2011) (unpublished opinion).
In the years since Saiz’ convictions, the United States Supreme Court has expanded its Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment jurisprudence as applied to minors. Pertinent cases include Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 74-75, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010) (); and Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 573-74, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005) (). Of key significance to Saiz’ case, in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, the Court held that mandatory life-without-parole (LWOP) sentences as applied to minors convicted of homicide are unconstitutional. Although the Court did not foreclose a life-without-parole sentence, it noted a sentencing court must first consider "how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." 567 U.S. at 480. And in Montgomery v. Louisiana , 577 U.S. 190, 200, 208-09, 212, 136 S. Ct. 718, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016), the Court clarified Miller announced a substantive rule—life without parole is disproportionate if the minor's crime "reflect[s] the transient immaturity of youth"—that applies retroactively in state habeas corpus proceedings.
Saiz filed a habeas corpus motion under K.S.A. 60-1507 in February 2020. Citing Miller , which prohibits mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles convicted of homicide, he argued his aggregated sentences constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment because his 917-month sentence amounts to a de facto LWOP sentence. He also cited Montgomery v. Louisiana , which held Miller applies retroactively, to excuse his untimely and successive motion. In light of Montgomery, the State agreed that the district court could address the motion's merits. The district court heard arguments in October 2020 and took the matter under advisement.
Shortly after the district court took the matter under advisement, a panel of our Court of Appeals published Williams v. State , 58 Kan. App. 2d 947, 476 P.3d 805 (2020), rev. granted 312 Kan. 902 (2021). The Williams panel found Miller applies to discretionary sentences, a hard-50 sentence is the functional equivalent of life without parole, and the district court failed to adequately consider the defendant's youth and attendant circumstances at sentencing. 58 Kan. App. 2d. at 963, 970-73, 975-76. In the present case the district court allowed the parties to submit additional briefing for consideration.
Following the additional briefing on the impact of Williams , the district court denied Saiz’ habeas corpus motion. The court agreed the motion was properly before it but found the sentence did not implicate Miller ; the sentence was neither a mandatory life sentence nor did it preclude parole. And if Miller did apply, the sentencing court held it had adequately considered Saiz’ age before sentencing him.
Saiz has timely appealed from the district court's denial of his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.
After the parties filed their original briefs, but before we heard oral argument in November 2021 in this case, two new and clearly pertinent events commanded our attention. First, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Jones v. Mississippi , 593 U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1318-20, 209 L. Ed. 2d 390 (2021), which significantly narrowed the scope of appellate review in juvenile LWOP sentences. The timing of the Jones decision enabled the parties to discuss its potential application to Saiz’ case at oral argument before us.
Second, however, we learned that the Kansas Supreme Court had granted a petition for review from the Court of Appeals decision in Williams . Since it became apparent that the Supreme Court's decision in that case might well determine the outcome of Saiz’ contentions in his case, we stayed a decision on Saiz’ appeal pending the Kansas Supreme Court's decision. The Williams decision was handed down on December 17, 2021. Williams , 314 Kan. 466. We will discuss the impact of the decision in our analysis that follows below.
After Williams was issued, at our request Saiz and the State submitted supplemental briefs discussing Williams contentions about his sentences. For the reasons we set forth below, we have determined that the district court's denial of his habeas corpus motion must be affirmed.
On appeal, Saiz raises three issues. First, he argues the State is barred from arguing the Kansas sentencing scheme complies with Miller because it did not raise that issue below. Second, he contends that Miller may be interpreted to prohibit de facto LWOP sentences for juveniles because the Kansas Supreme Court in Williams did not expressly overrule a prior case. And third, Saiz believes the district court failed to comply with Miller when it used his age as an aggravating, rather than a mitigating, factor at his sentencing. But based on our reading of our Supreme Court's opinion in Williams , Saiz is not entitled to relief; the district court did consider his age before imposing a discretionary sentence, although certainly not in the manner Saiz desired.
Before addressing Saiz’ contentions, we first briefly review the legal landscape in which his claims arise. In Miller , 567 U.S. at 470, 479-80, the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles convicted of homicide. Because juveniles are fundamentally different from adults—they are less mature, more susceptible to negative influences, and have not firmly developed fixed character traits—the Court found that the traditional justifications for LWOP incarceration for them are less compelling. 567 U.S. at 471-73. Thus, sentencing schemes that mandate life without parole ignore these differences. 567 U.S. at 473-74. Though courts may impose LWOP sentences, they must first follow a certain process—considering a juvenile's youth—before doing so. 567 U.S. at 479-80, 483.
Four years after Miller , in Montgomery ,...
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