San Jacinto River Auth. v. Medina

• Decision Date: 16 April 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-0402, No. 19-0401,No. 19-0400,19-0400
• Citation: 627 S.W.3d 618
• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Parties: SAN JACINTO RIVER AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. Vicente MEDINA, Ashley Medina and Aris Antoniou, Respondents San Jacinto River Authority, Petitioner, v. Michael A. Burney, et al., Respondents San Jacinto River Authority, Petitioner, v. Charles J. Argento, et al., Respondents

627 S.W.3d 618

SAN JACINTO RIVER AUTHORITY, Petitioner,

v.Vicente MEDINA, Ashley Medina and Aris Antoniou, Respondents

San Jacinto River Authority, Petitioner,

v.Michael A. Burney, et al., Respondents

San Jacinto River Authority, Petitioner,

v.Charles J. Argento, et al., Respondents

No. 19-0400

No. 19-0401

No. 19-0402

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued October 6, 2020

OPINION DELIVERED: April 16, 2021

Rehearing Denied September 3, 2021

Dennis C. Reich, Houston, Vincent L. Marable III, Wharton, Jennifer B. Rustay, Daniel P. Barton, Houston, Allison Haver Gabbert, Justin E. VandenBout, William Fred Hagans, Carl David Kulhanek Jr., Houston, for Respondents Medina, Vicente, Freeman, John R., Argento, Charles J., Medina, Ashley, Antoniou, Aris, Lange, Jennifer Wood, Wolf, Rodney M., Miles, Sherry K., Daniel, Carolyn F., Nowlin, Jack L., Revel, Louise W., Casey, Charles A., Faulkinberry, John, Ryan, Bernard F., Miller, Sally T., Casey, Maureen S., Revel, James R., Buchan, Kristofer D, Stegall, Dana M., Shepherd, Becky A., Burgess, Diane, Daniel, John M., Napier, Junior, William J., Sumner, Todd R., Ensley, Anne, Wolf, Nancy L., Wherry, Diane S., Faulkinberry, Laurie D., Medina, Vicente, Ensley, Jeff, Burgess, Brandon, Burney, Ginger R., Burney, Michael, Nowlin, Linda S., Shepherd, Barry L., Huseman, Kurt V., Miller, David L., Sumner, Kimberly A., Ryan, Cecilia M., Buchan, Melissa, Miles, Robert C., Argento, Katherine, Lange, William E., Freeman, Barbara, Huseman, Debbie L., Wherry, Charles H. F., Stegall, Danny C.

J. Mark Breeding, Cameron Phair Pope, Houston, Scott A. Brister, Austin, William S. Helfand, Frederick D. Junkin, Shane L. Kotlarsky, Houston, for Petitioner.

Jason R. LaFond, Jeffrey C. Mateer, Austin, Ryan Lee Bangert, W. Kenneth Paxton Jr., Austin, Kyle D. Hawkins, for Amicus Curiae State of Texas.

Justice Devine delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Hecht, Justice Guzman, Justice Lehrmann, Justice Boyd, Justice Busby, Justice Bland, and Justice Huddle joined.

During Hurricane Harvey in 2017, the San Jacinto River Authority released water from its Lake Conroe reservoir into the San Jacinto River. Contending that this release caused or contributed to the flooding of their properties, downstream property owners filed three multi-party suits in two different district courts, asserting both common-law inverse condemnation claims under Article 1, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution and statutory takings claims under Chapter 2007 of the Government Code. These cases reach us as interlocutory appeals from trial court orders denying the River Authority's motions to dismiss the three suits. The three cases have been consolidated for purposes of this appeal.¹

The issue we must decide is whether Chapter 2007 applies strictly to regulatory takings, as the River Authority maintains, or whether it may also apply to a physical taking, as the property owners contend. The court of appeals affirmed the trial courts' orders, which denied the River Authority's motions to dismiss, concluding that Chapter 2007's statutory takings claim included the physical takings claim alleged in the property owners' pleadings. San Jacinto River Auth. v. Burney , 570 S.W.3d 820 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018). We agree and affirm.

I

The San Jacinto River Authority is a conservation and reclamation district created in 1937 as a political subdivision of the State of Texas.² The River Authority has many responsibilities, including "storing, controlling, and conserving storm and floodwaters of the San Jacinto River and its tributaries."³

In 1973, the River Authority completed the construction of an earthen dam across the West Fork of the San Jacinto River to create Lake Conroe. The River Authority has operated and maintained the lake and dam since that time. The dam is about thirty miles north of the property owners' homes and properties.

