San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Bd. v. Price Co.

• Decision Date: 28 August 1995
• Docket Number: No. D021532,D021532
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6848, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,703 SAN DIEGO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT BOARD, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PRICE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 705

44 Cal.Rptr.2d 705

37 Cal.App.4th 1541, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6848,

95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,703

SAN DIEGO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT BOARD, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PRICE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.

No. D021532.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Aug. 28, 1995.

Asaro, Keagy, Freeland & McKinley, Roscoe D. Keagy and Richard R. Freeland, San Diego, for defendant and appellant.

Best, Best & Krieger, Bruce W. Beach and James B. Gilpin, San Diego, for plaintiff and respondent.

McDONALD, Associate Justice.

The Price Company (Price) appeals a judgment in condemnation. The trial court excluded from jury consideration evidence of access impairment as an element of severance damages. Price asserts prejudicial error by the exclusion of the evidence.

Price owns a 9.205 net acre parcel of land (Price Land) in the City of Santee, California, located at the southeast corner of Cuyamaca Street, which is a north-south street, and Buena Vista Avenue, which is an east-west street.

In connection with the construction and use of a north-south light rail transit line located in the center of Cuyamaca Street, the San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Board (MTDB) filed this condemnation action to acquire (i) a permanent easement along the westerly boundary of the Price Land extending in width from approximately 6.5 feet to approximately 17.5 feet measured perpendicularly in an easterly direction from Cuyamaca Street, and (ii) a temporary "construction easement" over a 12-foot-wide strip of the Price Land contiguous with and easterly of the permanent easement.

Construction of the transit line in the center of Cuyamaca Street includes the installation of concrete berms adjacent and parallel to the rail line from Prospect Avenue, which is an east-west street south of the Price Land, north to Buena Vista Avenue. As a result, existing direct vehicular access to and from the Price Land will become unavailable from and to the southbound traffic lanes of Cuyamaca Street. Existing direct vehicular access to and from the Price Land will remain available (i) from and to the northbound traffic lanes of Cuyamaca Street, and (ii) from and to Buena Vista Avenue. Indirect vehicular access to and from the Price Land will remain available from and to the southbound traffic lanes of Cuyamaca Street by making (i) a left-turn at the intersection of Cuyamaca Street and Buena Vista Avenue, and (ii) a U-turn at the intersection of Cuyamaca Street and Prospect Avenue.

Price's offer of proof of $451,101 in severance damages, of which apparently $325,101 was attributable to impairment of direct vehicular access to and from the southbound traffic lanes of Cuyamaca Street, was denied by the trial court; it held there were no compensable severance damages resulting from impairment of access. ¹ The parties then waived a jury determination of value, and the trial court entered judgment ² in condemnation in favor of MTDB, awarding damages to Price in the amount of $123,298.00, allocated as follows:

Before July 1, 1976, Price would have had no claim in this condemnation action for access impairment severance damages because the improvement in Cuyamaca Street causing the impairment is not located on the Price Land. (See People v. Symons (1960) 54 Cal.2d 855, 9 Cal.Rptr. 363, 357 P.2d 451.) Price may have had an inverse condemnation claim in a separate action for access impairment. (See, e.g., Bacich v. Board of Control (1943) 23 Cal.2d 343, 144 P.2d 818.) Effective July 1, 1976, Code of Civil Procedure section 1263.420 was enacted to provide in part:

"Damage to the remainder is the damage, if any, caused to the remainder by ...

"...

"(b) The construction and use of the project for which the property is taken in the manner proposed ... whether or not the damage is caused by a portion of the project located on the part taken."

Price may therefore assert in this action a severance damage claim for diminution in value of the Price Land caused by the construction and use of the project--that is, the construction and use of berms in Cuyamaca Street which eliminate direct vehicular access to and from the Price Land from and to the southbound traffic lanes of Cuyamaca Street.

The trial court determines whether there is a compensable impairment of access permitting an award of damages, and, if so, the amount of damages is submitted to the jury for determination. (See Orpheum Bldg. Co. v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 863, 146 Cal.Rptr. 5; People v. Ricciardi (1943) 23 Cal.2d 390, 144 P.2d 799; People v. Sayig (1951) 101 Cal.App.2d 890, 226 P.2d 702; see 1 Condemnation Practice in California (2d ed. 1995) § 5.22, pp. 210-211, and § 9.23, pp. 400-402.) In this case the trial court determined there was no compensable impairment of access because the impairment was not substantial, unreasonable or significant.

