Harman v. City and County of San Francisco

• Decision Date: 15 May 1972
• Docket Number: S.F. 22859
• Citation: 7 Cal.3d 150,101 Cal.Rptr. 880
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 496 P.2d 1248 June HARMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Defendants and Respondents. In Bank

Page 880

101 Cal.Rptr. 880

7 Cal.3d 150, 496 P.2d 1248

June HARMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Defendants and Respondents.

S.F. 22859.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

May 15, 1972.

John B. Harman, San Francisco, for plaintiff and appellant.

Thomas M. O'Connor, City Atty., Norman Sanford Wolff and Robert A. Kenealey, Deputy City Attys., Kopp & Goldstein, Quentin L. Kopp, Thomas M. Di Franco, Walter A. Dold, George S. Youngling, Thomas F. Stack, Hanson, Bridgett, Marcus & Jenkins, William J. Bush and Pierce N. Stein, San Francisco, for defendants and respondents.

Sidney E. Roberts, James K. Haynes and Orrick, Herrington, Rowley & Sutcliffe, San Francisco, as amici curiae on behalf of defendants and respondents.

TOBRINER, Justice.

In this taxpayer's suit we are asked to determine if San Francisco may properly sell its vacated streets, burdened with private easements of ingress and egress, for 50 percent of their unencumbered fee value We hold that, because the values of such easements in all of the city's streets are not uniform, the city's arbitrary reduction of 50 percent of the value of the vacated street in fixing the sales price violates its charter duty to obtain 90 percent of the rationally determined market value of all public property offered for sale.

Pursuant to the authority granted in the Streets and Highways Code and its charter, the City and County of San Francisco may upon petition of abutting landowners vacate a public street and convey the city's interest in such street to the petitioning landowners. After the petition of the landowners to the board of supervisors describing the purposes for their request and the intended use of the street to be vacated, the city director of property determines the street's appraised value. Upon the landowners' tender of a sum equal to that value, the board of supervisors is authorized to find that the granting of the landowners' petition will serve public convenience and to order the vacation and sale of the street.

In obtaining the appraised value of streets proposed for vacation, the city director of property estimates the value of a fee interest of an area equal to that of the street to be vacated, and he then halves that value to compensate for the continuing private easement of ingress and egress held by an owner whose property abuts the vacated street.

Plaintiff sues as a San Francisco taxpayer to obtain a declaration that the property director's method of obtaining appraised values results in a 'gift of public funds' contrary to 'the laws, statutes, charters, and ordinances governing such sales and transactions.' She alleges that in at least eight sales of former streets the private easements commanded no value, so that the city, in determining the price at which to sell, should not have discounted the value of the fee by 50 percent. Plaintiff also demands that the city receive as damages the differences between the actual value and sale price of the eight street segments conveyed.

Defendants, the city and landowners to whom the city has deemed vacated streets, demurred to plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The superior court, advising plaintiff that her complaint could not be cured by amendment, sustained defendants' demurrers without leave to amend. Plaintiff then prosecuted this appeal from a judgment of dismissal.

We hold that plaintiff has stated a valid cause of action, and that the judgment must be reversed with directions to overrule the demurrers. As we shall explain, plaintiff's status as a taxpayer qualifies her to raise the justiciable question of whether the city has violated a statutory duty in its alienation of formerly public streets. Resolving that question, we determine that a charter provision requires the city to obtain 90 percent of the market value of the street property that it sells. The city's practice of evaluating all easements of ingress and egress at 50 percent of the unencumbered fee value cannot stand, since each easement's value must necessarily vary according to the highest and best use of the dominant parcels that abut each street.

1. Plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action.

We meet at the outset defendants' contention that plaintiff's complaint does not state a cause of action and fails for lack of specificity. We explain that a complaint is not vulnerable to a general demurrer if the complaint states the essential and substantial facts to apprise defendant of the nature of the cause of action.

