OPINION
KUGLER, DISTRICT JUDGE:
Before this Court is the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus of Petitioner Derek Sample ("Petitioner"), brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner's habeas petition is DENIED, and Petitioner is DENIED a certificate of appealability.
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, provided the following summary of the factual background of Petitioner's case:
A Burlington County jury found defendant Derek Sample Sr. guilty of first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) or (2); felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(3); first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1); and first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1). Judge Thomas S. Smith, Jr. merged the two murder convictions and imposed a forty-five-year prison term with an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier pursuant to the No Early Release Act. The judge also merged the two robbery convictions and imposed a fifteen-year concurrent term, again with application of the No Early Release Act.
. . . Defendant killed Pickett Durham, who was fifty-seven years old and medically fragile. Durham suffered from heart disease, diabetes, successfully treated prostate cancer, and a transplanted kidney. Just prior to Durham's death, defendant was living in an apartment with him and his niece, who was defendant's girlfriend. On October 25, 2001, defendant had been out drinking and smoking crack cocaine. He returned to the apartment hoping to steal Durham's money to purchase more crack. A verbal altercation ensued, and defendant stabbed Durham in the back with a ten-inch kitchen knife. Defendant then stole Durham's jeans, because he believed that Durham's wallet, containing the money he was looking for, was in them.
Durham called 9-1-1 and told the dispatcher that defendant had stabbed him. Paramedics and police officers from Mount Holly and Lumberton responded. After Durham was stabilized, paramedics transported him to Cooper Hospital Trauma Center. As one of the officers was leaving the scene, he noticed defendant in the back of the building attempting to hide. Defendant was arrested and brought to headquarters.
Later, a sergeant and detective awoke defendant and brought him from his cell to the interview room in order to talk with him. As the sergeant escorted defendant, he noticed that defendant was able to walk without assistance and that his eyes were not bloodshot or glassy. He did not appear to be drunk or under the influence of any substance. The officers provided defendant with a blanket and coffee.
The sergeant advised defendant of his constitutional rights and defendant signed the Miranda card waiving those rights. Defendant articulately answered all questions and admitted stabbing Durham in the back. Defendant also disclosed the location of the wallet, knife, and jeans. Defendant then agreed to have his statement audiotaped. At no time during the interview did defendant request the assistance of counsel or request that the interview be discontinued.
Meanwhile, a doctor in the hospital performed surgery on Durham to stop the bleeding, repair the holes in his colon and diaphragm, re-expand his lung, and wash his abdomen in an attempt to remove fecal material from the area. The next day, Durham experienced breathing problems which required that he be placed on a respirator. That evening, Durham suffered a heart attack. The doctors suspected that Durham had a blood clot on his lung. The hospital moved him to Intensive Care where he began to suffer fromperitonitis, which was caused by the "spillage" of fecal matter from his colon into the abdominal cavity. Durham's condition deteriorated and several days later, pursuant to his wishes, the hospital removed him from life-support. He died within forty minutes.
State v. Sample, Indictment No. A-2477-04T4, 2006 WL 2882987, at *1-2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 12, 2006).
Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence. The Appellate Division affirmed on October 12, 2006, but remanded to correct a typographical error in his judgment of conviction. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification on January 12, 2007. State v. Sample, 915 A.2d 1050 (N.J. 2007). Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"), which was denied by the Superior Court on June 12, 2009. (ECF No. 10-20.) Petitioner appealed and the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of PCR on March 25, 2014. State v. Sample, Indictment No. A-5264-11T2, 2014 WL 1175166 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 25, 2014). The New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification on January 23, 2015. State v. Sample, 105 A.3d 1101 (N.J. 2015). In July of 2015, Petitioner filed a habeas Petition with this court raising seven grounds for habeas relief:
1. Petitioner's trial was wrongfully tainted by the admission of inflammatory and unduly prejudicial evidence, in violation of his rights to a fair trial a[s] guaranteed under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
A. Error in admission of hearsay statements and manner in which it was presented.
B. Error in admission of hearsay through Lieutenant Alfred Nagle.
C. Error in admission of other-crimes evidence.
D. Error in admission of hearsay and conclusion by Michael Covington.
2. The trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on reckless manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of murder, and failure to instruct the jury on theft as a lesser-included offense[] to robbery was plain error.
A. The trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on reckless manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder was reversible plain error in light of the clear mandate from the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347 (2004).
B. The trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on theft as a lesser-included offense of robbery was plain error.
3. Petitioner's right to effective assistance of counsel was violated as [a] result of his trial counsel's failure to object to evidence of prior wrongs that [were] included in Petitioner's statement to the po[li]ce.
4. Petitioner's right to effective assistance of counsel was violated as [a] result of his defense counsel's failure to protect Petitioner's right to be present at all critical phases of his trial.
5. Petitioner's right to effective assistance of counsel was violated as [a] result of his trial counsel's failure to pursue a defense of diminished capacity as supported by the expert report of Dr. Sadoff.
6. Petitioner's right to effective assistance of appellate counsel was violated.
7. The [cumulative] errors deprived Petitioner of due process.
(ECF No. 1-2.)
Respondents submitted an Answer in which they argue that Petitioner's claims are meritless. (ECF No. 10.) Petitioner submitted a traverse. (ECF No. 11.)
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), the district court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus [o]n behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." A habeas petitioner has the burden of establishing his entitlement to relief for each claim presented in his petition. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011); Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 641 (2003). District courts are required to give great deference to the determinations of the state trial and appellate courts. See Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010).
Where a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by the state courts, the district court shall not grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court adjudication
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Federal law is clearly established for these purposes where it is clearly expressed in "only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta" of the opinions of the United States Supreme Court. See Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015). "When reviewing state criminal convictions on collateral review, federal judges are required to afford state courts due respect by overturning their decisions only when there could be no reasonable dispute that they were wrong." Id. Where a petitioner challenges an allegedly erroneous factual determination of the state courts, "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct [and the] applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
In addition to the above requirements, a federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus under § 2254 unless the petitioner has "exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). To do so, a petitioner must "'fairly present' all federal claims to the highest state court before bringing them in federal court." Leyva v. Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 365 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Stevens v. Delaware Corr. Ctr., 295 F.3d 361, 369 (3d Cir. 2002)). This requirement ensures that state courts "have 'an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights.'" Id. (citing United States v. Bendolph, 409 F.3d 155, 173 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981)). Nevertheless, to the extent that a petitioner's constitutional claims are unexhausted, a court can nevertheless deny them on themerits under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). See Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 427 (3d Cir. 2007); Bronshtein v. H...