The California courts have struggled with the identification and extent of the right of access which a real property owner has in the abutting street. Justice Traynor, dissenting in Bacich v. Board of Control, supra, 23 Cal.2d 343 at page 371, 144 P.2d 818, was of the opinion:

"... that the right of ingress and egress is limited to adequate and reasonable access to the property from the street, that it does not extend to the full width of the street, or to the full length thereof, or even to all points upon the street in front of the abutting property. It is sufficient if there is access to a street that in turn connects with the general street system. Any improvement that does not materially interfere with such access does no compensable damage."

However, the majority of the California Supreme Court in Bacich determined that the property owner's "right of access" is more extensive and includes access to the abutting public street and along that street in both directions to the next intersecting streets. (Bacich, supra, 23 Cal.2d at p. 354, 144 P.2d 818; see also Beals v. City of Los Angeles (1943) 23 Cal.2d 381, 144 P.2d 839.) The property owner in Bacich was held to have compensable access impairment damages when the street abutting the property was terminated in one direction by the creation of a cul de sac before reaching the next intersecting street.

By rejecting the Traynor view of a limited right of access, the Bacich court majority recognized that its decision would require a case-by-case review of compensable impairment of access claims when it stated "... we are here concerned with the particular facts of this case and do not purport to declare the law for all cases under all circumstances." (Bacich v. Board of Control, supra, 23 Cal.2d at p. 355, 144 P.2d 818.)

Consequently, subsequent access impairment cases have analyzed in detail each factual situation with results that are seemingly inconsistent and irreconcilable. ³ Access impairment damages have been upheld when the access along the street in both directions to the next intersecting street was not impaired other than by increasing the travel distance necessary to reach the next intersecting street. (People v. Ricciardi, supra, 23 Cal.2d 390, 144 P.2d 799.) Access impairment damages have been denied when access along the street to the next intersecting streets was permitted in only one direction (People v. Sayig, supra, 101 Cal.App.2d 890, 226 P.2d 702; People v. Ayon (1960) 54 Cal.2d 217, 5 Cal.Rptr. 151, 352 P.2d 519), when access along the street remains available to only one of the next intersecting streets (Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 659, 39 Cal.Rptr. 903, 394 P.2d 719) and when access along the street remains available but the distance to intersecting streets has been substantially increased (People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Becker (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 634, 69 Cal.Rptr. 110; People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Home Trust Investment Co. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 1022, 87 Cal.Rptr. 722). In Stanley Brumer v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1738, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 314, the most recent of the published access impairment cases, the court undertook the daunting task of reviewing 50 years of cases, unsuccessfully seeking a consistent standard which could be applied to the facts of that case.

The approach of Justice Traynor in the Bacich case--that a right of access real property interest be defined and if taken or impaired compensation be paid ⁴--has not been the history of access impairment in California. The law has developed with the facts of each case being considered in the context of a general standard rather than a specific property right. The conclusion drawn from the many cases is that compensable access impairment exists if there is a "substantial" impairment of access to the abutting street and from there to the general system of public streets. (See Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co., supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 664, 39 Cal.Rptr. 903, 394 P.2d 719; Stanley Brumer v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1745-46, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 314 and authorities cited.) This general standard has been applied in condemnation cases (People v. Sayig, supra, 101 Cal.App.2d 890, 226 P.2d 702; People v. Ayon (1960) 54 Cal.2d 217, 5 Cal.Rptr. 151, 352 P.2d 519; People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Becker, supra, 262 Cal.App.2d 634, 69 Cal.Rptr. 110; People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Home Trust Investment Co., supra, 8 Cal.App.3d 1022, 87 Cal.Rptr. 722) and in inverse condemnation cases (Rose v. State of California (1942) 19 Cal.2d 713, 123 P.2d 505; Bacich v. Board of Control, supra, 23 Cal.2d 343, 144 P.2d 818; Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co., supra, 61 Cal.2d 659, 39 Cal.Rptr. 903, 394 P.2d 719; Orpheum Bldg. Co. v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., supra, 80 Cal.App.3d 863, 146 Cal.Rptr. 5). It does not matter whether the issue of compensable damages for impairment of access arises in a...