State v. Rynhart
| Decision Date | 28 November 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 20020760-CA.,20020760-CA. |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Tanja RYNHART, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
James M. Retallick, Public Defenders Association, Ogden, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, and Marian Decker, Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before DAVIS, GREENWOOD, and THORNE, JJ.
¶ 1 Tanja Rynhart appeals from a trial court order denying her motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search of her vehicle. We reverse.
¶ 2 On the morning of January 6, 2002, Officer Robert Burnham of the Brigham City Police Department received a dispatch call requesting investigation of an abandoned or wrecked vehicle. Burnham responded to the call at approximately 8:30 a.m. Upon arriving at the location of the vehicle, Burnham discovered that the vehicle had "traveled over the curb, down an embankment, [and] through two fences," before coming to rest in a "marsh" or "swamp." Burnham also discovered that the tire tracks leading to the vehicle were covered with snow. Because Burnham recalled that "[i]t had snowed as recently as 3:00" a.m., he determined that the accident had occurred at some point prior to that time.
¶ 3 As Burnham approached the vehicle, he saw that it had a license plate, but he did not attempt to identify the owner of the vehicle by using the license plate number. Burnham entered the unlocked vehicle and discovered that there was no one inside. At the May 29, 2002 preliminary hearing, Burnham testified that his purpose for entering the vehicle was to "[t]ry to find out the identity of the owner, the driver, and if anybody was in the vehicle at all." However, at the July 22, 2002 hearing on the motion to suppress, Burnham admitted that he performed a "very thorough search" of the vehicle, and testified that he "opened all the doors" and "looked under the seats." He testified that there were "quite a number of items in the vehicle," but admitted that he did not inventory all of the vehicle's contents. Burnham indicated that he was "primarily concerned with" finding and retrieving any "jewelry," "money," or "valuables" that may have been left in the vehicle.
¶ 4 In his search of the vehicle, Burnham found a partially full bottle of vodka in the console between the two front seats, a briefcase on the front passenger seat, and a purse on the floor near the front passenger seat. He searched through the purse and the briefcase to determine their contents. Inside the purse, Burnham found a wallet, which he also searched. In his search of the purse and the wallet, Burnham found Rynhart's driver license, $329 in cash, several gift certificates, a small plastic bag containing a "white powdery substance," and "a mirror with some powder on it."
¶ 5 After Burnham completed his investigation, he had the vehicle towed to a wrecking yard for "safe keeping," but did not officially impound the vehicle.1 He retained the briefcase, the purse, and the items he found in the purse. At some point after he had "cleared from the scene" of the accident, Burnham attempted to contact Rynhart by phone, but was unsuccessful. Later that afternoon, someone from the wrecking yard contacted Burnham by phone to notify him that Rynhart was attempting to retrieve her vehicle. Burnham went to the wrecking yard and met with Rynhart. At that time, Burnham asked Rynhart about the small plastic bag containing white powder that he had found in Rynhart's purse. Rynhart admitted to Burnham that the small plastic bag contained cocaine, but told him that it belonged to a friend.
¶ 6 On March 27, 2002, Rynhart was charged with possession of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a public structure, a second degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. At the conclusion of the May 29, 2002 preliminary hearing, the trial court ruled that there were "reasonable grounds to believe that [Rynhart] committed the offense[s]" and, accordingly, "requir[ed] that [Rynhart] be held to answer on the charges." Rynhart pleaded not guilty to both charges.
¶ 7 Thereafter, Rynhart filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during Burnham's warrantless search of her vehicle. In its ruling on Rynhart's motion, the trial court determined that Rynhart had not abandoned her expectation of privacy in her vehicle. In support of this determination, the trial court made the following findings, which are not challenged on appeal:
The officer inspected the vehicle at 8:30 in the morning and determined that it had been in the marsh since at least 3:00 ... that morning. The owner or driver would not have had time to make arrangements to retrieve the vehicle if it was damaged. The State failed to present any evidence of the state of the vehicle. If the vehicle could be driven, then the officer may have been more justified in believing that it had been abandoned. Although there clearly had been an accident, it appears that no other vehicles were involved. The apparent early hour, the winter conditions, and the single vehicle nature of the accident all combine to belie the officer's imputing an intent to abandon the vehicle.
However, the trial court also determined that Burnham's warrantless search of Rynhart's vehicle was justified under the emergency aid doctrine.2 See Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, ¶ 12, 994 P.2d 1283
. In support of this determination the trial court entered the following findings:
The accident occurred around 3:00 a.m. on a cold January night. The absence of the driver made it imperative that the officer identify the driver so that he or she could be found. The driver could have been in distress and lost or disoriented. The officer acted appropriately in attempting to determine who was [sic] the driver. Although [Rynhart] makes a good point that the owner of the vehicle could be ascertained by using the license plate number, the owner and the driver are not necessarily the same person, and the officer had a duty to ascertain the facts in order to preserve life in the event the driver had wandered off and was lost.
Based upon its conclusion that the emergency aid doctrine was applicable, the trial court denied Rynhart's motion to suppress in an order dated September 3, 2002.
¶ 8 On September 23, 2002, Rynhart petitioned this court, pursuant to rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to permit her appeal from the trial court's interlocutory order denying her motion to suppress. On November 5, 2002, we granted that petition and Rynhart's appeal ensued.
¶ 9 The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying Rynhart's motion to suppress evidence.3 The trial court denied the motion based upon its determination that the warrantless search of Rynhart's vehicle was justified under the emergency aid doctrine. See Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12,¶ 12, 994 P.2d 1283
.
The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearly-erroneous standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts.
State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah Ct.App.1996).
ANALYSIS
¶ 10 Rynhart argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence. The trial court denied the motion based upon its determination that the warrantless search of Rynhart's vehicle was justified under the emergency aid doctrine. See Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12,¶ 12, 994 P.2d 1283
.
¶ 11 State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992) (citation omitted). "The burden of establishing the existence of one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement is on the prosecution." State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990); see State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 294 (Utah 1995)
. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12 at ¶¶ 9-10, 994 P.2d 1283 (citations omitted).
Id. () (quoting Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Lawfulness of Search of Person or Personal Effects Under Medical Emergency Exception to Warrant Requirement, 11 A.L.R. 5th 52, § 2[a] (1993)). We adopted the emergency aid doctrine in Davidson, see id. at ¶ 13, and provided the following test for its application:
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State v. Rynhart
...of appeals granted. The court of appeals reversed the district court, holding that the emergency aid doctrine did not apply. State v. Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, ¶ 15, 81 P.3d 814. The court of appeals also held that the search could not be upheld under the abandonment doctrine, stating the S......
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...“emergency aid doctrine.” We find their analysis of the emergency aid doctrine helpful and persuasive. For example, in State v. Rynhart, 81 P.3d 814 (Utah App.2003), a police officer discovered a wrecked vehicle in a marsh. Id. at 815. The officer approached the vehicle and eventually enter......
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...trial court's suppression order, we review its factual findings for clear error, and its legal conclusions for correctness. See State v. Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, ¶ 9, 81 P.3d 814. ANALYSIS I. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy ¶ 9 As a threshold matter, the State argues that Earl is in no p......