Samples v. Brown

• Decision Date: 11 January 2007
• Docket Number: No. A112594.,No. A112343.,A112343.,A112594.
• Citation: 146 Cal.App.4th 787,53 Cal.Rptr.3d 216
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Patricia SAMPLES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Edmund G. BROWN, Jr., as Attorney General, etc., Defendant and Appellant.

53 Cal.Rptr.3d 216

146 Cal.App.4th 787

Patricia SAMPLES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Edmund G. BROWN, Jr., as Attorney General, etc., Defendant and Appellant.

No. A112343.

No. A112594.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2.

January 11, 2007.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Louis R. Mauro, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Christopher E. Krueger, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Kathleen A. Lynch, Deputy Attorney General, for Appellant.

Mark T. Clausen, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

HAERLE, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

The trial court entered a judgment declaring that sections 14602.6 and 23109.2 of the Vehicle Code¹ are unconstitutional on their face. The court also awarded respondent, Patricia Samples (Samples), $249,018.59 in attorney fees and costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The Attorney General appeals both the judgment and the attorney fees order. We reverse.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Background

In October 2002, Samples commenced this action challenging two distinct statutory schemes: (1) provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to the seizure and forfeiture of property (Health & Saf.Code, §§ 11469-11495), and (2) provisions of the Vehicle Code pertaining to impoundment of vehicles that are either driven by unlicensed drivers or used in dangerous activities such as speed contests.

Samples filed this action pursuant to section 526a of the Code of Civil Procedure as a tax-paying "citizen interested in the government's compliance with constitutional requirements." She did not allege, nor has she ever argued, that the statutes she challenges were applied to her or that she or any other individual has suffered any damages. Samples sought declaratory and injunctive relief or, in the alternative, a writ of mandate. The trial court sustained a demurrer to Samples's cause of action seeking a writ of mandate. After a motion for a preliminary injunction and a subsequent motion for summary adjudication of issues were both denied by the trial court, Samples voluntarily dismissed her cause of action directed at the Controlled Substances Act.²

The trial court, resolved Samples's constitutional challenges to the Vehicle Code provisions in the context of a motion for summary adjudication of issues which the court granted in part on March 8, 2004. The Honorable Lawrence G. Antolini found that two provisions, sections 14602.6 and 23109.2, subdivision (a) (hereafter section 23109.2(a)), were unconstitutional on their face.

B. The Vehicle Code Provisions

1. Section 14602.6

Section 14602.6 authorizes and regulates the impoundment of vehicles driven by persons without valid licenses. Subdivision (a) of this statute provides that, if a person is driving a vehicle without a valid license or in violation of a driving restriction, a peace officer is authorized to arrest the person and seize the vehicle and the "vehicle so impounded shall be impounded for 30 days." (§ 14602.6, subd. (a)(1).)

Section 14602.6, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 14602.6(b)), states: "The registered and legal owner of a vehicle that is removed and seized under subdivision (a) or their agents shall be provided the opportunity for a storage hearing to determine the validity of, or consider any mitigating circumstances attendant to, the storage, in accordance with Section 22852."³

Section 14602.6, subdivision (d), states that an impounded vehicle must be released to its registered owner or his or her agent prior to expiration of the impoundment period "under any of the following circumstances: [¶] "(A) When the vehicle is a stolen vehicle. [¶] (B) When the vehicle is subject to bailment and is driven by an unlicensed employee of a business establishment, including a parking service or repair garage. [¶] (C) When the license of the driver was suspended or revoked for an offense other than those included in Article 2 (commencing with Section 13200) of Chapter 2 of Division 6 or-Article 3 (commencing with Section 13350) of Chapter 2 of Division 6.[¶] (D) When the vehicle was seized under this section for an offense that does not authorize the seizure of the vehicle. (E) When the driver reinstates his or her driver's license or acquires a driver's license and proper insurance." (§ 14602.6, subd. (d)(1).)

Section 14602.6, subdivision (f), provides that an impounded vehicle must be released to it legal owner prior to expiration of the impoundment period if "[t]he legal owner is a motor vehicle dealer, bank, credit union, acceptance corporation, or other licensed financial institution legally operating in this state or is another person, not the registered owner, holding a security interest in the vehicle" provided that other specified conditions are met. (§ 14602.6, subd. (f)(1).)

