Sallee v. Barrett

• Decision Date: 13 September 2005
• Citation: 171 S.W.3d 822
• Parties: Thomas SALLEE v. Tyler BARRETT.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 822

171 S.W.3d 822

Thomas SALLEE v. Tyler BARRETT.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville.

June 8, 2005 Session.

September 13, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David William Haines, Jr., Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Tyler Barrett.

Phillip Leon Davidson, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Thomas Sallee.

James Russell Farrar and Mary Byrd Ferrara, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Amicus Curiae, Tennessee Municipal League Risk Management Pool.

OPINION

WILLIAM M. BARKER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C.J., and E. RILEY ANDERSON and JANICE M. HOLDER, JJ., joined. ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., J., not participating.

This appeal arises from a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendant, a police officer, accidently discharged his gun while standing behind the plaintiff, startling the plaintiff. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, concluding that the defendant was immune from suit pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-310(b) (2000). The trial court also denied the plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint to add the City of Clarksville as a defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that section 29-20-205(2), which retained immunity for governmental entities for the "infliction of mental anguish"¹ caused by its employee applied to both negligent, as well as intentional infliction of mental anguish. We reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's order granting the motion to dismiss in favor of the defendant. With regard to the plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying that motion, as the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.03 were not met.

I. Factual Background

On April 3, 2002, the plaintiff, Thomas Sallee ("Sallee"), was standing at the counter of an Amoco station located at 601 Riverside Drive in Clarksville, Tennessee. The defendant, Tyler Barrett ("Barrett"), a police officer employed by the City of Clarksville, was also inside the Amoco station, standing several feet behind Sallee. While Sallee was talking to the station's clerk, Barrett placed his hand on his weapon, which was located in its holster. The weapon discharged suddenly and unexpectedly, and the bullet struck the floor near Barrett's right foot.

Sallee filed a complaint against Barrett for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Sallee alleged that Barrett was negligent in failing to maintain his weapon in its holster in such a safe, secure manner as to not have it discharge in public; that the gun's discharge was "loud, startling and unexpected;" and that as a direct and proximate cause of Barrett's negligence, Sallee suffered severe and permanent emotional distress and post-traumatic stress disorder. Sallee did not file suit against Barrett's employer, the City of Clarksville.

Barrett filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). Barrett argued that he was immune from suit pursuant to the provisions of the Governmental Tort Liability Act ("GTLA"), Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-20-101 et seq. It was his position that the City of Clarksville was the proper party because governmental entities are subject to liability for the negligent acts of its employees, and there is no exception for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Sallee countered that one of the exceptions to the general waiver of immunity for negligent acts is for "infliction of mental anguish," Tennessee Code Annotated 29-20-205(2) (2000), and this includes both negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. As such, the City of Clarksville would be immune from suit for negligent infliction of emotional distress caused by its employees, making Barrett the proper party to this lawsuit. Sallee also filed a motion to amend his complaint to add the City of Clarksville as a defendant.

Barrett's motion to dismiss was heard by the trial court on June 5, 2003. The court granted the motion to dismiss by order dated June 30, 2003. The trial court concluded that under the provisions of the GTLA, Barrett was immune from suit. Specifically, the court cited to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-205, which removes governmental immunity for injuries proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of its employee. Under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-310, if the immunity of a governmental entity is removed, the employee is immune from suit. The court also held that Sallee's request to amend his complaint to substitute the City of Clarksville as a party defendant would be "futile" because such an amendment would not relate back to the original date of the filing of Sallee's complaint.

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that:

[T]he legislature intended to include both negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress in this exception to the removal of a governmental entity's immunity. Since the City of Clarksville is immune from suit for the negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from its employee's negligent act, under T.C.A. § 29-20-310(b), Barrett is the proper Defendant in this suit.

Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing the case based on Barrett's immunity. The Court of Appeals did not address the issue of whether Sallee should have been allowed to amend his complaint to add the City of Clarksville as a defendant because this issue was pretermitted by its decision to reverse the trial court's grant of Barrett's motion to dismiss.

We granted review to determine whether governmental entities are immune from liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

II. Standard of Review

The construction of statutes and application of the law to the facts of a case are questions of law. See State v. Jennings, 130 S.W.3d 43, 45 (Tenn.2004); State v. Jackson, 60 S.W.3d 738, 742 (Tenn.2001). Accordingly, the standard of appellate review is de novo without any presumption of correctness given to the lower courts' conclusions of law. Jennings, 130 S.W.3d at 45; Jackson, 60 S.W.3d at 742.

The grant or denial of a motion to amend is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the court's action will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. See Doyle v. Frost, 49 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tenn.2001); Henderson v. Bush Bros. & Co., 868 S.W.2d 236, 237-38 (Tenn.1993).

III. Analysis

A. Barrett's Motion to Dismiss

The primary issue in this case is whether "infliction of mental anguish," as used in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-205(2) (2000), encompasses both the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress as well as the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. If both torts are included in the statutory language, then the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that Barrett was the proper party defendant. On the other hand, if the words as used in the statute include only the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, then the trial court was correct in holding that the City of Clarksville, and not officer Barrett, was the proper party defendant.

We begin our analysis by noting that historically, governmental entities have been held immune from suit absent their express waiver of that immunity. See Limbaugh v. Coffee Med. Ctr., 59 S.W.3d 73, 79 (Tenn.2001). In 1973, the General Assembly enacted the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA), which waived in part the immunity previously afforded to governmental entities. 1973 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch 345, codified at Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-20-101 et seq. (2000). Specifically, section 29-20-205 removes immunity "for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of any employee within the scope of his employment...." Where immunity has been waived, such as for the negligent acts of governmental employees, the governmental entity is the proper party-defendant. In such circumstances, the employee is, by statute, immune from suit. Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-20-310(b) (2000).

While generally waiving governmental immunity for the negligent acts committed by employees of governmental entities, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-205(2) (2000) specifically preserves immunity from claims arising out of "false imprisonment pursuant to a mittimus from a court, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, invasion of right of privacy, or civil rights." (Emphasis added.) Therefore, our task in this case is to determine whether the legislature intended to preserve immunity for claims arising out of negligent infliction of emotional distress as well as the intentional infliction of emotional distress.

To assist in our interpretation of the statute, it is helpful to review the historical underpinnings and emergence of claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Historically, courts denied recovery where the defendant's negligence caused mental disturbance without accompanying physical injury or physical consequences, or without other independent basis for tort liability. See, e.g., Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn.1982); Medlin v. Allied Inv. Co., 217 Tenn. 469, 398 S.W.2d 270 (1966) abrogated by Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn.1996); Bowers v. Colonial Stages Interstate Transit, Inc., 163 Tenn. 502, 43 S.W.2d 497 (1931) abrogated by Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn.1996); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436 cmt. c (1965).

Over the years, this Court has carved out exceptions to the general rule, allowing recovery for mental disturbance alone in certain limited circumstances. For example, in Hill v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 154 Tenn. 295, 294 S.W. 1097 (1...