We said in Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156--157, 157 P.2d 1, 5, that '(a)ll that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that his complaint set forth the Essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action' (emphasis added). Similarly, in Krug v. Meeham (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 274, 277, 240 P.2d 732, the court suggested that averment of the 'substantial facts' that constituted a cause of action would suffice to dispel a general demurrer.

Scott v. City of Indian Wells (1972) 6 Cal.3d 541, 549, 99 Cal.Rptr. 745, 750, 492 P.2d 1137, 1142, establishes the principle that no more is required than a showing that plaintiff is entitled to Some relief, stating, 'If upon a consideration of all the facts stated it appears that the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the defendants, the complaint will be held good, although the facts may not be clearly stated, . . . or although the plaintiff may demand relief to which he is not entitled under the facts alleged.' (See also Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639, 14 Cal.Rptr. 496; Terry Trading Corp. v. Barsky (1930) 210 Cal. 428, 438, 292 P. 474.)

Indeed, a general demurrer to a complaint should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint raises the reasonable possibility that its defects can be cured by amendment. Thus the court in Lemoge Electric v. County of San Mateo (1956) 46 Cal.2d 659, 664, 297 P.2d 638, 641, explains: 'In the furtherance of justice great liberality should be exercised in permitting a plaintiff to amend his complaint, and it ordinarily constitutes an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.' (See also Lingsch v. Savage (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 729, 739--740, 29 Cal.Rptr. 201.) In sum, if the pleadings contain 'sufficient particularity and precision to acquaint the defendants with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action' the general demurrer should be overruled. (Strozier v. Williams (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 528, 532, 9 Cal.Rptr. 683; see Smith v. Kern County Land Co. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 205, 209, 331 P.2d 645.)

Plaintiff at the very least states the essential and substantial facts to apprise the defendants of the nature of her cause of action. Thus plaintiff alleges that the named eight defendants set forth in Exhibit A, the abutting owners of certain streets, petitioned defendant city to vacate the streets on which their property abutted. In accordance with the provisions of the Street Vacation Act of 1941, the defendant city published notice of intention to vacate these streets. Pursuant to the notices defendant board of supervisors held hearings and thereafter ordered the vacation of those streets. It directed the defendant Dolan, clerk of the board of supervisors, and the defendant Alioto, the Mayor, 'to execute a document transferring the interest of defendant City to the defendant herein petitioning for vacation and owning the abutting property.' These defendants, the abutting owners, 'have purchased or acquired or have a right to purchase or acquire from defendant City, and defendant City has sold or agreed to sell or transfer its fee title or other interest' in the described streets.

Turning to the value of the vacated streets, plaintiff alleges that the defendant city and the defendant director of property 'have determined the value of each street or portion of a street' and after so doing 'gave, granted, and allowed to each person acquiring title to such street or portion thereof from defendant City a sum equal to 50% Of the true value thereof to said abutting owners as compensation for rights of ingress and egress over and upon the property vacated and ordered sold.' Despite such allowances plaintiff alleges on information and belief 'that said rights o(f) ingress and egress were and are of no value to the abutting owners and purchasers.' Indeed, each abutting owner 'asserted his or its intention to abandon said street or portion thereof as a street and to consolidate it with other properties owned by each of said defendants and abutting owners as a single property.' The complaint states that it was the intention of the abutting owner 'to exclude the public therefrom and to construct buildings over and upon said properties including said street or portion thereof.'

As a result of these transactions, the complaint alleges, '(d)efendant City received no benefit or consideration from allowance of 50% Of said value for alleged rights of ingress and egress, . . . but was deprived of the true and reasonable value of such property so transferred. . . .' Finally, the complaint asserts that the aforementioned transactions were 'all contrary to the best interests of defendant City, plaintiff, and each taxpayer of the City and County of San Francisco, constituting a gift of public funds, which is contrary to the Constitution of the State of California, the laws, statutes, charters, and ordinances governing such sales and transfers.'

These allegations contain the substance of plaintiff's purported cause of action that the city violated a statutory duty owed to its taxpayers. Although the complaint...