Salt Lake Child and Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 940175

• Decision Date: 01 February 1995
• Docket Number: No. 940175,940175
• Citation: 890 P.2d 1017
• Parties: SALT LAKE CHILD AND FAMILY THERAPY CLINIC, INC., Petitioner, v. The Honorable J. Dennis FREDERICK, Respondent.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 1017

890 P.2d 1017

SALT LAKE CHILD AND FAMILY THERAPY CLINIC, INC., Petitioner, v. The Honorable J. Dennis FREDERICK, Respondent.

No. 940175.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Feb. 1, 1995.

Ross C. Anderson, Kate A. Toomey, Salt Lake City, for petitioner.

Colin R. Winchester, Brent M. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for respondent.

H. Wayne Wadsworth, Salt Lake City, for Moriarty.

Denton M. Hatch, Dale J. Lambert, Karra J. Porter, Salt Lake City, for Harper Excavating.

AMENDED OPINION

RUSSON, Justice:

Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B(e)(2)(A), Salt Lake Child and Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. (the Clinic), filed a petition for extraordinary relief against the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, challenging his denial of its motion for a protective order concerning allegedly privileged information. We grant the petition.

I. FACTS

In the underlying case, Moriarty v. Harper Excavating, Inc., ¹ Mary Moriarty filed an action against Harper Excavating, Inc. (Harper), alleging that she sustained "severe, permanent physical injuries which have caused her to suffer great physical pain, emotional upset and emotional anguish and permanent partial disability and impairment of bodily functions" as a result of an automobile accident for which Harper is liable. Among other claims, Moriarty asserted that she had received a significant brain injury manifested by memory loss, dizziness, diminished attention span, partial loss of cognitive skills, blurred vision, sensitivity to light, inability to organize, headaches, depression, and other symptoms. Harper sought discovery as to Moriarty's injuries and requested that she execute a release by which her medical records could be obtained. She refused, and Harper moved to compel her to execute a release of any records relating to "the condition of [her] health, observation or treatment, including medical and work histories." The trial court granted Harper's motion, and Moriarty executed the release. Pursuant to the release, Harper sought to acquire from the Clinic all records related to counseling obtained by Moriarty. The Clinic, however, refused to produce such records, arguing that the information was privileged and that such privilege could not be waived under Utah Code Ann. § 58-39-10 (1994). That section provides that "[a]ny communication between the marriage and family therapist and the person treated is privileged and confidential. Its secrecy shall always be preserved and this privilege is not subject to waiver" and then lists four exceptions to this general rule. The Clinic subsequently moved for a protective order, but the trial court denied the same.

The Clinic filed this petition for extraordinary relief pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B(e)(2)(A), ² challenging the trial court's denial of the Clinic's motion for a protective order on the ground that the plain language of section 58-39-10 prohibits waiver of the privilege against disclosure of the allegedly privileged information to Harper. Harper responds that (1) section 58-39-10 prohibits waiver of the privilege against disclosure by marriage and family therapists only, not by clients, and (2) the Mental Health Professional Practice Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-60-101 to -406 (Supp.1994), which was passed while this case was pending before this court and which repeals section 58-39-10, should be applied to the facts in this case.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B(e)(4) provides, "Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, the court's review shall not extend further than to determine whether the respondent has regularly pursued its authority." Since the issue here involves the interpretation and application of a statute, the trial court's legal conclusion is granted no particular deference but is reviewed for correctness. Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990); State ex rel. Div. of Consumer Protection v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Mental Health Professional Practice Act

As an initial matter, we address Harper's claim that recent changes to Title 58 of the Utah Code should be applied to the present case. In March 1994, the Utah legislature enacted the Mental Health Professional Practice Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-60-101 to -406 (Supp.1994). This act overhauled various statutes concerning mental health professionals such as clinical social workers, certified social workers, social service workers, and marriage and family therapists. It did so by systematizing previously divergent sections of the code addressing the mental health practices of these professionals into a comprehensive, organized scheme in one chapter. It further repealed Utah Code Ann. § 58-39-10 (1994) and replaced it with a new section, Utah Code Ann. § 58-60-114, effective July 1, 1994, under which the communications between Moriarty and the Clinic would not be subject to privilege in this matter. Harper contends that because the new act became effective prior to disclosure of the allegedly privileged information in the present case, it should be applied here.

There is a general presumption under Utah law that statutes are not to be applied retroactively unless there is an express provision to the contrary. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (stating that "[n]o part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared"); National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 912 (Utah 1993) (holding that "[a]s a general rule, amendments to statutes are not retroactive").

Harper makes two arguments to rebut this general presumption. First, it argues that while the communications in question occurred under the old statute, the relevant point in time for the application of the current section 58-60-114 is not the point at which the communication took place, but rather the point at which the communication is to be disclosed. For support of this position, Harper relies upon Doe v. American National Red Cross, 790 F.Supp. 590, 591-92 (D.S.C.1992) (holding that "the appropriate time frame ... is when [the interested party] is seeking to gain access" to allegedly privileged information), and Scott v. McDonald, 70 F.R.D. 568, 573 (N.D.Ga.1976) (holding that "[t]he applicability and availability of a privilege should be governed by the current law in force at the time of trial and not at the time the alleged confidential communication took place"). Such reliance, however, is misplaced. The issue in both Doe and Scott concerned the extension of a privilege where it had not previously existed, not, as in the present case, the restriction of a privilege upon which a party had previously relied. Therefore, unlike the present case, no substantive right to have communications which had been conducted under an expectation of confidentiality kept private was implicated in either of those two cases. Moreover, both cases involved situations in which the statute allegedly being applied retroactively had been enacted after the communication but before the court action had been commenced. Thus, when the plaintiffs filed suit, they did so under notice that certain potential evidence was subject to privilege. In the instant case, however, the action had been commenced, discovery begun, the protective order applied for, and the denial of that order appealed, all under the previous statute. Clearly, to apply section 58-60-114 to the action at this point would be to do so retroactively.

Second, Harper argues that even if section 58-60-114 is being applied retroactively, such application is proper because the privilege created by this section is procedural. Insofar as section 58-60-114 has been designed to keep relevant and otherwise admissible information from being withheld from civil and criminal court proceedings, it is procedural. However, under Utah law, only procedural statutes "which do not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights" may be applied retroactively. Board of Equalization v. Utah State Tax Comm'n ex rel. Benchmark, Inc., 864 P.2d 882, 884 (Utah 1993) (quoting Pilcher v. State, 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983)). Because section 58-60-114 affects Moriarty's vested right to have her communications with the Clinic, conducted under an expectation of confidentiality, kept private, it cannot be applied retroactively. ³ Accordingly, we turn to an analysis of the Clinic's claim of privilege under the former statute, Utah Code Ann. § 58-39-10 (1994).

B. Section 58-39-10

The Clinic asserts that it is forbidden to produce Moriarty's records, arguing that such information is protected by an unwaivable privilege outlined in the opening paragraph of Utah Code Ann. § 58-39-10 (1994). Harper responds that because the statute is designed to protect clients' rights, the prohibitions against waiver contained therein apply only to marriage and family therapists, not to the clients themselves, and since Moriarty signed a release, disclosure of her records in the present case is permitted.

In the interpretation of statutory language, we are guided by the principle that statutes are generally construed according to their plain language. Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989); accord Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988). Moreover, "[u]nambiguous language in the statute may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning." Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989) (per curiam). Pursuant to these principles, when reviewing a statute, we "assume[ ] that each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable." Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991). The reason for such an approach is plain: "We must be guided by the law as it is.... When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for...