San Ysidro Irrigation District v. Superior Court of SanDiego County

• Decision Date: 26 October 1961
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 365 P.2d 753 SAN YSIDRO IRRIGATION DISTRICT et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent; The City of San Diego, Real Party in Interest. L. A. 26395.

Page 609

16 Cal.Rptr. 609

56 Cal.2d 708, 365 P.2d 753

SAN YSIDRO IRRIGATION DISTRICT et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent The City of San Diego, Real Party in Interest.

L. A. 26395.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Oct. 26, 1961.

Kaminar, Sorbo, Andreen, Thorn & Gallagher and Robert Thorn, San Diego, for petitioners.

Henry A. Dietz, County Counsel, and Joseph Kase, Jr., Deputy County Counsel, San Diego, for respondent.

Alan M. Firestone and J. F. DuPaul, City Attys., San Diego, for real party in interest.

DOOLING, Justice.

Petitioners seek a peremptory writ of prohibition restraining respondent superior court from taking any further proceedings in a pending action instituted by the City of San Diego against petitioners.

The San Ysidro Irrigation District (hereinafter referred to as the district) was duly created in 1911 under the Irrigation District Law of the State of California (now Water Code, §§ 20500-29978) and at all times since, the district has been the sole supplier of water to a heretofore unincorporated area known as the City of San Ysidro. On September 13, 1957, the City of San Diego (hereinafter referred to as the city) annexed all of the territory lying within the boundaries of the district. This was the 'South Bay Annexation,' the validity of which was unsuccessfully challenged before the Supreme Court of the United States (Hazelton v. City of San Diego, 1960, 183 Cal.App.2d 131, 6 Cal.Rptr. 723; certiorari denied 366 U.S. 910, 81 S.Ct. 1084, 6 L.Ed.2d 235.) At no time since the annexation has the city attempted to furnish water to the inhabitants within the boundaries of the district.

In January 1961 the city brought an action for declaratory relief against the district and its board of directors for an adjudication that the district was dissolved by operation of law on September 13, 1957, when the district was annexed by the city. The city also sought in the action a preliminary and a permanent injunction enjoining the district and its directors from entering into any contracts for the construction of any new water lines and facilities and from disposing of any assets of the district. The city's complaint alleged that the district does not have an adequate supply of water and that such supply of water as is available to the district is not of the quality required by state laws and regulations. It further alleged that the city has requested the district's board of directors to turn over the facilities and assets of the district to the city so that the city could serve the inhabitants of the district with an adequate supply of water but this request has been refused; that the inhabitants and property owners of the district are suffering irreparable damage by reason of the service of 'inadequate and unpotable water' by the district; and that the city will suffer irreparable damage if the district is permitted to continue its usurpation of the city's functions. It also alleged that the district threatened to and would, unless enjoined, construct substandard water facilities within the district's boundaries, and so within the city's boundaries.

A temporary restraining order was issued against the district and its directors enjoining them from constructing water facilities and from disposing of the district's cash and assets pending a further hearing on an order to show cause as to why a preliminary injunction to the same effect should not be issued. The city next amended its complaint to bring in as a party defendant a company which had designed and agreed to construct a filtration plant for the district; and a further temporary restraining order was issued prohibiting the company's proposed plant construction.

The district and its directors then moved for dismissal of the proceedings for lack of jurisdiction, filing the following documents: (1) a motion to strike the complaint upon the ground that the court was without jurisdiction in the matter, under sections 23202 and 27401 of the Water Code, requiring the assent of the Secretary of the Interior to the dissolution of any irrigation district having a contract with the United States for the delivery of water; the supporting affidavit stated that the required assent had not been given and named three governmental agencies for which the district was obligated to supply water; (2) a demurrer on the ground of lack of capacity to sue and failure to state a cause of action in that quo warranto was the exclusive means to test the validity of the existence of the district and its board of directors and (3) a motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the legislative and administrative acts of public officers until it was judicially determined that the district had been dissolved. After hearing on February 9, 1961, the court denied the district's motions and overruled the demurrer; and granted the city's request for a preliminary injunction. Thereupon the district and its directors petitioned for this writ of prohibition, claiming that unless restrained by this court, respondent court will proceed to trial on the case on its merits and enforce the preliminary injunction to petitioners' irrevocable injury.

