San Leandro Teachers Ass'n. v. Governing Bd.

• Decision Date: 28 August 2007
• Docket Number: No. A114679.,No. A115686.,A114679.,A115686.
• Citation: 154 Cal.App.4th 866,65 Cal.Rptr.3d 288
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: SAN LEANDRO TEACHERS ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. GOVERNING BOARD OF the SAN LEANDRO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Appellants.

65 Cal.Rptr.3d 288

154 Cal.App.4th 866

SAN LEANDRO TEACHERS ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. GOVERNING BOARD OF the SAN LEANDRO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. A114679.

No. A115686.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1.

August 28, 2007.

Littler Mendelson, P.C., Garry G. Mathiason, Esq., Kimberly L. Owens, Esq., San Francisco, for Defendants and Appellants.

Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, Bruce A. Barsook, Esq., Los Angeles, Didier Y. Reiss, Esq., for California School Boards Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.

California Teachers Association, Priscilla S. Winslow, Esq., Beverly Tucker, Esq., Ballinger G. Kemp, Esq., Ramon E. Romero, Esq., Burlingame, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Michael R. Clancy, Chief Counsel, Christina C. Bleuler, Staff Attorney, for California School Employees Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Rothner, Segall & Greenstone, Glenn Rothner, Esq., Pasadena, Jonathan Cohen, Esq., for American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, and Service Employees Union, Local 99 as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.

SWAGER, J.

The Governing Board of the San Leandro Unified School District, the San Leandro Unified School District (District), District Superintendent Christine Lim, and Assistant Superintendent Mike Martinez (collectively referred to as appellants) appeal the trial court's order granting the petition for peremptory writ of mandate brought by the San Leandro Teachers Association (SLTA) and the California Teachers Association (CTA) (collectively referred to as respondents), prohibiting appellants "from restricting the content of communications by SLTA placed in the District's mailboxes." Appellants also appeal the order granting respondents' motion for attorney fees.¹ We reverse.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The essential facts underlying this case are not in dispute. SLTA is the exclusive bargaining representative of the District's certificated employees. On October 11 and 12, 2004, SLTA distributed two employee newsletters by placing them in internal faculty mailboxes located at the District's schools. The first newsletter, entitled "SLATE," is a two-page memorandum from SLTA's president that contains a section discussing the upcoming school board election.² The second news letter is a one-page memorandum addressed to SLTA's members, entitled "From the Table." Among other matters, this newsletter urges members to support SLTA's endorsed candidates for school board, and to engage in activities in support of these candidates.³ Both newsletters were produced entirely at SLTA expense.

The District's mailboxes are permanent fixtures at each school, consisting of a wooden or metal frame grid that is fixed to the wall in school offices. Each certificated employee is assigned a mailbox. The normal intended purpose of the school mailboxes is to communicate with teachers and staff regarding school-related matters. Nonschool organizations do not have direct access to these mailboxes. Pursuant to District policy, materials generated by such organizations may not be placed in the mailboxes without the District's prior approval. As a representative employee organization, SLTA is allowed to use the mailboxes to communicate with its employee members pursuant to the Educational Employment Relations Act (Gov.Code, § 3540 et seq.) (EERA) and the collective bargaining agreement.

On October 15, 2004, Assistant Superintendent Martinez sent a letter to the president of SLTA advising him that the union is prohibited by Education Code⁴ section 7054⁵ from using school district mail facilities to distribute materials that contain political endorsements. The letter goes on to state: "[T]his letter serves to place you on notice that we will not allow the SLTA access to faculty mailboxes if any future distributions contain impermissible political endorsements."⁶

On November 16, 2004, SLTA filed an unfair practice charge with the Public Employee Relations Board (PERB), alleging that the District violated provisions of the EERA by prohibiting SLTA from distributing union newsletters containing its political endorsements via the school mailboxes.

On June 28, 2005, PERB adopted an earlier decision of one of its agents, dismissing the unfair practice charge. The agent had determined that "the plain meaning of [section 7054] prohibited the use of mailboxes as a means of distributing political information." The agency also relied on one of its own earlier decisions, which held that a school's internal mail system amounted to "services" or "equipment" within the meaning of section 7054.

