Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 17 December 2021
• Docket Number: No. 121,815,121,815
• Citation: 500 P.3d 1182
• Parties: Ronell WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Kansas, Appellee.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

500 P.3d 1182

Ronell WILLIAMS, Appellant,

v.STATE of Kansas, Appellee.

No. 121,815

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Opinion filed December 17, 2021

Joseph A. Desch, of Law Office of Joseph A. Desch, of Topeka, argued the cause, and was on the brief for appellant.

Daniel G. Obermeier, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Mark A. Dupree Sr., district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the briefs for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Rosen, J.:

In 2000, a jury convicted Ronell Williams of two counts of premeditated murder, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary for acts he committed when he was 14 years old. For the murder convictions, the district court sentenced Williams to two concurrent life sentences without the possibility of parole for 50 years (hard 50). Many years after his sentencing, Williams filed an action under K.S.A. 60-1507, arguing that the scheme under which he was sentenced violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The district court dismissed the motion as untimely and successive. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new hearing on whether Williams' youth and attendant characteristics made the hard 50 disproportionate punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The State petitioned for review.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At Williams' original criminal trial, the State put forth evidence to establish that Williams killed two people when he was 14 years old. The evidence showed that, on August 3, 1999, Williams and his twin brother Donell encountered Wilbur and Wilma Williams (no relation to the appellant) outside their house and forced the couple inside. The brothers searched the house, allegedly looking for things to steal. After finding the couple's car keys, Donell went outside to get the car and Ronell shot and killed both Wilbur and Wilma before the brothers left the scene.

State v. Williams , 277 Kan. 338, 341, 85 P.3d 697 (2004). The State prosecuted Williams as an adult, and a jury convicted him of two counts of premeditated first-degree murder, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary. 277 Kan. at 338, 85 P.3d 697.

After considering aggravating and mitigating factors, the district court sentenced Williams to two hard 50 life terms for the murders, 59 months' imprisonment for the robbery, and 32 months' imprisonment for the burglary, all to run concurrent. Williams , 277 Kan. at 339, 85 P.3d 697. This court affirmed the convictions. 277 Kan. at 358, 85 P.3d 697.

Williams filed a motion in 2005 under K.S.A. 60-1507 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Williams v. State , No. 99,516, 2009 WL 1140260 (Kan. App. 2009) (unpublished opinion).

On September 30, 2016, Williams filed a second motion under K.S.A. 60-1507. He argued his hard 50 life sentences were cruel and unusual punishment. He relied on Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 470, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), which held that mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders is cruel and unusual punishment, and Montgomery v. Louisiana , 577 U.S. 190, 210-12, 136 S. Ct. 718, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016), which announced that Miller was a retroactive change in the law. The district court dismissed the motion as successive and untimely.

Williams appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision. Williams v. State , 58 Kan. App. 2d 947, 985, 476 P.3d 805 (2020). It concluded his motion was subject to an exception to the prohibition on successive motions because it was based on a change in law, and that "rare and extraordinary circumstances" required an extension of the one-year time limit to prevent manifest injustice. Williams , 58 Kan. App. 2d at 954, 476 P.3d 805.

The Court of Appeals further held that under the sentencing rules announced in Miller , a hard 50 sentence for a juvenile offender is unconstitutional unless the sentencer first considers the offender's youth and the characteristics of youth before imposing the sentence. The panel ruled that the sentencing court failed to adequately take these factors into consideration. Consequently, it held Williams' sentence was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.

We granted the State's petition for review.

ANALYSIS

The State argues that the panel has impermissibly extended Miller and that the Supreme Court's position in Jones v. Mississippi , 593 U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 209 L. Ed. 2d 390 (2021), confirms this. Alternatively, the State argues, the sentencing court properly considered Williams' youth and the characteristics of youth, so the sentencing process satisfied the Miller requirements. We agree with the State that Jones requires us to reverse the Court of Appeals.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. This clause "guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions." Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 560-61, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005). A punishment that is disproportionate to the offense is excessive and thus cruel and unusual under the Eighth amendment. 543 U.S. at 560-61, 125 S.Ct. 1183.

The United States Supreme Court has held that certain sentencing practices will always be disproportionate to the offense because of "mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the severity of a penalty." Miller , 567 U.S. at 470, 132 S.Ct. 2455. It has imposed categorical bans on these sentencing practices. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana , 554 U.S. 407, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 171 L. Ed. 2d 525 (2008) (death penalty for individuals who commit nonhomicide crimes violates Eighth Amendment); Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002) (death penalty for mentally disabled offenders violates Eighth Amendment). In 2005, the Court began a string of cases— Roper , Graham , Miller , Montgomery , and Jones —that barred certain sentencing practices for juveniles.

In Roper , the Court held that the death penalty is disproportionate punishment for juvenile offenders. The Court explained that society reserves the death penalty for "those offenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’ " Roper , 543 U.S. at 568, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 319, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 [2002] ). It concluded juveniles are not in this class because they have a less developed character, are immature and irresponsible, are vulnerable to peer pressure and negative influence, have a high capacity for reform, and are unlikely to be "irretrievably depraved." 543 U.S. at 569-70, 125 S.Ct. 1183. After recognizing "the diminished culpability of juveniles," the Court concluded that "the penological justifications [of retribution and deterrence] for the death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to adults." 543 U.S. at 571, 125 S.Ct. 1183.

In Graham , the Court relied on the Roper reasoning to hold that life without parole is also a disproportionate sentence for juvenile offenders who commit nonhomicide crimes. Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 81-82, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010). And, in Miller , the Court recognized that life without parole would be disproportionate for most juvenile offenders regardless of the nature of their crimes—homicide or nonhomicide. Consequently, it held that "mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment." (Emphasis added.) Miller , 567 U.S. at 487, 132 S.Ct. 2455. The Court explained it would require any sentencer "to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison" before imposing life without parole. 567 U.S. at 480, 132 S.Ct. 2455. In Montgomery , the Court held that Miller has retroactive effect. 577 U.S. at 208, 136 S.Ct. 718.

In this case, the Court of Appeals ruled that Miller requires sentencing courts to consider youth and its attendant characteristics before imposing life without parole or the functional equivalent of life without parole. 58 Kan. App. 2d at 970, 476 P.3d 805. It concluded the hard 50 is the functional equivalent of life without parole. 58 Kan. App. 2d at 972-73, 476 P.3d 805. Thus, it ruled, the district court should have considered youth and its attendant characteristics in this case and, if it did not, Williams' sentencing procedure ran afoul of Miller. 58 Kan. App. 2d at 983-84, 476 P.3d 805. The panel ultimately concluded the district court failed to comply with the Miller requirements. 58 Kan. App. 2d at 984, 476 P.3d 805.

After the Court of Appeals ruled, the Supreme Court decided Jones. In Jones , the Court held that Miller does not require a sentencing court to explain on the record how it considered youth and its attendant characteristics or make an explicit finding of permanent incorrigibility before imposing life without parole on a juvenile offender. In so ruling, the Court explained that "[u]nder Miller [ ], an individual who commits a homicide when he or she is under 18 may be sentenced to life without parole ... if the sentence is not mandatory and the sentencer therefore has discretion to impose a lesser punishment. " (Emphasis added.) Jones , 141 S. Ct. at 1311. The Court reasoned that an on-the-record-discussion "is not necessary to ensure that a sentencer considers a defendant's youth," because "if a sentencer has discretion to consider the defendant's youth, the sentencer necessarily will consider the defendant's youth." 141 S. Ct. at 1319. We conclude the Court of Appeals interpretation of Miller cannot survive Jones.

When Williams committed his crimes, the base...