San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. National Bank of Commerce of San Antonio
| Decision Date | 30 September 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 16540,16540 |
| Citation | 626 S.W.2d 794 |
| Parties | SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT and City of San Antonio v. NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE OF SAN ANTONIO. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Peter Torres, Jr., Baldemar A. Jiminez, San Antonio, for appellants.
William R. Simcock, Charles Hanor, Cox & Smith, Inc., San Antonio, for appellee.
Before CADENA, C.J., and KLINGEMAN, J.
This is a suit by the National Bank of Commerce (Bank) against the City of San Antonio (City) and the San Antonio Independent School District (School District) for recovery of an alleged overpayment of ad valorem taxes for the year 1976. The Bank sought a refund contending an overpayment was made through a mutual mistake. The trial court judgment, based on the jury's verdict, 1 ordered that the Bank recover from the City and the School District a total of $51,458.95. The defendant moved for judgment non obstante veredicto which was denied by the trial court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The City's and the School District's, appellants herein, basic contention in this appeal is that the trial court erred in denying their motion for judgment non obstante veredicto because (1) appellee was negligent in failing to ascertain the correctness of the tax statement prior to paying the assessed taxes, and because of such negligence appellee's payment of tax as billed was a unilateral mistake which would preclude any refund; (2) appellee's payment of tax as billed was voluntary, and such voluntary payment would preclude any refund; and (3) there is no statute authorizing the refund.
Appellants also assert that (A) there was no evidence to support the jury's answer to Special Issue No. 2; (B) appellee failed to exhaust administrative remedies and did not properly appeal the valuation of the Board of Equalization; and (C) the collection of the tax was validated by the legislature.
A judgment non obstante veredicto is authorized only when there is no evidence warranting the submission of the issue to the jury, and when there is no evidence to support the jury's answer to such issue. Sanders v. Harder, 148 Tex. 593, 227 S.W.2d 206 (1950). Jury findings may not be disregarded if the record contains any evidence of probative value which will reasonably support the finding. Lynch v. Ricketts, 158 Tex. 487, 314 S.W.2d 273 (1958); Frost Nat'l Bank v. Nicholas & Barrera, 534 S.W.2d 927 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Appellee contends that the trial court judgment was correct and should be affirmed because (1) the record does not establish negligence as a matter of law but, to the contrary, there is sufficient evidence to support the submission of, as well as, the jury's findings to Special Issue No. 2; and (2) the Bank's payment of the taxes was without knowledge of their excessiveness, a result of a mutual mistake, and not a voluntary payment.
Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 7166 (Vernon 1960) provides for the assessment of real estate by a bank and requires that each share in such bank shall be taxed only for the difference between its actual cash value and the proportionate amount per share at which its real estate is assessed. The testimony given in the trial court shows the usual and accepted method used to assess and tax bank property. Each bank is required to provide certain information to the tax assessor in order to arrive at the value of the total capital structure of the bank. The bank is also required to provide a list of real estate properties it owns and a market value is placed on each. The total value of the real estate is subtracted from total capital accounts, and the remainder is considered personalty. The net effect is that the bank is taxed on the value placed on its total capital accounts, regardless of the respective values placed on realty and personalty. The taxing authority then applies an assessment ratio and a tax rate to arrive at the taxes owed by the bank.
On May 14, 1976, Jeff Gordon, the City Treasurer, sent a letter to the Bank requesting a Statement of Condition as of May 31, 1976, and other information necessary to assessing property taxes for both the City and the School District. In response, the Bank's comptroller, Jack Eidson, Jr., supplied the requested data, including a statement of the Bank's capital accounts which totalled $33,229,969. In October, 1976, the Tax Assessor sent Notices of Tax Valuation to the Bank, one of which listed the Capital Structure Value of Shares at $25,260,750. The other notices listed market values of two separate pieces of property at $2,281,039 and $1,012,537, apparently reflecting recent improvements which had been made on the properties.
On July 29, 1977, the Bank paid its taxes to the Tax Assessor for the tax year 1976 in response to six (6) statements sent to the Bank. The total tax paid by the Bank was $661,062.96. Around the end of September, 1977, a Bank employee made some calculations and realized the Bank had been taxed on a total property value of $36,035,060 instead of the $33,229,969 amount it had originally rendered in May of 1976. Jack Eidson telephoned Jeff Gordon, the City Treasurer, in late September, to discuss the alleged overpayment. Gordon suggested Eidson put his problem in writing. Eidson then wrote a letter addressed to the City Treasurer, dated October 5, 1977, in which he explained the matter and requested a refund. The refund was never made and the Bank brought this suit.
It is the Bank's contention that, after it had rendered its total capital structure value of $33,229,969, the change in value of certain real estate properties owned by the Bank caused the tax assessor to revalue such properties. The Bank contends, however, the tax assessor failed to make a necessary corresponding counteradjustment to the personalty. This resulted in the alleged overpayment by the Bank.
We first consider appellants' contention that appellee was negligent as a matter of law and that there is no evidence to support the jury's findings to Special Issue No. 2. It is obvious that Jack Eidson, the Comptroller for the Bank made a mistake in paying the tax as billed to...
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