Salt Lake City v. Davidson

• Decision Date: 27 January 2000
• Docket Number: No. 981508-CA.,981508-CA.
• Citation: 2000 Utah Ct. App. 012,994 P.2d 1283
• Parties: SALT LAKE CITY, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Steven DAVIDSON, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

994 P.2d 1283

2000 Utah Ct. App. 012

SALT LAKE CITY, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Steven DAVIDSON, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 981508-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

January 27, 2000.

David S. Kottler, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.

Richard W. Daynes, Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

Before GREENWOOD, P.J., and BENCH and WILKINS, JJ.¹

OPINION

GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge:

¶ 1 Defendant Steven Davidson appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence and subsequent conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Code § 11.20.040.² We reverse.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 "In reviewing the trial court's ruling, we recite the facts in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings." State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1230 (Utah 1996).

¶ 3 On April 11, 1998, Officer Alvin Hedenstrom of the Salt Lake City Police Department was dispatched to 1129 Third Avenue on a report of a possible heroin overdose. Upon arrival, Officer Hedenstrom found paramedics and firefighters attending to an unconscious man who was lying face up on the kitchen floor. Defendant was also present in the kitchen.

¶ 4 When Officer Hedenstrom entered the kitchen, paramedics immediately asked him to remove defendant. Officer Hedenstrom complied and took defendant to an adjacent room where he obtained defendant's name and date of birth. Next, Officer Hedenstrom asked defendant for his address, which defendant refused to provide. Defendant stated that he and the unconscious man did not live at the house. As Officer Hedenstrom was trying to determine where defendant lived, a paramedic yelled to Hedenstrom to ask defendant what drug the unconscious man had taken. Defendant refused to give any such information. He also refused to explain why he and the unconscious man were at the residence or answer the officer's question about the location of the homeowner.

¶ 5 When defendant remained uncooperative, Officer Hedenstrom demanded to see his identification, which, after several requests, defendant produced. At this time Officer Hedenstrom performed a cursory search of the premises for drugs or drug paraphernalia. The search did not yield any information to help the unconscious man. Officer Hedenstrom then told defendant that he was obstructing the officer's efforts to help the unconscious man. Defendant responded that he had rights and did not have to answer the officer's questions. Officer Hedenstrom then proceeded to arrest, handcuff, and search defendant. This search yielded a marijuana pipe and marijuana. Officer Hedenstrom testified that he searched defendant because it was standard procedure to search someone upon arrest and because he was hoping to find the drug paraphernalia used by the unconscious man so he could identify the substance the man had taken.

¶ 6 Defendant was charged with, among other things,³ possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Code § 11.20.040. He moved to suppress the marijuana and drug paraphernalia under both article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution on the grounds that Officer Hedenstrom conducted an unlawful warrantless search. The trial court denied the motion, stating the warrantless search was justified under the emergency aid doctrine. Specifically, the trial court determined the search was justified by the need to determine on what substance the unconscious man had overdosed. In its ruling, the trial court stated that although no probable cause existed to search defendant, the emergency aid doctrine did not require a determination of probable cause. Defendant subsequently entered, and the trial court accepted, a conditional plea of guilty to the charge, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. See Utah R. Crim P. 11(i); Sery, 758 P.2d at 937-38. Defendant appeals.

¶ 7 On appeal, defendant raises a single substantive issue: Did the trial court correctly rule that the warrantless search of defendant's person was justified under the emergency aid doctrine? Assuming we apply this doctrine, defendant argues the exception does not apply in this case because: (1) the officer was primarily motivated by his intent to arrest and seize evidence, in violation of the doctrine; (2) probable cause is required under this doctrine, and the trial court found probable cause was not present; and (3) this exception is limited to searches of persons who themselves are in need of medical attention, not bystanders.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8 We review the factual findings underlying the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress under a clearly erroneous standard. See State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah 1996)

. We will determine there was clear error "only if the factual findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the record." Id. By contrast, we review "the trial court's conclusions of law based on such facts under a correctness standard, according no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions." Id.

EMERGENCY AID SEARCH

¶ 9 Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, searches conducted without warrants "`are per se unreasonable... subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)).⁴ One such exception to the warrant requirement recognized by both the United States Supreme Court and Utah's appellate courts is exigent circumstances. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)

; State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 921 (Utah Ct.App.1995).

¶ 10 The emergency aid doctrine, sometimes referred to as the medical emergency doctrine, is a variant of the exigent circumstances doctrine. See Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Lawfulness of Search of Person or Personal Effects under Medical Emergency Exception to Warrant Requirement, 11 A.L.R. 5th 52, § 2[a] (1993). Bateman describes the emergency aid doctrine as follows:

The medical emergency exception will support a warrantless search of a person or personal effects when [a] person is found in an unconscious or semiconscious condition and the purpose of the search is to discover evidence of identification and other information that might enhance the prospect of administering appropriate medical assistance, and the rationale is that the need to protect life or avoid serious injury to another is paramount to the rights of privacy....

Id. Several courts have also applied the emergency aid doctrine when a person is missing and feared to be injured or dead. See, e.g., People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607 (1976)

. Whether an emergency exists is fact intensive and the state has the burden "to prove that the exigencies of the situation make the course imperative." Annotation, 11 A.L.R. 5th, § 2[a] at 60.

¶ 11 The emergency aid doctrine has not been specifically adopted or applied by a majority opinion of either of Utah's appellate courts, but was endorsed in a concurring opinion in State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 550 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (Greenwood, J., concurring in result). However, in Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah Ct.App. 1992), this court approved the closely related community caretaker doctrine under which a seizure does not violate the Fourth Amendment if certain criteria are satisfied.⁵ In that case, a police stop of an automobile was declared lawful because the officer reasonably believed the motorist was contemplating suicide. See id. at 364-66.⁶ The community caretaker doctrine and the emergency aid doctrine are based on similar rationales, as noted by the Kansas Court of Appeals, which, in endorsing the emergency aid doctrine, stated that the doctrine "reflects a recognition that the police perform a community caretaking function which goes beyond fighting crime." State v. Jones, 24 Kan. App.2d 405, 947 P.2d 1030, 1034 (1997).

¶ 12 In Yoder, the concurring opinion advocated adopting a test for application of the emergency aid doctrine similar to that set forth in Mitchell, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246,347 N.E.2d at 609. Pursuant to that test, a warrantless search is lawful under the emergency aid doctrine if the following requirements are met:

(1) Police have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency exists and believe there is an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life.

(2) The search is not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence.

(3) There is some reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched. That is, there must be a connection with the area to be searched and the emergency.

Yoder, 935 P.2d at 550 (Greenwood, J., concurring in result). The Mitchell three-prong test has been followed by "[s]everal states, including Alaska, Arizona, Illinois, Nebraska, and North Dakota ... and it is often cited with approval by legal commentators." Jones, 947 P.2d at 1037; see also State v. Cheers, 79 Ohio App.3d 322, 607 N.E.2d 115, 117-18 (1992)

(approving emergency doctrine but stating search illegal because no reasonable basis to believe emergency situation existed).

¶ 13 We believe the emergency aid doctrine is sound and consistent with case law from both the United States Supreme Court and our own supreme court. It validates and encourages law enforcement personnel to engage in activities that promote the safety and well-being of the citizens and also includes reasonable restrictions to avoid abuses. Therefore, we turn to the facts of this case and apply the Mitchell test as enunciated in the Yoder concurring opinion.

¶ 14 Defendant argues, among other things, that the third element is lacking in this case. Defendant asserts that the third...