Barking Hound Vill., LLC. v. Monyak

• Decision Date: 06 June 2016
• Docket Number: S15G1184
• Parties: Barking Hound Village, LLC. et al. v. Monyak et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

299 Ga. 144

787 S.E.2d 191

Barking Hound Village, LLC. et al.

v.Monyak et al.

S15G1184

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: June 6, 2016

Joel Lee McKie, Andrew Kevin Hazen, Hall Booth Smith, P.C., for Appellants.

Jonathan C. Peters, Robert P. Monyak, Peters & Monyak, LLP, for Appellees.

Leonard Searcy, II, Victor E. Schwartz, Philip S. Goldberg, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P., Jennifer Devine Odom, Ann Wrege Ferebee, Bryan Cave LLP, Katherine Marie Smallwood, Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, amici curiae.

THOMPSON

, Chief Justice.

The subject matter of this case is near and dear to the heart of many a Georgian in that it involves the untimely death of a beloved family pet and concerns the proper measure of damages available to the owners of an animal injured or killed through the negligence of others. Observing that pet dogs are considered personal property under Georgia law, but finding that not all dogs have an actual commercial or market value, the Court of Appeals held that where the actual market value of the animal is non-existent or nominal, the appropriate measure of damages would be the actual value of the dog to its owners. See Barking Hound Village, LLC v. Monyak , 331 Ga.App. 811, 813–814, 771 S.E.2d 469 (2015)

. The Court of Appeals concluded that the actual value of the animal could be demonstrated by reasonable veterinary and other expenses incurred by its owners in treating its injuries, as well as by other economic factors, but held that evidence of non-economic factors demonstrating the dog's intrinsic value to its owners would not be admissible. Id.

This Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the proper measure of damages for the loss of a pet dog is the actual value of the dog to its owners rather than the dog's fair market value. Because we find that long-standing Georgia precedent provides that the damages recoverable by the owners of an animal negligently killed by another include both the animal's fair market value at the time of the loss plus interest, and, in addition, any medical and other expenses reasonably incurred in treating the animal, we affirm in part and reverse in part the Court of Appeals' decision.

The damages at issue in this case arise from the death of a mixed-breed dachshund owned by Robert and Elizabeth Monyak. In 2012, the Monyaks boarded Lola, their 8 ½–year–old dachshund mix, for ten days at a kennel owned by Barking Hound Village, LLC (“BHV”) and managed by William Furman. Along with Lola, the Monyaks boarded their 13–year–old mixed-breed Labrador retriever, Callie, who had been prescribed an anti-inflammatory drug for arthritis

pain—medication which the Monyaks gave to kennel personnel with directions that it be administered to Callie. Three days after picking up their dogs from BHV, Lola was diagnosed with acute renal failure. Despite receiving extensive veterinary care over a nine-month period, including kidney dialysis treatment, Lola died in March 2013.

The Monyaks sued BHV and Furman for damages alleging that while boarded at the kennel Lola was administered toxic doses of the medication prescribed for Callie, a much larger dog. The Monyaks asserted various claims of negligence against BHV and Furman, and sought compensatory damages, including over $67,000 in veterinary and other expenses incurred in treating Lola. In addition, alleging fraud and deceit on the part of the defendants, the Monyaks sought litigation expenses and punitive damages.

BHV and Furman moved for summary judgment on all the Monyaks' claims asserting that the measure of damages for the death of a dog was capped at the dog's fair market value and that, in this case, the Monyaks failed to prove Lola had any market value; thus their claims were barred as a matter of law. Alternatively, the defendants sought partial summary judgment on the Monyaks' claims for punitive damages and fraud.

In its order denying summary judgment to the defendants except as to the Monyaks' fraud claim which the court found duplicative of their negligence and punitive damages claims, the trial court held the Monyaks would be permitted to present evidence of the actual value of the dog to them, as demonstrated by reasonable veterinary and other expenses incurred in her treatment, as well as evidence of non-economic factors demonstrating the dog's intrinsic value. Further, the trial court found sufficient evidence existed to create a jury issue on the Monyaks' claim for punitive damages pursuant to

OCGA § 51–12–5.1 (b)

.¹ The Court of Appeals granted the defendants' application for interlocutory review, and the Monyaks cross-appealed challenging the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment with respect to their fraud claim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling rejecting a market value cap on damages. See Monyak , 331 Ga.App. at 814, 771 S.E.2d 469

