Sammis v. Bennett

• Decision Date: 27 November 1893
• Citation: 32 Fla. 458,14 So. 90
• Parties: SAMMIS v. BENNETT.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

14 So. 90

32 Fla. 458

SAMMIS v. BENNETT.

Florida Supreme Court

November 27, 1893

Appeal from circuit court, Duval county; W. B. Young, Judge.

In the matter of the probate of an alleged will of Mary Williams alias Bennett. A decree of the circuit court affirmed a decree of the probate court revoking the probate of the will and Albert C. Sammis appealed, and moves for a supersedeas to the decree appealed from. Granted.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. The provision of the act of May 11, 1893, (chapter 4130,) that all appeals in chancery, whether from final decrees or interlocutory orders, must be taken within six months after the entry of the decree or order appealed from, has no retroactive effect, but applies only to decrees and orders entered after the act became operative. The act took effect August 1, 1893, or 60 days after the final adjournment of the legislature.

2. The purpose of section 18 of article 3 of the constitution, that a statute shall not take effect until 60 days from the final adjournment of the legislature at which it may be enacted unless otherwise specially provided in the act, was to enable the people to become acquainted with the provisions of legislation, and not to require them to govern their actions by the same before it has become operative.

COUNSEL M. C. Jordan, for applellant.

Walker & L'Engle, for appellee.

OPINION

RANEY C.J.

On the 26th day of May, 1892, a decree was rendered in the circuit court of Duval county affirming, on appeal, a decree which had been previously made by the county judge, revoking the probate of an alleged last will and testament of Mary Williams, alias Mary Bennett, and from the stated decree of the circuit court the above-named Sammis entered an appeal in October of the present year to the January term, 1894, of this court, and now he moves for a supersedeas to the decree appealed from. Section 1280, Rev. St., provides that appeals from the circuit court to the supreme court, in matters arising before the county judge and pertaining to his probate jurisdiction, shall be governed in all respects by the law and rules regulating appeals in chancery. Prior to the enactment of chapter 4130, Laws 1893, approved May 11, 1893 the period of time allowed for taking such appeals to this court was two years, (section 1456, Rev. St.;) but the mentioned statute of the present year, 'An act to limit the time within which appeals in chancery may be taken,' provides that 'all appeals in chancery, whether from final decrees or interlocutory orders, must be taken within six months after the entry of the final decree or of the entry of the interlocutory order or decree appealed from.' This act became of force, under section 18 of article 3 of the constitution, on August 1st, or 60 days after the final adjournment of the legislature, its session of 1893 having closed on the second day of June. It was the purpose of section 1280, Rev. St., that the time for taking appeals like the one before us should conform to that prescribed for appeals from chancery decrees of the circuit court.

The purpose of section 18 of article 3 of the constitution, that a statute shall not take effect until 60 days from the final adjournment of the legislature at which it may have been enacted, unless it is otherwise specially provided in the act, is, according to what we deem the better view, to enable the people to become acquainted with its provisions, but not to require them to govern their actions by the law before it becomes operative. It was contemplated that, by the lapse of the 60 days, the statutes of the session of the legislature would be published and be accessible to the public, but they are not operative laws until the stated period has expired and no one can be charged with notice of them reasonably...