Samuel v. Home Run, Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 February 1992
• Docket Number: No. IP 89-1294-C.,IP 89-1294-C.
• Citation: 784 F. Supp. 548
• Parties: Bashir SAMUEL, Plaintiff, v. HOME RUN, INC., a corporation, and John H. Carter, Charles Layne and Kreigh A. Spahr, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

784 F. Supp. 548

Bashir SAMUEL, Plaintiff, v. HOME RUN, INC., a corporation, and John H. Carter, Charles Layne and Kreigh A. Spahr, Defendants.

No. IP 89-1294-C.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

February 10, 1992.

William H. Sparrenberger, Indianapolis, Ind., for plaintiff.

Michael R. Franceschini, Steers Sullivan McNamar & Rogers, Tom Schultz, Locke Reynolds Boyd & Weisel, Indianapolis, Ind., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM ENTRY DISCUSSING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT HOME RUN, INC. ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES CLAIM

TINDER, District Judge.

Paragraph eight of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Home Run Inc. "was guilty of reprehensible conduct, oppressive and malicious action, gross negligence and intentional reckless, willful, and wanton misconduct in that it did violate and disregard the applicable laws of the State of Indiana...." (Pl.'s Am. Compl. ¶ 8.) Based upon that allegation, Plaintiff prayed for a judgment of punitive damages — apparently (and incorrectly) against all Defendants. Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages is not supported by the evidence required at this stage of the proceedings. Therefore, Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND¹

This personal injury action is prosecuted by a passenger, who was traveling in an automobile which struck the rear-most of three parked semi-tractor trailers. The three natural person Defendants each drove a semi tractor-trailer for the corporate Defendant Home Run Inc. ("Home Run") on the date of the accident. Prior to the accident, these three semi tractor-trailers, plus a fourth, driven by Neal Riggsby, were traveling in tandem on north-bound Interstate 465. At some point, possibly due to construction in the area, the traffic on the interstate came to a stop. The four semi tractor-trailers were in the left-most or "passing" lane. (Def.'s Answers Interrogs. at 4.) Defendant Layne, whose semi tractor-trailer was first in the line of four, stalled his rig and could not restart it or take it out of gear. Layne's tractor did not restart because of failure in the electrical system; the posts on one of his batteries was badly corroded and had broken free from the battery. (Riggsby Aff. ¶ 7; Sarber Aff. at 2.)

The other three semi tractor-trailers were stopped behind Layne's. After determining that Layne needed mechanical assistance, the driver of the rear-most rig, Neal Riggsby, drove ahead. At that point, Defendant Carter's semi tractor-trailer was rear-most in line. (Def.'s Answers Interrogs. at 4.) There is a dispute about whether the drivers activated their emergency flashers. At least one of the drivers swears he turned on his flashers (Spahr Supplemental Ans. Interrogs. at 2); but, the Plaintiff submitted evidence from affiants who "did not see" any active flashers on the vehicles. (Epeards Aff. at 4; Sarber Aff. at 1.) For purposes of this Motion, the Court will assume that none of the drivers activated his flashers.

There is also a dispute about whether Defendant Carter placed emergency triangles behind the rear of his trailer. Two Defendants stated that Carter placed three triangles behind Carter's trailer, which was the rear-most trailer. (Carter Ans. Interrogs. at 6; Layne Ans. Interrogs. at 8.) Plaintiff and some other affiants state that they "did not remember seeing" any triangles behind the rear-most trailer. (Bashir Ans. Interrogs. at 3; Bashir Dep. at 53, 114; Sarber Aff. at 1; Sarber Dep. at 92; Epeards Aff. ¶ 3; Epeards Dep. at 41.) Andre Warren, the driver of the automobile in which Plaintiff rode, stated in his deposition that he saw broken triangles in the road after the accident. (Warren Dep., correction sheet to page 43, line 11.) The Indiana State Police Officer who investigated the accident, Anthony E. Blackburn, stated in his affidavit that he "found reflector triangles which had been placed behind the semi-tractor trailer which was involved in the accident." (Blackburn Aff. ¶ 5.)

Plaintiff argues alternatively that (1) Defendants did not place any triangles behind the rear-most trailer, or (2) if they did, those triangles were not present at the time Plaintiff's automobile approached the trailer. Again, for purposes of this Motion, resolving every reasonable (and possibly unreasonable²) inference in favor of the Plaintiff, it will be assumed that Defendants never placed any triangles behind Carter's trailer.

