Sammons v. Copeland
| Decision Date | 19 February 1952 |
| Docket Number | No. 33866,No. 2,33866,2 |
| Citation | 69 S.E.2d 617,85 Ga.App. 318 |
| Parties | SAMMONS v. COPELAND |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
In a trover action the plaintiff may recover the highest value of the personalty between the date of conversion and the date of trial. In determining value, the jury is not confined to the opinions of witnesses where from the facts proved as to the nature of the property and other facts properly within its knowledge it may legitimately arrive at a different valuation; but, where the property is described in such generic terms that no inference of its value may be independently drawn, a verdict for a sum entirely unsupported by the evidence is unauthorized.
E. D. Sammons brought a bail-trover proceeding in Cobb Superior Court against P. C. Copeland for one 1949 Ford pick-up truck and nineteen small articles, including an electric saw, wheelbarrow, and paint brushes, alleging that the articles were included in a retention-title note made out to the plaintiff and had a value of $1586.10. The defendant answered that the plaintiff, prior to the execution of the note and bill of sale in question, entered into a conspiracy with his nephew, M. B. Cameron, who was a business partner of the defendant, under the firm name of Cameron Construction Company, to defraud him of his interest in the partnership assets, and that therefore the note and bill of sale are void. The intervention of equity is prayed to cancel the same. The plaintiff amended by showing that his claim was based on two retention-title notes, one in the sum of $1,000 made out by Cameron Construction Company to the plaintiff on April 29, 1950, and the other a retention-title note and contract on the Ford truck, on which there is a balance due of $586.10, dated May 18, 1949, which had been transferred by the payee, Wade Motor Company, to First National Bank and by it to the plaintiff. These instruments were introduced on the trial. The evidence of Sammons was: that Cameron and Copeland had issued some checks on the firm which they were unable to cover; that they were engaged at that time in fulfilling a contract to build a house and Cameron asked the plaintiff in the defendant's presence whether he could let them have enough money to cover the checks until they finished the house; that the plaintiff told them his money was in a savings bank in Macon, but agreed to lend the partnership $1,000; that the defendant then instructed Cameron to drive the plaintiff to Macon for the purpose of getting the money, which was done. The money was turned over to Cameron for the firm and used in part to cover outstanding checks, on the agreement that it should be refunded in two or three weeks' time when the house was finished; that at that time they were unable to repay the money; that the plaintiff wished to protect his loan, and on April 29, 1950, took a note and bill of sale on the Ford and other equipment listed in the sum of $1,000, payable in fifteen days, signed, 'M. B. Cameron & P. C. Copeland tr. as Cameron Const. Co.'; that thereafter a prior retention-title note on the truck became due at the First National Bank in the sum of $586.10, and this was paid by the plaintiff to protect his interest, he receiving an assignment of the instruments to himself. M. B. Cameron testified for the plaintiff that he owned 51 percent of the partnership assets and the defendant owned 49 percent. He identified the bank records of the Cameron Construction Company and indicated a deposit of $1,000 to the firm's credit on April 12, 1950, as being the $1,000 received from the plaintiff; and in general confirmed the plaintiff's testimony. The testimony of the company auditor was to the effect that at the time the loan was made the firm had outstanding liabilities of approxmiately double that amount, and that the money was used in the payment of partnership debts. The partnership was dissolved in May, 1950, and the property divided between the partners, that levied upon being in the possession of the defendant.
The defendant's evidence was to the effect that he owned 50 percent of the partnership assets; that he was not present and had no conversion with either the plaintiff or Cameron concerning the loan; that it was not a necessary loan and so far as he knows was not made; that Cameron, his wife and the bookkeeper kept books and he was not able to find out anything about them although he tried to do so. The defendant admitted having in his possession the Ford truck, electric cord, extension ladder, wheelbarrow, and one screw jack. The value of these items was estimated by the witness Cameron to be of a minimum value of $835, his being the only testimony as to the value...
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... ... See also McLendon v. City of LaGrange, 47 Ga.App. 690(3), 171 S.E. 307; Southern v. Cobb County, 78 Ga.App. 58(2), 50 S.E.2d 226, supra; Sammons v. Copeland, 85 Ga.App. 318, 321, 69 S.E.2d ... 617; Baker v. Richmond City Mill Works, 105 Ga. 225, 227, 31 S.E. 426; McCarthy v. Lazarus, 137 Ga ... ...
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