Sanchez v. People, 90SC262

• Citation: 820 P.2d 1103
• Decision Date: 12 November 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90SC262,90SC262
• Parties: Harold SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.
• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado

Page 1103

820 P.2d 1103

Harold SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.

No. 90SC262.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

Nov. 12, 1991.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 9, 1991.

David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Douglas D. Barnes, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for petitioner.

Gale A. Norton, Atty. Gen., Raymond T. Slaughter, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Timothy M. Tymkovich, Sol. Gen., Cheryl A. Linden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for respondent.

Justice KIRSHBAUM delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The defendant, Harold Sanchez, was convicted in Denver District Court of heat of passion manslaughter, in violation of section 18-3-104(c), 8B C.R.S. (1986). In affirming that conviction on appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court's failure to specifically answer questions asked by the jury regarding the relationship of the defense of self-defense to the offense of heat of passion manslaughter did not constitute error. People v. Sanchez, No. 87CA1501 (Colo.App. Mar. 8, 1990) (not selected for official publication). Having granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals judgment with respect to that issue, we affirm. However, we disapprove of that portion of the Court of Appeals opinion holding that a person may not assert the affirmative defense of self-defense to a charge of heat of passion manslaughter.

I

Sanchez is approximately forty-four years old, of slim build, and is partially disabled. He suffers from a weakness of his lower limbs that has caused occasional involuntary muscle spasms in his legs and loss of agility and quickness.

In 1975 or 1976, he met Daniel Leyba at a recreation gym. Leyba was a muscular, six-foot tall person who weighed between 212 and 250 pounds during the time pertinent to these proceedings. During the next few years the two met socially on infrequent occasions. At some time during 1980, while at Sanchez' home, Leyba challenged Sanchez to an arm wrestling contest and, when Sanchez refused, broke one of Sanchez' fingers.

Sanchez moved into a Denver apartment complex in 1982. A year later Leyba, having separated from his wife, moved into the same complex. In early 1984, Sanchez, who at the time was suffering from a disabling back condition, helped Leyba employ an attorney to represent Leyba in his dissolution of marriage proceeding. On May 10, 1984, Sanchez accompanied Leyba on a visit to the latter's attorney. During the return drive, Leyba stopped the car at a park. An argument erupted, during which Leyba knocked Sanchez to the ground, removed a hammer from the car and began swinging the hammer at Sanchez. Sanchez testified that Leyba later calmed down and helped Sanchez back into the car.

Sanchez reported this incident to police officials and indicated that he feared further harm from Leyba. When the officials informed Sanchez that he had the right to defend himself in his own residence with a gun, he purchased two hand guns and placed both weapons on a nightstand in his apartment.

On May 15, 1984, Sanchez underwent surgery to alleviate his back condition. When he returned home from the hospital, he discovered that the tires and body of his van had been slashed with a knife. Leyba offered to pay for the damage without explanation, although he never admitted the vandalism.

On April 9, 1985, Sanchez discovered fecal matter on his doorstep. That evening Leyba pounded on Sanchez' door, demanding removal of the excrement. When Sanchez opened the door, Leyba entered and began arguing. Sanchez testified that Leyba threatened him with forced anal intercourse and that when he told Leyba that he intended to have him evicted from the apartment complex, Leyba threatened to kill him.

The next night Leyba again pounded on Sanchez' door. Sanchez testified that when he opened the door, Leyba struck Sanchez, throwing him against a wall and onto a bed; that Leyba then rushed out of the apartment, only to return holding his left hand behind his back; and that as Leyba advanced toward Sanchez, Sanchez picked up both guns from his nightstand and began shooting. Sanchez testified that he continued to shoot as Leyba backed out of the apartment and entered a nearby laundry room. Leyba received several wounds, one of which caused his death. Sanchez also testified that he was afraid Leyba kept a hammer in the laundry room, although no weapon was found on Leyba or in the laundry room.

