Salce v. State
| Citation | 184 A.D.3d 1037,126 N.Y.S.3d 780 |
| Decision Date | 25 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | 528685 |
| Parties | Lydia–Ann SALCE, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Respondent. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court Appellate Division |
184 A.D.3d 1037
126 N.Y.S.3d 780
Lydia–Ann SALCE, Appellant,
v.
STATE of New York, Respondent.
528685
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.
Decided and Entered: June 25, 2020
Calendar Date: May 20, 2020
David A. Harper, Saratoga Springs, for appellant.
Letitia James, Attorney General, Albany (Dustin J. Brockner of counsel), for respondent.
Before: Garry, P.J., Egan Jr., Mulvey, Devine and Colangelo, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Egan Jr., J.
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims (Collins, J.), entered October 25, 2018, upon a decision of the court following a bifurcated trial in favor of defendant on the issue of liability.
During the early morning hours of August 11, 2011, claimant and her husband, Michael McKee, engaged in a physical altercation at their residence during which McKee was stabbed numerous times. Claimant was thereafter indicted for attempted murder in the second degree, two counts of assault in the first degree and two counts of assault in the second degree and, following a jury trial, was convicted of attempted murder in the second degree and two counts of assault in the first degree and sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 16 years on all three counts plus a period of postrelease supervision. Claimant appealed, and this Court reversed the judgment of conviction, finding that, although her convictions were supported by legally sufficient evidence and the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence, claimant was entitled to a new trial as the trial court improperly precluded the testimony of her expert witness and provided the jury an improper charge on the defense of justification ( People v. Salce, 124 A.D.3d 923, 926, 1 N.Y.S.3d 417 [2015], lv denied 25 N.Y.3d 1207, 16 N.Y.S.3d 529, 37 N.E.3d 1172 [2015] ). In 2015, a second jury trial was conducted on the same charges, following which claimant was acquitted on all counts. As a result of her initial conviction, claimant was incarcerated from September 4, 2012 through January 13, 2015.
In July 2015, claimant commenced this action pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 8–b, seeking compensation for her unjust conviction and wrongful imprisonment. Following a bench trial on the issue of liability only, the Court of Claims dismissed the claim, fining that claimant failed to establish her innocence by clear and convincing evidence. Claimant appeals.
To prevail on a claim for unjust conviction and imprisonment pursuant to Court of Claims § 8–b, it was claimant's burden "to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) [she] was convicted of one or more felonies or misdemeanors, sentenced to a prison term and that [she] served all or a part of the term, (2) [her] conviction was reversed [and a new trial was ordered, and she was found not guilty at the new trial], (3) [she] did not commit any of the acts charged in the accusatory instrument, and (4) [she] did not cause or bring about [her] own conviction" ( Romero v. State of New York, 294 A.D.2d 730, 732–733, 742 N.Y.S.2d 701 [2002], appeal dismissed 98 N.Y.2d 727, 749 N.Y.S.2d 476, 779 N.E.2d 187 [2002], lv denied 99 N.Y.2d 503, 753 N.Y.S.2d 806, 783 N.E.2d 896 [2002] ; see Court of Claims Act § 8–b [5] ; Ivey v. State of New York, 80 N.Y.2d 474, 479, 591 N.Y.S.2d 969, 606 N.E.2d 1360 [1992] ). "The linchpin of the statute is innocence" ( Ivey v. State of New York, 80 N.Y.2d at 479, 591 N.Y.S.2d 969, 606 N.E.2d 1360 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ), as an acquittal, in and of itself, is not tantamount to a finding of innocence; it only demonstrates that the People failed to meet their burden
of proving claimant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial (see Reed v. State of New York, 78 N.Y.2d 1, 7–8, 571 N.Y.S.2d 195, 574 N.E.2d 433 [1991] ). Thus, to meet her burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence of her innocence, claimant had to demonstrate that "the evidence makes it highly probable that what [she] claims is what actually happened" ( N.Y. PJI 1:64 ; see Matter of Duane II, [Andrew II.], 151 A.D.3d 1129, 1130–1131, 56 N.Y.S.3d 360 [2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 918, 2017 WL 4015064 [2017] ), with said evidence being
"neither equivocal nor open to opposing presumptions" ( Solomon v. State of New York, 146 A.D.2d 439, 440, 541 N.Y.S.2d 384 [1989] ; see Reed v. State of New York, 78 N.Y.2d at 9, 571 N.Y.S.2d 195, 574 N.E.2d 433 ; Alexandre v. State of New York, 168 A.D.2d 472, 472, 563 N.Y.S.2d 635 [1990], appeal dismissed 77 N.Y.2d 925, 569 N.Y.S.2d 603, 572 N.E.2d 44 [1991] ).
Claimant provided documentary proof demonstrating that she was convicted of multiple felonies, sentenced to a period of incarceration and served a portion thereof before her conviction was overturned, a new trial ordered and she was acquitted of all counts following the second trial. Accordingly, the first two elements of her claim were satisfied. The issue, therefore, distills to whether claimant presented clear and convincing evidence establishing that she was innocent of the crimes for which she was charged.
The evidence at trial established that, following claimant's marriage to McKee in February 2011, their relationship started to deteriorate in the spring of 2011 after McKee began drinking heavily and associating with a motorcycle club known as Prisoners of Fate. On August 2, 2011, claimant locked McKee out of their house and called the police after he had returned home drunk and purportedly threatened her; however, no charges were ever filed as a result of this incident. On the morning of August 10, 2011, claimant went to work and two of her coworkers recounted that claimant appeared upset and angry and she told them that, if she did not talk to a psychiatrist soon, she was "going to kill [McKee]." Later that same day, claimant met up with a friend to go for a walk and, according to the friend, claimant was angry and upset with McKee, indicated that she wanted to "beat [him] up" and spent the majority of their two-hour walk discussing her relationship issues before returning home. McKee, meanwhile, spent the afternoon and early evening of August 10, 2011 at a barbeque with members of his motorcycle club. At approximately 10:15 p.m., McKee caught a ride home with one of his friends and, as they pulled into claimant's driveway, claimant exited the house and started yelling and screaming at both McKee and his friend. McKee and his friend left the residence but McKee returned sometime after midnight on August 11, 2011. After
claimant ultimately let McKee back inside the house, the two began...
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