Samuel Mares Post No. 8, American Legion, Dept. of Wyoming v. Board of County Com'rs of Converse County, No. 84-167

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming
• Writing for the Court: Before THOMAS; BROWN
• Citation: 697 P.2d 1040
• Parties: The SAMUEL MARES POST NO. 8, AMERICAN LEGION, DEPARTMENT OF WYOMING, Appellant (Defendant), v. The BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF CONVERSE, Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Decision Date: 08 April 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-167

Page 1040

697 P.2d 1040 The SAMUEL MARES POST NO. 8, AMERICAN LEGION, DEPARTMENT OF WYOMING, Appellant (Defendant),
v.
The BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF CONVERSE, Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). No. 84-167. Supreme Court of Wyoming. April 8, 1985.

David D. Uchner of Lathrop & Uchner, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

Craig Newman and Thomas F. Reese of Brown, Drew, Apostolos Massey & Sullivan, Casper, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted in favor of appellee Board of County Commissioners (hereinafter County) in a quiet title action to the land where

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the Douglas airport is situate. The County initiated the action against appellant American Legion (hereinafter Legion) and all others claiming an interest in the land adverse to the County.

We will affirm.

The Legion raises the following issues for our review:

"1. Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the Legion's request for trial by jury.

"2. The propriety of a summary judgment in light of the following considerations: (1) reformation of the 1933 Deed; (2) the specific language contained in the 1936 Deed; and (3) the claim of adverse possession."

Since we hold summary judgment was proper, the Legion's first issue regarding the propriety of the trial court's denial of a jury trial need not be addressed.

I

The facts reveal that title to the property at issue was conveyed by the Legion to the Town of Douglas by warranty deed dated May 11, 1933. This deed was recorded. On March 16, 1936, the Town of Douglas conveyed the mineral rights to the property back to the Legion under an instrument entitled "Mineral Deed," which was also recorded. Although the Legion contends this deed conveyed the entire interest in the property, the district court concluded that the 1936 deed conveyed only the mineral rights to the property. On March 29, 1959, the Town of Douglas conveyed the property to the County by way of quitclaim deed, which was recorded.

In concluding summary judgment was proper, the trial judge stated:

"Summary judgment is granted on this basis: The 1933 deed is clear and unambiguous and I can find no reason for reformation.

"As to the 1936 deed it appears to me this was a mineral conveyance and was never intended to reconvey to the American Legion anything other than a mineral interest.

"Having disposed of these two questions I find it unnecessary to address the question of adverse possession."

We hold the trial court was correct in finding no ambiguity in the 1933 deed and that the 1936 deed was only a conveyance of mineral rights.

II

We begin by citing the rules of appellate review of a summary judgment. The scope of our review of a summary judgment is to examine the judgment "in the same light as the district court, using the same material and information as did the district court." Lane Company v. Busch Development, Inc., Wyo., 662 P.2d 419, 421 (1983). The moving party has the burden of proving there exists no genuine issue of material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Larsen v. Roberts, Wyo., 676 P.2d 1046 (1984); and Miller v. Reiman-Wuerth Company, Wyo., 598 P.2d 20 (1979). A material fact is one which, if proved, would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of the cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. Shrum v. Zeltwanger, Wyo., 559 P.2d 1384 (1977). We review the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving to him all favorable inferences which may be drawn from the facts. Bancroft v. Jagusch, Wyo., 611 P.2d 819 (1980). It is a trial court's duty, nay obligation, to render summary judgment in the absence of any genuine issue of material fact:

" * * * The judgment sought [by a motion for summary judgment] shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. * * * " Rule 56(c), Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Legion claims summary judgment was improper in light of: "1) reformation of the 1933 Deed; 2) the specific language

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contained in the 1936 Deed; and 3) the claim of adverse possession." Since we find summary judgment was proper inasmuch as there was no ambiguity in either the 1933 or 1936 deeds, we need not address the issue of adverse possession.

A. Reformation of the 1933 Deed.

The Legion contends that the 1933 deed, wherein the property was conveyed by warranty deed to the Town of Douglas, should be reformed to express the intent of the parties when the deed was conveyed. The Legion claims the property was conveyed to the Town of Douglas to be...