Immediately after the shooting, Sanchez drove to his daughter's residence in California, stopping along the way to bury the guns. Several days later he returned to Colorado, obtained an attorney and surrendered himself to police officials. He was subsequently charged with the offenses of murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, heat of passion manslaughter, reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide.

At trial, Sanchez asserted the affirmative defense of self-defense. The trial court instructed the jury that self-defense constituted an affirmative defense to the offenses of first degree murder, second degree murder and heat of passion manslaughter. ¹

During the course of jury deliberations, the jury foreman sent the following two questions to the trial court:

If we believe there is an element--however small or large of self defense does that rule out the possibility of manslaughter--Heat of Passion[?]

Is there such a thing as self defense in combination w/ the elements of Manslaughter Heat of Passion[?]

The trial court met with the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel to discuss possible responses to these questions. Arguing that the questions implied a jury conclusion that Sanchez had acted in self-defense, defense counsel requested the following instruction: "[I]f the people have failed to prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Sanchez did not act in self-defense, then he must be acquitted." Defense counsel also argued that the questions suggested that the jury had rejected the first and second degree murder charges and that the court should in some fashion withdraw those charges from further jury consideration. ² The prosecuting attorney asserted that the questions were ambiguous as to the status of the jury's deliberations and asked the trial court to inform the jury that self-defense may not be considered a defense to the offense of heat of passion manslaughter.

The trial court ultimately announced its proposed response to the jury's questions as follows:

Over the objection of both counsel, this is going to be my response. "Regarding your two inquiries, you have been adequately instructed by the court in the written instructions. It would not be appropriate to instruct you further."

....

I think the fact that they have questions could be resolved by reading of the instructions, and I think any attempt by this court to try and construe what's in the back of their mind or to instruct them any further would be to invite reversible error.

Soon after receiving the trial court's formal response, the jury returned verdicts of guilty to the offense of heat of passion manslaughter and not guilty to all other alleged offenses.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed Sanchez' conviction. The court held that the trial court's response to the jury's questions did not constitute error. The court also determined that the trial court did err in instructing the jury that the defense of self-defense was applicable to the charge of heat of passion manslaughter, but that the error was harmless.

II

Sanchez contends that by submitting the two questions the jury demonstrated a fundamental misunderstanding of the applicability of the affirmative defense of self-defense to the offense of heat of passion manslaughter and that the trial court therefore erred in failing to reinstruct the jury specifically in response to those questions. We disagree, although for reasons that differ from the analysis adopted by the Court of Appeals.

The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice contains the following provisions respecting the responsibility of a trial judge with respect to questions asked by a jury during jury deliberations:

(a) If the jury, after retiring for deliberation, desires to be informed on any point of law, they shall be conducted to the courtroom. The court shall give appropriate additional instructions in response to the jury's request unless:

(i) the jury may be adequately informed by directing their attention to some portion of the original instructions;

(ii) the request concerns matters not in evidence or questions which do not pertain to the law of the case; or

(iii) the request would call upon the judge to express an opinion upon factual matters that the jury should determine.

(b) The court need not give additional instructions beyond those specifically requested by the jury, but in its discretion the court may also give or repeat other instructions to avoid giving undue prominence to the requested instructions.

(c) The court may recall the jury after they have retired and give them additional instructions in order:

(i) to correct or withdraw an erroneous instruction;

(ii) to clarify an ambiguous instruction; or

(iii) to inform the jury on a point of law which should have been covered in the original instructions.

(d) The provisions of standard 15-3.6(d) and (f) also apply to the giving of all additional instructions, except that the court in its discretion shall decide whether additional argument will be permitted.

ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 15-4.3(a) (2d ed. 1980). In Leonardo v. People, 728 P.2d 1252 (Colo.1986), we held that trial judges should use these provisions as a guide when applicable.

Here, the jury received detailed instructions describing the elements of the offenses charged and the affirmative defense of self-defense. ³ The trial court also instructed the jury that the affirmative defense of self-defense applies to heat of passion manslaughter. While the...