Rental car agencies are separately addressed in section 14602.6, subdivision (h), which states that an impounded vehicle "shall be released to a rental car agency prior to the end of 30 days' impoundment if the agency is either the legal owner or registered owner of the vehicle and the agency pays all towing and storage fees related to the seizure of the vehicle." (§ 14602.6, subd. (h)(1).) Although the agency may continue to rent the recovered vehicle, it may not rent a vehicle to the driver of the recovered vehicle until 30 days after the date that the vehicle was seized. (§ 14602.6, subd.(h)(2).)

2. Section 23109.2

Section 23109.2 authorizes and regulates the seizure and impoundment of a vehicle involved in a speed contest. This statute provides that, when a peace officer determines that a person was engaged in such an activity, his or her motor vehicle may be seized and "[a] motor vehicle so seized may be impounded for not more than 30 days." (§ 23109.2(a).)

A registered and legal owner of a vehicle seized pursuant to section 23109.2 or their agents are entitled to a storage hearing in accordance with section 22852 to determine the validity of the impoundment. (§ 23109.2, subd. (b).)

Circumstances under which the impounding agency "shall" release the vehicle to its registered owner prior "to the conclusion of the impoundment period described in subdivision (a)" are set forth in section 23109.2, subdivision (c), and include situations in which the vehicle was stolen, the registered owner did not authorize the person involved in the speed contest to use his or her vehicle, the vehicle is owned by a rental car agency, or when criminal charges for engaging in a speed contest or other unauthorized activity are not filed or are dismissed.

Section 23109.2, subdivision (d), provides that an impounded vehicle shall be released to its legal owner or the legal owner's agent "on or before the 30th day of impoundment" if the legal owner "is a motor vehicle dealer, bank, credit union, acceptance corporation, or other licensed financial institution legally operating in this state, or is another person, not the registered owner holding a security interest in the vehicle," and the legal owner or his or her agent "pays all towing and storage fees related to the impoundment of the vehicle," and "presents foreclosure documents or an affidavit of repossession for the vehicle."

C. The Trial Court's Rulings

The trial court found that the phrase "mitigating circumstances" in section 14602.6(b), which directs an impounding agency to consider mitigating circumstances at a storage hearing, is unconstitutionally vague because there is nothing in this statute or elsewhere which indicates what constitutes mitigating circumstances. The court also found that this phrase violates the separation of powers doctrine because the lack of any guidance as to the meaning of "mitigating circumstances" leaves the matter to law enforcement agencies across the state to interpret the phrase as they wish. In addition, the court found that section 14602.6 violates equal protection by authorizing the early release of impounded vehicles to rental car agencies. The court reasoned that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between car-rental companies and private individuals in this context.

The trial court also found that section 23109.2(a), which pertains to vehicles used in speed contests, violates the separation of powers doctrine by providing for the impoundment of a vehicle for "up to 30 days" without providing any standards for determining when, within that 30-day period a vehicle may be released.⁴

A judgment entered May 23, 2005, contained the following findings: "1. The court declares and decrees that the phrase `mitigating circumstances' in Vehicle Code section 14602.6, on its face, is unconstitutionally vague. [¶] 2. The court declares and decrees that the phrase `mitigating circumstances' in Vehicle Code section 14602.6, on its face, violates the separation of powers doctrine. [¶] 3. The court declares and decrees that Vehicle Code section 23109.2(a), on its face, violates the separation of powers doctrine because the Legislature failed to provide guidelines for how an agency is to determine the length of impoundment under section 23109.2(a) [¶] 4. The court declares and decrees that Vehicle Code section 14602.6, on its face, violates equal protection because the Legislature did not have a rational basis for distinguishing between vehicles that are privately owned and those that are owned by rental car companies. [¶] 5. As to every other claim or cause of action asserted in the complaint, plaintiff shall take nothing."

D. Attorney Fees

On July 11, 2005, the trial court awarded Samples attorney fees pursuant to section 1021.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the amount of $238,047.74 which included a multiplier of 1.5. The court denied Samples's request for costs in the amount of $7,313.90. However, on December 2, 2005, the court granted Samples's motion for reconsideration and awarded her $7,313.90 for costs, and applied a multiplier of 1.5 which resulted in a total award of $249,018.59.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standards Governing Review

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