Sanal v. Meador
| Decision Date | 25 January 1952 |
| Citation | 108 Cal.App.2d 820,239 P.2d 908 |
| Parties | SANAL v. MEADOR et al. Civ. 18606. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
William H. Brawner and Newell & Chester, Los Angeles, for appellant.
Knight, Gitelson, Ashton & Hagenbaugh, Los Angeles, for respondents.
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment in favor of defendant Meador in an action for damages arising out of an accident in which plaintiff was injured when she was struck by defendant's automobile as she was crossing Glenoaks Boulevard at Colgin Court, in the city of Burbank.
The action was first tried to a jury, but after the jury disagreed was submitted to and decided by the trial judge. The court found that defendant was not negligent in the operation of his automobile, and that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. These findings are challenged as being without support in the evidence. It is also contended by plaintiff that the court failed to make its findings upon the most important factual question in the case, namely, whether plaintiff, when she was struck, was in an unmarked crosswalk.
Glenoaks Boulevard, a north and south street, is approximately 60 feet in width. Colgin Court is located on the east side of Glenoaks between Santa Anita Avenue to the north, and Providencia Avenue to the south. It is 15 feet six inches in width between curbs and has narrow sidewalks extending along its northerly and southerly lines. There are many small houses, placed side by side, facing the court. Opposite Colgin Court, and extending westerly from Glenoaks, is an alley of the same dimensions as Colgin Court. At about 5:15 p. m. on the 29th day of October, 1949, plaintiff drove her automobile south on Glenoaks and parked it at the west curb just north of the intersection of the alley. At that time there was a single streetcar line on the west half of Glenoaks, the east rail of which was a few feet west of the center line of the boulevard, which center line was marked by one or two white lines. Plaintiff emerged from her car and walked across the westerly half of Glenoaks. She stopped at the center line waiting for the passage of northbound vehicular traffic on the east half of Glenoaks. It was dusk and headlights of the cars were burning, some on low beam and some on high beam. As she was standing near the middle of the street she was struck by defendant's car traveling south in the car tracks on Glenoaks. She was knocked to the ground ahead of the car, was rendered unconscious, suffered numerous fractures and other serious injuries. Defendant had previously lost the sight of one eye but otherwise possessed normal vision. The weather was clear and the street was dry. Defendant testified that he did not see plaintiff until he was within two car lengths of her; he was driving 20 or 25 miles an hour with his lights on low beam; other cars were passing him on his right; upon seeing plaintiff he applied his brakes and endeavored to stop, and did stop within about a car length after striking plaintiff. Plaintiff testified she was dressed in a brown blouse and blue jeans, that as she entered Glenoaks she looked to the left, or north, and saw no car approaching south of Santa Anita, 150 feet or more to the north. Having reached the middle of the street she watched for traffic traveling north. She again looked to the north on the west side of the street and for the first time saw defendant's car which was practically upon her. Before she had an opportunity to escape she was struck.
The court found that defendant was not negligent, and that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
A primary factual question was whether plaintiff was in a crosswalk. The complaint read in paragraph V as follows: '* * * the plaintiff was walking across said Glenoaks Boulevard at or about the northerly intersection of said Glenoaks Boulevard with Colgin Court, and at and in the usual and regular crossing for pedestrians on said street, at said intersection.' This was considered during the trial as a sufficient allegation that plaintiff was in a crosswalk, and evidence was introduced as to whether a corsswalk existed and whether plaintiff was in it. The court made the following finding: 'That all of the allegations contained in paragraph V of said Complaint are untrue except that an accident did occur on October 29, 1949, near the intersection of said Glenoaks Boulevard with Colgin Court between the Chrysler automobile operated by defendant John Donald Meador and the person of plaintiff, and that plaintiff did sustain certain injuries.' This finding could mean either that there was a crosswalk and that plaintiff was not in it, or that there was no crosswalk. Defendant would have us hold it to be merely a finding that if there was a crosswalk plaintiff was not in it. The learned trial judge would not have made such an ambiguous and inconclusive finding. The complaint was deemed sufficient to allege there was a crosswalk. Counsel for defendant in drafting the findings to negative the allegation no doubt understood that they negatived the existence of a crosswalk. It is a situation that will continue to occur as long as attorneys incorporate in findings ambiguous allegations of the pleadings, and courts sign them in the hope that they are sufficient to settle the material facts. We cannot agree with defendant's construction of the finding.
If plaintiff was in a crosswalk she had the right of way over vehicles, Vehicle Code, § 560; if she was crossing Glenoaks at a point other than within a crosswalk it would have been her duty to yield the right of way to vehicles. Vehicle Code, § 562. Failure to yield the right of way is negligence. The duties of the respective parties in this respect lay at the very foundation of their conduct from which negligence or the absence of negligence was to be found. All the witnesses who testified to plaintiff's position placed her at or about the northerly line of the intersection. The undisputed evidence was that defendant's car traveled about a car length after striking plaintiff and came to rest with its rear end at the north line of the intersection. Plaintiff lay in the intersection a few feet ahead of the car. Her car, which she had just left, was parked at the north line of the intersection. It was not disputed that she was traveling straight across Glenoaks. We must resolve the ambiguity of the finding in the light of this evidence, and we cannot construe it as a finding that plaintiff was not struck at the north intersection of the two roadways. In view of the fact that the court made a finding on the subject it was clearly the intention to find that a crosswalk did or did not exist. Defendant contended at the trial there was no...
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