The main question in dispute is whether quo warranto is the exclusive remedy for attacking the validity of the existence of an irrigation district, as petitioners maintain, or whether a declaratory relief action is likewise available as a proper method of determining the legal existence of the district, as the city maintains. Declaratory relief has been granted in two cases where the plaintiff sought an adjudication as to whether a public district was dissolved by operation of law when the territory embraced by the boundaries of the district was entirely included within an incorporated city. City of Escalon v. Escalon Sanitary Dist., 1960, 179 Cal.App.2d 475, 3 Cal.Rptr. 889; Dickson v. City of Carlsbad, 1953, 119 Cal.App.2d 809, 260 P.2d 226. In the Dickson case the court cited the well-settled rule that 'there cannot be at the same time, within the same territory, two distinct municipal corporations exercising the same powers, jurisdiction, and privileges' and accordingly 'where one municipal corporation is annexed to another, the annexing city takes over the functions of the annexed municipality, and the latter by virtue of the annexation is extinguished, and its property, powers, and duties are vested in the corporation of which it has become a part.' 119 Cal.App.2d at page 812, 260 P.2d at page 228; see also Allied Amusement Co. of Los Angeles v. Bryam, 201 Cal. 316, 320, 256 P. 1097; In re Petition East Fruitvale Sanitary Dist., 158 Cal. 453, 457, 111 P. 368. The Escalon case cited and quoted from Dickson, 179 Cal.App.2d at pages 478-480, 3 Cal.Rptr. 889, as decisive. Neither the Dickson nor Escalon cases discusses the matter of quo warranto.

Petitioners argue that quo warranto is the exclusive remedy (Code Civ.Proc. § 803; 41 Cal.Jur.2d Quo Warranto, § 5, p. 614; § 12, p. 624), citing Keech v. Joplin, 1909, 157 Cal. 1, 14, 106 P. 222; Wilson v. City of San Bernardino, 1960, 186 Cal.App.2d 603, 611, 9 Cal.Rptr. 431; Coe v. City of Los Angeles, 1919, 42 Cal.App. 479, 481, 183 P. 822; Jaques v. Board of Supervisors, 1914, 24 Cal.App. 381, 385, 141 P. 404; and Metcalfe v. Merritt, 1910, 14 Cal.App. 244, 247, 111 P. 505; that the existence of a public corporation cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding by private individuals (Reclamation District No. 542 v. Turner, 1894, 104 Cal. 334, 335, 37 P. 1038; Quint v. Hoffman, 1894, 103 Cal. 506, 507, 37 P. 514, 777) but only in a proceeding in quo warranto at the suit of the state. With the exception of the Wilson case, all the cases cited by petitioners were decided prior to the adoption of the declaratory relief statute in 1921. (Code Civ.Proc. § 1060 et seq.) In the Wilson case plaintiff as a taxpayer brought an action for declaratory relief against a city and a water district, seeking a declaration that the city was not a part of the district as the result of an election. He also sought an adjudication as to his and other taxpayers' rights and duties, and to have the district restrained from levying or assessing taxes on property within the city. The trial court found that 'a proceeding in quo warranto was the required action to be taken to test the questions here raised and that the attorney general has never consented to bringing this action,' and '(j)udgment was entered denying plaintiff relief.' 186 Cal.App.2d at page 606, 9 Cal.Rptr. at page 433. The District Court of Appeal approved this finding, citing 41 Cal.Jur.2d 614, section 5, where it is said that the 'statutory proceeding in the nature of quo warranto generally affords the exclusive remedy as to matters coming within its scope' and thus 'a proceeding in quo warranto by or on behalf of the state is the exclusive remedy for challenging the due incorporation * * * of * * * for attacking the regularity of the organization of a municipal or other public corporation such as a reclamation, irrigation or protection district. * * *'

Petitioners also cite an opinion of the Attorney General wherein the City of Downey requested permission from the Attorney General to bring an action in quo warranto to test the validity of the existence of the Downey County Water District, the city claiming that the district 'became merged with the city' and 'by reason of such merger became dissolved.' (35 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 214.) Apparently in the Attorney General's opinion, as is petitioners' contention, a municipal corporation has no status different from a 'private person' in testing the validity of the existence of another political subdivision and so is subject to Code of Civil Procedure, section 803. However, while the Attorney General held that quo warranto was proper, he did not indicate that it was the sole remedy.

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