The property owners allege that during Hurricane Harvey in late August and early September 2017, the River Authority released rising water from Lake Conroe into the West Fork of the San Jacinto River, causing or exacerbating the downstream flooding of their properties. They seek damages from the River Authority in three separate lawsuits in Harris County district courts. Each suit alleges takings claims under both the Texas Constitution⁴ and the Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act, which is codified as Chapter 2007 of the Texas Government Code.⁵

The River Authority filed Rule 91a motions to dismiss the property owners' suits on grounds of governmental immunity. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a. The district courts denied the motions, and the River Authority appealed. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(8) (authorizing an interlocutory appeal from an order on the government's jurisdictional plea). In that appeal, the River Authority raised a new jurisdictional argument, asserting that the county civil courts at law in Harris County possessed exclusive, original jurisdiction over eminent domain proceedings. See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 25.1032(c) ("A county civil court at law has exclusive jurisdiction in Harris County of eminent domain proceedings, both statutory and inverse.").

The court of appeals agreed that the district courts of Harris County lacked jurisdiction over the property owners' inverse-condemnation claims and dismissed them without prejudice to refile in the proper court. 570 S.W.3d at 838–39. Concluding that the district courts otherwise possessed jurisdiction to determine the property owners' statutory takings claims under Chapter 2007, the court of appeals affirmed the trial courts' decision not to dismiss them. Id. at 839 ; see also TEX. GOV'T CODE § 2007.021(a) (stating that takings claims under the chapter "must be filed in a district court"). The River Authority's petition for review to this Court complains that the appellate court erred in not also dismissing the property owners' statutory claims because the taking alleged in their pleadings is outside Chapter 2007's scope and limited waiver of sovereign immunity.

II

Sovereign and governmental immunity protect the state and its political subdivisions, respectively, from suit and liability absent the state's express waiver. Rusk State Hosp. v. Black , 392 S.W.3d 88, 93 (Tex. 2012). Chapter 2007's Property Rights Act waives that immunity "to the extent of liability created by this chapter" by authorizing a property owner to bring suit "to determine whether the governmental action of a political subdivision results in a taking under this chapter." TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 2007.004(a), .021(a). The Act defines the term "taking" to include governmental actions compensable as takings under the state and federal constitutions, as well as less intrusive governmental actions that cause "a reduction of at least 25 percent in the market value of the affected private real property." Id. § 2007.002(5). The Property Rights Act further enumerates the governmental actions to which it applies, while specifying fourteen governmental actions to which it does not apply. Id. § 2007.003.

The River Authority makes a twofold argument that the Act's waiver of governmental immunity does not apply to its decision to release water from the Lake Conroe reservoir. First, it contends that the Act applies only to regulatory takings and not the physical taking alleged by the property owners; that is, the flooding allegedly caused by the River Authority. Alternatively, the Authority maintains that even if the Act might be construed to cover a physical taking, its actions here are nevertheless excluded because they were responsive to "a grave and immediate threat to life and property." See id. § 2007.003(b)(7). We consider these arguments in turn.

III

The River Authority contends that Chapter 2007 applies to regulatory takings only. Takings may be classified as either physical or regulatory. Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Gragg , 151 S.W.3d 546, 554 (Tex. 2004). A physical taking occurs when the government literally takes property from its owner, such as when it "authorizes an unwarranted physical occupation of an individual's property." Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale , 964 S.W.2d 922, 933 (Tex. 1998). A regulatory taking occurs when the government restricts a property owner's rights to such an extent as to become the functional equivalent of a physical seizure. Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State , 381 S.W.3d 468, 490 (Tex. 2012). The River Authority maintains that a fair reading of the chapter indicates (1) that the liability created here is only for regulatory takings (not the physical taking alleged in the property owners' pleadings) and (2) that governmental immunity is waived only for suits to invalidate and rescind such regulations.

The court of appeals disagreed. It "reject[ed] the River Authority's contention that Chapter 2007 applies only to regulatory takings and does not apply to physical takings, such as flooding," noting that "the statute expressly applies to a governmental action ‘that imposes a physical invasion ... of private real property.’ " 570 S.W.3d at 832 (quoting TEX. GOV'T CODE § 2007.003(a)(2) ). The court relied further on the chapter's broad definition of "taking." That definition includes both regulatory and physical takings. See id. at 831 (noting the inclusion of compensable takings under both the state and federal constitutions in the statutory definition). The court accordingly concluded that the property owners' allegations of a physical taking were sufficient to invoke the chapter's waiver of governmental immunity. Id. at 832.

The River Authority maintains that the court of appeals has misinterpreted the physical-invasion provision to expand the chapter's scope to physical takings. It concedes, however, that governmental actions that impose a "physical invasion" of real property can refer to either a physical or regulatory taking. But in the context of this statute, it reasonably refers only to the latter, according to the River...