Salazar v. Torres

• Decision Date: 18 April 2007
• Docket Number: No. 29,476.,29,476.
• Citation: 158 P.3d 449,2007 NMSC 019
• Parties: Phillip SALAZAR, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Richard L. TORRES, individually and as owner and operator of Richard L. Torres Concrete Company, Defendant-Petitioner.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

158 P.3d 449

2007 NMSC 019

Phillip SALAZAR, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Richard L. TORRES, individually and as owner and operator of Richard L. Torres Concrete Company, Defendant-Petitioner.

No. 29,476.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

April 18, 2007.

Riley, Shane & Hale, P.A., Richard J. Shane, Susan R. Johnson, Albuquerque, for Petitioner.

Morris Law Firm, P.A., Kerry Morris, Albuquerque, Dunn Law Offices, Ralph Rodney O. Dunn III, Rio Rancho, for Respondent.

OPINION

BOSSON, Justice.

{1} We are asked to address a question left unanswered by this Court in Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148: When a worker is injured on the job and questions whether the injury was intentionally inflicted by the employer, must the worker forego all benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) while pursuing an intentional tort action under Delgado? Based on the clear intent of the Act, we conclude that the worker is not so constrained. However, we also conclude that when a worker enters into a final settlement of the workers' compensation claim in exchange for a lump-sum payment of indemnity benefits, then the worker may not proceed further with a Delgado claim. Because Phillip Salazar (Worker) asked for and received such a lump-sum payment, the district court correctly dismissed his Delgado action. The Court of Appeals having overturned the decision of the district court, we now reverse the Court of Appeals. See Salazar v. Torres, 2005-NMCA-127, 138 N.M. 510, 122 P.3d 1279.

BACKGROUND

{2} On April 16, 2001, during the course and scope of his employment with Richard L. Torres and Richard L. Torres Concrete Company (jointly, Employer), Worker was injured when Employer directed him to pour gasoline onto a truck carburetor while another employee was instructed simultaneously to start the truck. The gasoline ignited, causing first-degree burns to Worker's face and second- and third-degree burns to his arms and hands.

{3} Following his injury, Worker received workers' compensation benefits from Employer's insurer, including his medical expenses and weekly indemnity benefits of $213.33. See NMSA 1978, §§ 51-1-1 to -70 (as amended through 2005) (the Workers' Compensation Act). Then in November 2001, Worker filed for and received a partial lump-sum payment of $3,744.01 to pay debts accumulated during the course of his disability. See NMSA 1978, § 52-5-12(C) (2003). Worker subsequently filed another workers' compensation complaint for a lump-sum payment of permanent partial disability and attorney fees, as well as scheduled future medical benefits. On March 18, 2002, a mediator's recommended resolution gave Worker $11,000.00, representing all permanent partial disability and future indemnity benefits. Worker's medical benefits were left open so long as treatment was necessary. The agreement constituted a lump-sum payment under NMSA 1978, § 52-5-12(B) (2003) and was considered a complete resolution of Worker's compensation claim.

{4} Two days later, Worker filed a complaint in district court which alleged that these same injuries were caused by Employer's intentional, willful, and tortious misconduct similar to Delgado. Employer responded with a motion for summary judgment asserting that the benefits Worker had already received constituted his exclusive remedy. See § 52-1-9. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment for Employer. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed, with Judge Pickard specially concurring in part and dissenting in part. We granted certiorari to resolve residual issues remaining after this Court's ground-breaking opinion in Delgado; namely, whether and when a worker can receive benefits under the Act without compromising a potential intentional tort action under Delgado.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

{5} "Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1998-NMSC-046, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 396, 970 P.2d 582. Because "neither party argues that genuine issues of material fact exist," and our review is thus limited to that of a legal question, we "review the disposition of the summary judgment motion[] de novo." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Barker, 2004-NMCA-105, ¶ 4, 136 N.M. 211, 96 P.3d 336.

