Sanchez v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc.

• Decision Date: 15 July 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-25,92-25
• Citation: 855 P.2d 1256
• Parties: 8 IER Cases 1101 Marie SANCHEZ, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. LIFE CARE CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC., Appellee (Defendant).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 1256

855 P.2d 1256

8 IER Cases 1101

Marie SANCHEZ, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. LIFE CARE CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC., Appellee (Defendant).

No. 92-25.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

July 15, 1993.

Bernard Q. Phelan, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Kate M. Fox, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before MACY, C.J., CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ., and BROWN, J. (Retired).

BROWN, Justice (Retired).

This case is a wrongful employee termination action brought by appellant Marie Sanchez, against appellee Life Care Centers of America, Inc. (Life Care). The district court granted summary judgment against appellant.

The issues on appeal are:

I.

Whether the disclaimer contained in the Handbook of Employment Guidelines is sufficiently conspicuous to maintain the at-will nature of employment.

II.

Whether this Court recognizes the doctrine of promissory estoppel as a cause of action in wrongful termination cases, and, if so, whether the conspicuous disclaimers contained in the Life Care Employment Guidelines prevent its application in this case.

We reverse and remand.

During a portion of 1990, appellant was employed by Life Care. At the time of her employment, she was issued a Handbook of Employment Guidelines. This handbook contained a "handbook disclaimer."

Detailed facts surrounding appellant's termination are disputed, but were not considered by the trial court and are not at issue in this appeal, nor do they appear in the record. However, we do know that appellant called in on July 20, 1990, to inform her employer that she could not come in the following day due to fatigue; that she was told to "forget coming in"; and that she was removed from the work schedule, which effectively terminated her employment.

The district court's order granting summary judgment was filed December 23, 1991. The court ruled in favor of Life Our standard of review in cases involving the granting of summary judgment has been stated many times. W.R.C.P. 56(c) provides in pertinent part:

Care, holding that (1) the handbook disclaimer was conspicuous as a matter of law and did not modify the at-will status of appellant's employment; and (2) that no majority of the Wyoming Supreme Court had recognized a cause of action based on promissory estoppel in wrongful termination cases in Wyoming and, therefore, appellant did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

In Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo.1987) (citations omitted), we said:

A motion for summary judgment places an initial burden on the movant to make a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that summary judgment should be granted as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. Once a prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to present specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact does exist. We analyze challenges to a grant of summary judgment by reviewing the record in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion giving him all favorable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Conclusory statements or mere opinions are insufficient, however, to satisfy an opposing party's burden.

When the issue on review is the construction and interpretation of a contract, the standard of review is further stated as follows:

Normally, the construction and interpretation of a contract is for the court as a matter of law. If the meaning of a contract is ambiguous or not apparent, it may be necessary to determine the intention of the parties from evidence other than the contract itself, and interpretation becomes a mixed question of law and fact.

McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 820 P.2d 986, 988 (Wyo.1991) (quoting Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 706 (Wyo.1985)).

In Wyoming, employment is presumed to be at-will; however, "[a] handbook may change the employer's unfettered right to discharge an employee." Leithead v. American Colloid Company, 721 P.2d 1059, 1062 (Wyo.1986); Alexander v. Phillips Oil Company, 707 P.2d 1385 (Wyo.1985); Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 704 P.2d 702.

The disposition of this case depends on construction of the purported disclaimer along with other provisions in the Handbook in the nature of disclaimers. "The Handbook of Employment Guidelines" given to appellant when she was employed contained a disclaimer on page 2 as follows:

HANDBOOK DISCLAIMER

The guidelines outlined in this handbook are for the mutual benefit of this nursing center and its associates. These guidelines include methods of procedure which, when implemented, can effectively enhance the management of a successful nursing center. The executive director and supervisors must therefore reserve all the customary rights of management, including the right to supervise and control all operations; direct all work; interpret, change or cancel all personnel policies with or without notice; hire, schedule, terminate, layoff, transfer, promote, reward, discipline, or otherwise manage associates and select the manner, method and means of doing so. This handbook is not a contract and contains no promises, guarantees, representations, agreements, or warranties upon which any prospective, current or prior associates of this nursing center can reasonably maintain or create any expectations of such.

Life Care points to provisions in the handbook disclaimer to support its contention:

The executive director and supervisors * * * reserve * * * the right * * * to * * * interpret, change or cancel all personnel policies with or without notice; hire, schedule, terminate, layoff, transfer, promote, reward, discipline, or otherwise manage associates and select the manner, method and means of doing so. This handbook is not a contract and contains no promises, guarantees, representations, agreements, or warranties * * *. [Emphasis added.]

The "Handbook of Employment Guidelines" contains twenty-five numbered pages and five unnumbered pages, including the "Table of Contents." The contents were in fine print--topic headings were in larger print and bold-faced. Under the caption "Discipline and Termination," thirty-nine examples of unacceptable employee conduct are listed. The paragraph at the top of page 21 cautions:

The list that follows, though not all-inclusive, gives examples of violations of the nursing center principles of conduct which may subject the offender to disciplinary action. Such action includes, but is not limited to, warning notices, suspension and/or discharge.

Under the caption "Disciplinary Procedures" of the handbook, a four-step progressive discipline approach is outlined which the employer will "generally" apply. The first paragraph states that "[t]he nursing center may, depending on the severity of the offense terminate an associate after the first offense." After listing the four disciplinary steps, the handbook further states:

This will be our usual and preferred process for administering discipline. However, conduct of any type which causes the center to lose confidence in your ability to perform adequately your assigned job may result in immediate discharge.

The handbook contains a tear-out "Acknowledgment Card," in which the employee states that she will familiarize herself with its contents. Appellant signed her acknowledgment card December 4, 1989.

In McDonald, 820 P.2d at 986, this court adopted the rules set forth in Jimenez v. Colorado Interstate Gas Company, 690 F.Supp. 977, 980 (D.Wyo.1988) (citations omitted) which state:

For this disclaimer to be effective against plaintiff, it must be conspicuous. Whether a disclaimer is conspicuous is a question of law. * * *

Defendant was not obligated to write SOPs and to post them in an employee area. Because it has done so, the court is now faced with a "strong equitable and social policy reasons militating against allowing employers to promulgate for their employees potentially misleading personnel manuals while reserving the right to deviate from them at their own caprice." These policy reasons help explain why an effective disclaimer must be conspicuous. The disclaimer in question is not set off in any way that would attract attention. It falls under the heading "GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS" and the subheading "CONTENTS." Nothing is capitalized that would give notice of a disclaimer. The type size equals that of other provisions on the same page. No border sets the disclaimer apart from any other paragraph on the page. The disclaimer is not conspicuous. Therefore, this court grants summary judgment that the SOPs create implied contract rights.

In McDonald, 820 P.2d at 986, we quoted with approval Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985), mod., 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985). In Woolley, the court set out an example of what need be done if the employer does not want the manual to be capable of being construed by the court as a binding contract. The court said:

It would be unfair to allow an employer to distribute a policy manual that makes the workforce believe that certain promises have been made and then to allow the employer to renege on those promises. What is sought here is basic honesty: if the employer, for whatever reason does not want the manual to be capable of being construed by the court as a binding contract, there are simple ways to attain that goal. All that need be done is the inclusion in a very prominent position of an appropriate statement that there is no promise of any kind by the employer contained in the manual; that regardless of what the manual says or provides, the employer promises nothing and remains free to change wages and...