Salo v. Pacific Coast Cas. Co.

• Decision Date: 26 February 1917
• Docket Number: 13831.
• Citation: 163 P. 384,95 Wash. 109
• Parties: SALO v. PACIFIC COAST CASUALTY CO.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

163 P. 384

95 Wash. 109

SALO v. PACIFIC COAST CASUALTY CO.

No. 13831.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

February 26, 1917

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Gilliam, Judge.

Action by Sigrid Salo against Pacific Coast Casualty Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Mount Morris, Chadwick, and Fullerton, JJ., dissenting.

Geo McKay and Henry S. Noon, both of Seattle, for appellant.

Crowder & Crowder, of Seattle, for respondent.

MAIN J.

The purpose of this action was to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff, Sigrid Salo, when a jitney bus, in which she was a passenger, collided with an antomobile, at the intersection of Twenty-Third avenue and Union street, in the city of Seattle. In the same accident four other persons were injured, and each brought a separate action for the recovery of damages. In each case recovery was sought against the owner and operator of the jitney bus, and the surety upon the bond required under Laws of 1915, p. 227, c. 57 (Rem. Code, § 5562-37 [95 Wash. 110] et seq.). In each of the five cases the surety company filed an answer, setting up, as an affirmative defense, the pendency of the other four cases stating the amount of damages claimed in each, and alleging that the limit of liability, as against it, was the penalty mentioned in the bond. By stipulation, the five cases were tried together, but were not consolidated as one action. The evidence as to liability was the same in the several causes. The surety company requested the trial court to charge the jury that the limit of its liability was the sum of $2,500, and that the sum of the verdicts, if any, in favor of the plaintiffs, must not exceed this sum as against it, and, if the jury should return a verdict for two or more of the plaintiffs, and the sum of those verdicts should exceed the sum of $2,500, that then the $2,500 should be distributed between the plaintiffs in whose favor the jury found. This instruction the court declined to give, and the jury were told that, if they found in favor of any of the plaintiffs, the verdict must be against all of the defendants, including the Pacific Coast Casualty Company, the surety. In this case, the jury returned a verdict for $3,700. In the other four cases, the verdicts were, respectively, $100, $1,500, $200, and $500. In the cases in which the verdicts were $100, $1,500, and $200, the court entered a judgment against the bonding company for the amount of each verdict. In this case, the amount of the verdict was $3,700, and judgment was entered against the bonding company for $2,500. In the case in which the verdict was $500, a new trial was granted. The defendant surety company appeals from the judgment entered against it in this case, and from the judgment in each of the other cases.

With the exception of the case in which a new trial was granted, the question to be determined is the same in each case. That question is: Is the surety company liable to each person injured, to the extent of $2,500, the amount of the penalty in the bond, provided the verdict equals, or exceeds, this sum, or is the surety company only liable to the extent of $2,500, even though the verdicts against the principal defendant should aggregate a greater sum? In other words, is the surety liable to each person injured, individually, to the extent of the amount of the penalty named in the bond, provided the verdict equals, or exceeds, this sum, or is the $2,500 penalty the extent of the liability, no matter how many persons may be injured, or the amount of the respective verdicts that they may recover?

Much discussion is found in the briefs over the question whether a surety can be held liable for a greater amount than the penalty named in the bond. There is a line of cases which hold that, where the action is brought upon a covenant found in the bond, and is not brought for the penalty, which at common law would have been an action of debt, the recovery may exceed the amount of the penalty. It is unnecessary to review these cases, as they are not here applicable. In this case, the action against the surety company is not upon a covenant in the bond other than the stipulated penalty. If the bond in this case does not furnish protection to each individual injured, to the extent of the penalty named, then the judgment should be reversed. On the other hand, if it was the intention of the statute, under which the bond is given, to furnish protection to each individual injured, to the extent of the penalty named in the bond, then the judgment should be affirmed. In a statutory bond, in order to determine the extent of the liability, the provisions of the act under which the bond is given are read into, and become a part of, such bond. Snohomish County v. Ruff, 15 Wash. 637, 47 P. 35, 441; Davis v. Virges, 39 Wash. 256, 81 P. 688; KalbGlibert Lumber Co. v. Cram, 60 Wash. 664, 111 P. 1050; Denny-Renton Clay & Coal Co. v. National Surety Co., 160 P. 1.

Over this proposition there seems to be no controversy, but there is controversy touching the meaning of the statute. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the provisions of the statute and declare its meaning. The act is one relating to, and regulating, common carriers of passengers upon public streets, roads, and highways, and providing for the issuance of permits. Laws of 1915, page 227 (Rem. Code, § 5562-37 et seq.).

Section 1 ( Id. § 5562-37) of the act provides that it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation, other than a steam, street, or interurban railway company, to engage in or carry on the business of carrying or transporting passengers for hire in any motor-propelled vehicle along any public street, road, or highway, within the corporate limits of any city of the first class, 'without having first obtained a permit so to do as hereinafter provided. * * *'

Section 2 ( Id. § 5562-38) provides that every person, firm, or corporation, other than a steam, street, or interurban railway company, desiring to engage in the business of carrying or transporting passengers for hire in any motor-propelled vehicle over or along any public street, road, or highway in any city of the first class, and every street or interurban railway or other transportation company desiring to engage in the business of transporting passengers for hire in any motor-propelled vehicle except street cars, 'shall apply to the secretary of state for a permit so to do, and such applicant for each motor vehicle intended to be so operated shall deposit and keep on file with the secretary of state a bond running to the state of Washington in the penal sum of twenty-five hundred dollars * * * conditioned for the faithful compliance by the principal of said bond with the provisions of this act and to pay all damages which may be sustained by any person injured by reason of any careless, negligent or unlawful act on the part of said principal, his agents or employés in the conduct of said business or in the operation of any motor-propelled vehicle used in transporting passengers for hire. * * *' This section further requires that there shall be paid to the secretary of state a fee of $5, and thereupon a license shall be issued to the applicant.

Section 3 provides that:

'Every person injured by any careless, negligent or unlawful act of any person, firm or corporation receiving a permit under the provisions of this act, * * * shall have a cause of action against the principal and surety upon the bond provided for in the preceding section for all damages sustained and in any such action the full amount of damages sustained may be recovered against the principal, but the recovery against the surety shall be limited to the amount of the bond. * * *' Id. § 5562-39.

The controversy here is over the meaning of the excerpt quoted from section 3. It is a familiar canon of construction that in determining the meaning of a word, clause, or sentence, appearing in a statute, all the provisions of the act, so far as they may throw any light upon the construction of the particular word, clause, or sentence involved, shall be considered. In this statute we find nothing in the preceding or the subsequent sections which would tend to show a legislative intent to give a meaning to the sentence quoted from section 3 other than the language there used would indicate. If the clause, 'but the recovery against the surety shall be limited to the amount of the bond,' were removed from its setting, and considered as standing alone, it may be that its proper construction would be to limit the liability upon the bond to the amount of $2,500, no matter how many persons may have been injured, or the aggregate amount of the verdicts which they had obtained. But it should be noted that this clause is the concluding...