On September 30, 2005, respondents filed a petition for peremptory writ of mandate to cause appellants to "cease and desist from enforcing a policy which forbids [respondents] from placing in the school mailboxes any materials generated by the [SLTA] which contain references to candidates for public office or ballot initiatives." Appellants demurred to the writ petition, asserting that prohibiting the distribution of partisan political material via the mailboxes is both constitutional as a matter of law and mandated by section 7054.⁷

On May 3, 2006, the trial court granted the writ petition and overruled appellants' demurrer. Subsequently, the court awarded respondents their attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

"`On appeal following a trial court's decision on a petition for a writ of mandate, the reviewing court "`need only review the record to determine whether the trial court's findings are supported by substantial evidence.'" [Citation.] However, we review questions of law independently. [Citation.]' [Citation.] Where, as here, the issue involves statutory interpretation, we exercise our independent judgment and review the matter de novo." (Armando D. v. State. Dept. of Health Services (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 13, 21, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 66.) We review de novo both the trial court's interpretation of the relevant provisions and the constitutional issues it resolved. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 11 P.3d 956; Baba v. Board of Supervisors (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 504, 512, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 428; Herbst v. Swan (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 813, 816,125 Cal.Rptr.2d 836.)

Attorney fee awards under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 578, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 331, 101 P.3d 140.) "The questions are whether the court applied the proper legal standards under section 1021.5 and, if so, whether the result was within the range of the court's discretion [citation], i.e., whether there was a reasonable basis for the decision...." (Bowman v. City of Berkeley (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 173, 177, 31 Cal. Rptr.3d 447.)

II. Education Code section 7054

The trial court determined that section 7054 did not bar the distribution of SLTA newsletters containing political matter through the District's mailboxes. The court found that, in the context of this case, "the `use' of public funds is nominal, at best. The mailboxes exist. There is no cost or use of public resources over and above the normal costs of the mailboxes which is incurred by the District on account of SLTA's use of the mailboxes. The newsletters at issue here are produced and distributed entirely by SLTA, with no use of any District resources. This is simply not the type of political campaigning activity to which section 7054 is directed." (Fn. omitted.)

Appellants maintain that they are required by section 7054 to prohibit respondents from using school mailboxes for partisan political campaigning. They assert that the trial court erroneously interpreted section 7054 to apply only to direct expenditures of District funds. They also claim the court erred in finding that this section does not apply to the newsletters at issue here simply because the impact on public funds is "nominal." They note that PERB has interpreted this section to prohibit a district from "passively allow[ing] its mailboxes to be used to distribute union political materials...." (Am. Fed of Teachers Guild v. San Diego Community College Dist. (2001) PERB Dec. No. LA-CE4217-E [26 PERC ¶ 33014, p. 41, p. 43].)

Respondents argue that section 7054 does not apply to SLTA's use of the mailboxes because SLTA bears the cost of producing and distributing the message. They support their argument by noting that other sections of the Education Code allow for the solicitation of political contributions on school property and authorize school districts to allow nongovernmental speakers to engage in political discussions on school grounds. Thus, they conclude that section 7054 does not extend to the "passive toleration of the speech of others whose voice could not be confused with that of the government's." They also claim that a separate provision found in the EERA guarantees employee organizations access to faculty mailboxes.

A. Statutory Construction

We begin with a basic principle of statutory construction: We need not resort to legislative history or other interpretive aids if the statutory language itself is unambiguous. "`"If there is no ambiguity in the language, we presume the Legislature meant what it said and the plain meaning of the statute governs." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 905, 119 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 44 P.3d 949; Lennane v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 263, 268, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 563, 885 P.2d 976.)

In our view, section 7054 unambiguously decrees that school district resources may not be used in furtherance of political activities, regardless of the identity of the actor or the cost to the district.⁸ The statute's use of the passive voice ("[n]o school...