. Finding the evidence showed Lola had little or no market value,² the Court of Appeals observed that “[w]here the absence of a market value is shown, ‘the measure of damages ... is the actual value to the owner.’ ” Id. at 813, 771 S.E.2d 469, quoting Cherry v. McCutchen , 65 Ga.App. 301, 304, 16 S.E.2d 167 (1941). Noting, however, that, in Cherry , no recovery was allowed for the sentimental value of the object to the owner, the Court of Appeals concluded that damages for the intrinsic value of the dog to the Monyaks were not recoverable. Monyak , 331 Ga.App. at 815, 771 S.E.2d 469. Finally, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment on the Monyaks' fraud claim, albeit on different grounds than the trial court.³

BHV and Furman contend that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that an actual value to owner standard of damages was appropriate in this case, rather than the fair market value standard of damages generally applicable in actions for the negligent injury to, or loss of, personal property. They assert that under the fair market value standard a plaintiff is prevented from recovering an amount of damages against a tortfeasor greater than the fair market value of the property prior to its impairment, and thus argue that the entire amount of damages recoverable by the Monyaks cannot exceed the fair market value of their dog. Moreover, BHV and Furman claim that Georgia case law specifically limits the recovery of animal treatment expenses to an animal's pre-injury fair market value, citing Atlanta & West Point R. Co. v. Hudson , 62 Ga. 679, 683(2) (1879)

and Southern Ry. Co. v. Stearns , 8 Ga.App. 111, 68 S.E. 623 (1910).

The Monyaks, on the other hand, contend the Court of Appeals correctly rejected a market value cap on damages, arguing that to limit damages for the loss of a family pet to market value would not only be unjust, but would go against both Georgia precedent and the weight of authority from other jurisdictions. Although agreeing with the Court of Appeals that an actual value to owner standard is the appropriate measure of damages in this case, the Monyaks ask this Court to clarify that evidence of non-economic factors, though inadmissible for proving the dog's intrinsic value, would be admissible for other purposes, such as proving the reasonableness of their decision to incur significant expenses in an effort to save the life of their pet.

1. The parties agree, and Georgia law clearly provides, that a pet dog has value and is considered the personal property of its owner. See Columbus R.R. Co. v. Woolfolk , 128 Ga. 631, 633, 58 S.E. 152 (1907)

. See also Wilcox v. State , 101 Ga. 563, 565, 28 S.E. 981 (1897) (finding Georgia law pertaining to domestic animals applicable to dogs); Graham v. Smith , 100 Ga. 434, 436, 28 S.E. 225 (1897) (holding that the owner of a dog has a property right in the animal sufficient to sustain an action for trover). As a result, the owner of a dog may maintain an action against anyone who wantonly, maliciously, intentionally, or negligently injures or kills it. See Woolfolk , 128 Ga. at 634, 58 S.E. 152

; Vaughn v. Nelson , 5 Ga.App. 105, 108–109, 62 S.E. 708 (1908). See generally Chalker v. Raley , 73 Ga.App. 415, 37 S.E.2d 160 (1946).

2. Having established that dogs are personal property for which a suit for damages will lie, we look to Georgia precedent in order to determine the appropriate measure of damages recoverable by a dog's owners in such actions. In so doing, we find the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that application of an actual value to owner standard was the appropriate measure of recoverable damages, but additionally find that a cap on all damages based on application of the fair market value standard as urged by defendants is likewise incorrect.

Generally, in a suit to recover damages to personal property it is a well-established principle that “a plaintiff cannot recover an amount of damages against a tortfeasor greater than the fair market value of the property prior to impairment.” See MCI Communications Svcs. v. CMES, Inc. , 291 Ga. 461, 463–464, 728 S.E.2d 649 (2012)

. However, over 120 years ago this Court decided that such a limitation was not appropriate in negligence cases involving the injury or death of an animal. See Telfair County v. Webb , 119 Ga. 916, 919, 47 S.E. 218 (1904) ; Atlanta Cotton–Seed Oil Mills v. Coffey , 80 Ga. 145, 150, 4 S.E. 759 (1887). Instead, this Court determined that where an animal is negligently injured and subsequently dies as a result of those injuries, the proper measure of damages recoverable by the animal's owner includes not only the full market value of the animal at the time of the loss plus interest, but also expenses incurred by the owner in an effort to cure the animal. See Webb , 119 Ga. at 918, 47 S.E. 218; Coffey , 80 Ga. at 150, 4 S.E. 759

.

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