True to the language of paragraph eight of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has submitted evidence to support his argument that the vehicles were not properly permitted to carry their loads in Indiana. Plaintiff also submitted various statutes and regulations he claims the Defendants violated. Further, Plaintiff submitted evidence which he argues creates a fact about whether maintenance procedures on the Layne vehicle were negligent. For the singular purpose of this Motion, these matters will be taken as proved also.

II. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Evidence Required Under Indiana Law to Support Award of Punitive Damages

In 1982, the Indiana Supreme Court stated the current evidentiary standard required to impose punitive damages:

punitive damages should not be allowable upon evidence that is merely consistent with the hypothesis of malice, fraud, gross negligence or oppressiveness. Rather, some evidence should be required that is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the tortious conduct was the result of a mistake of law or fact, honest error of judgment, over-zealousness, mere negligence or other such noniniquitous human failing.

Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349, 362 (Ind.1982) (punitive damages vacated because allegations of fraud, deceit and oppressive conduct not borne out by clear and convincing evidence). Twice the Indiana Supreme Court has revisited and reaffirmed this standard. Bud Wolf Chevrolet v. Robertson, 519 N.E.2d 135, 137 (Ind.1988) (punitive damages upheld for malicious treatment of customer); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Traina, 486 N.E.2d 1019, 1023 (Ind.1986) (punitive damages vacated because defendant merely negligent). Decisions by the Indiana Courts of Appeals applying this standard are legion. See e.g., Erie Ins. Co. v. Hickman, 580 N.E.2d 320 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (jury grant of punitive damages vacated because no evidence inconsistent with human failing); Eden United v. Short, 573 N.E.2d 920, 926 (Ind.Ct. App.1991); W & W Equipment Co., Inc. v. Mink, 568 N.E.2d 564 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (affirmed punitive damages on evidence of malicious fraud against former shareholders in closely held corporation); Watson v. Thibodeau, 559 N.E.2d 1205, 1210 (Ind.Ct. App.1990) (affirmed denial of punitive damages); Dow Chemical Co. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Center, 553 N.E.2d 144 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (affirmed punitive damages imposed because defendant withheld knowledge of faulty product).

Negligent conduct — and even grossly negligent conduct — is not sufficient to support punitive damages without the additional mental state of malice or wantonness. Bud Wolf, 519 N.E.2d at 137. A defendant must have "subjected other persons to probable injury, with an awareness of such impending danger and with heedless indifference of the consequences." Orkin, 486 N.E.2d at 1023 (emphasis added). There must be sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence of the malfeasor's state of mind to conclude that the person recognized the danger and consciously disregarded it; mere failure recognize a dangerous situation or failure to correct a situation are not sufficient. See Orkin, 486 N.E.2d at 1023. The Court requires "obduracy," which is the state of being hardened against good or moral influence; it means hardhearted, or stubborn. Orkin, 486 N.E.2d at 1022. Defendants' conduct in question must be more than just a human failing (negligence), it must bear incidents of "iniquity," which denotes wickedness, sinfulness and moral turpitude. Plainly, punitive damages are not often warranted in negligence actions.

Because punitive damages are imposed by law solely to promote the public interest — and not to benefit injured parties or their lawyers — a finding that punitive damages are warranted is quasi-criminal in nature. Orkin, 486 N.E.2d at 1023; Travelers, 442 N.E.2d at 363. Therefore, Indiana requires that punitive damages be supported by "clear and convincing evidence" of the malfeasor's state of mind. The purpose of this higher standard is to avoid allowing punitive damages for negligent conduct alone. Travelers, 442 N.E.2d at 362. A corollary to this higher evidentiary standard is that the defendant's conduct, though tortious, is presumed to be the result of noniniquitous human failings. Orkin, 486 N.E.2d at 1023. A plaintiff bears the burden of producing evidence sufficient to rebut this presumption. Id.

B. Review of Non-movant's Evidence at Summary Judgment Stage

When challenged by a motion for summary judgment, the allegations of a complaint must be fleshed out by facts provided by admissible evidence:

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate shall be entered against the adverse party.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Plaintiff's argument that "one need merely to read the complaint" to see that he has stated a valid punitive damage claim is directly contrary to law.³ Samuels v. Wilder, 871 F.2d 1346 (7th Cir.1989). Attested facts submitted by the non-moving party must be accepted by the Court as true. Those facts, and other facts that may reasonably be inferred from them, must be sufficient to establish the existence of every...