The Court of Appeals Opinion and the Law of Other Jurisdictions

{6} Employer argues that the exclusivity provision of the Act requires injured workers to forego any compensation benefits if pursuing, or contemplating the pursuit of, a tort claim for intentional injury. As both the Court of Appeals majority and dissent observe, there is a split in other jurisdictions regarding whether an injured worker can receive benefits and also pursue an intentional tort action. In those jurisdictions that allow a worker to receive workers' compensation benefits while pursuing an intentional tort claim, the analysis supporting the result is also divided. Some courts rely on classification of the injury as accidental, when seen from the worker's perspective, but also intentional and outside the Workers' Compensation Act when the intent requirement is examined from the employer's perspective. See Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222, 228, 233 (1991) (holding worker could receive both workers' compensation benefits and pursue a tort action because the injury could be classified as both accidental and intentional). Other jurisdictions rely heavily on legislative intent and policy underlying the workers' compensation laws. See Gagnard v. Baldridge, 612 So.2d 732, 735-36 (La.1993) (relying on the legislature's intent in enacting workers' compensation act and holding that worker could receive workers' compensation benefits while pursuing a separate tort action); Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 15 Ohio St.3d 90, 472 N.E.2d 1046, 1054-55 (1984) (stating that the policy behind the workers' compensation act is to protect employers from negligence, not intentional acts and thus, worker could receive workers' compensation benefits while also pursuing an intentional tort action).

{7} Contrary to the jurisdictions that hold that an injury can be classified as both intentional and accidental, those jurisdictions that bar workers from seeking both forms of redress assert that the event causing the injury cannot be classified as accidental in one forum and intentional in another. See Williams v. Delta Steel Corp., 695 N.E.2d 633, 637 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (holding worker could not receive workers' compensation benefits and then file a tort claim against employer because an injury cannot be both accidental and intentional); Medina v. Herrera, 927 S.W.2d 597, 600-01 (Tex.1996) (holding worker could not receive benefits under the workers' compensation act and then file a tort claim because worker was barred by the doctrine of election of remedies). See generally 6 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 102.03[2] (2006) [hereinafter Larson's] ("A successful [workers'] compensation claim will ordinarily bar a subsequent damage suit . . . ." (footnote omitted)).

{8} With regard to Worker's present claim, our Court of Appeals held that the injury could be characterized as both accidental from the worker's perspective (not self-inflicted or willful), and also intentional when evaluating the employer's conduct. Salazar, 2005-NMCA-127, ¶¶ 6, 17, 138 N.M. 510, 122 P.3d 1279. However, the distinction between accidental and intentional was not the primary thrust of the opinion. The majority's holding also relied on policy factors underlying the legislative intent behind the Act, and discussion of those factors in prior opinions of our respective courts. Id. ¶¶ 8-17; accord Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148; Eldridge v. Circle K Corp., 1997-NMCA-022, 123 N.M. 145, 934 P.2d 1074.

{9} Judge Pickard's dissent acknowledged the importance of policy, stating that "the real reason for holding one way or another on the issue at hand . . . should be one's views of the policy and philosophy behind the Workers' Compensation Act." Salazar, 2005-NMCA-127, ¶ 34, 138 N.M. 510, 122 P.3d 1279 (Pickard, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part). We agree. Considerations of policy and philosophy that inform the legislative intent behind the Act are vital to our resolution of the issue before us. Accordingly, we turn our discussion to those policy considerations and how they affect Worker's Delgado claim.

The Policy and Philosophy of the Act

{10} One policy factor of great concern is that any judicial analysis under the Act must balance equally the interests of the worker and the employer without showing bias or favoritism toward either. NMSA 1978, § 52-5-1 (1990) (The Act is not to be construed "in favor of the claimant or employee on the one hand, nor are the rights and interests of the employer to be favored over those of the employee on the other hand."). The legislature has spoken clearly that the Act is designed to afford "benefits to both workers and employers." Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034, ¶ 12, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148.

{11} Recognizing that evenhandedness, the Act makes workers' compensation benefits the worker's exclusive remedy for all accidental injuries. Section 52-1-9; see also § 52-1-6(E) ("The Workers' Compensation Act provides exclusive remedies."); Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034, ¶ 12, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148 ("The employer . . . is assured that a worker accidentally injured, even by the employer's own negligence, will be limited to compensation under the Act and may not pursue the unpredictable damages available outside its boundaries."). The worker's benefit, on the other hand, is the receipt of "compensation quickly, without having to endure the rigors of litigation or prove fault on behalf of the employer." Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034, ¶ 12, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148. Thus, the balance struck between...