Sanchez v. State, 24973

• Decision Date: 15 November 1950
• Docket Number: No. 24973,24973
• Parties: SANCHEZ v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 149

235 S.W.2d 149

155 Tex.Crim. 364

SANCHEZ v. STATE.

No. 24973.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 15, 1950.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 10, 1951.

J. Lev Hunt, William York, and E. G. Henrichson, all of Edinburg, for appellant.

George P. Blackburn, State's Atty., of Austin, for the State.

WOODLEY, Commissioner.

Appellant was convicted of murder with malice and his punishment was assessed at 20 years in the penitentiary.

Appellant, a man about 25 years of age, is married, and is the father of four children.

Appellant is the son of the boss of a crew engaged in harvesting and packing vegetables and other crops, and in the absence of his father acted as boss of the crew of some twenty to fifty Mexican laborers. Most if not all of the crew were 'wetbacks,' that is, in the United States without passports.

Among the crew was on Sofia Serrato, a cousin of appellant's wife, whose home was in Mexico.

Appellant became interested in Sofia and sought to have sexual relations with her, but she declined. He asked her to be his sweetheart, and she told him she would not because he was a married man.

The deceased, Fidel Saiz Rodriguez, also a citizen of Mexico, was also a member of the crew employed by appellant's father.

Appellant became angry with the deceased because of his talking with Sofia.

On Saturday before the homicide on the following Wednesday, appellant tallied to the deceased about the matter. Regarding this conversation appellant testified:

'On Sunday I told Fidel he would be a traitor to me if he took Sofia away from me.'

The following day the deceased was deported to Mexico. Appellant denied any responsibility for or connection with such deportation. The deceased returned from Mexico the following day, and on Wednesday rejoined the crew.

Early Wednesday afternoon, the laborers were grouped in the field awaiting a new supply of baskets. Sofia was seated some 15 feet from the other laborers, and the deceased sat near her.

According to the witness Sofia Serrato, the deceased was engaged in cutting a beet when appellant approached them and told the deceased to go to hell. Then as the deceased was rising to his feet, appellant pulled a knife from under his shirt and stabbed the deceased in the heart, from the effect of which he died.

Appellant, as a witness in his own behalf, testified that the deceased came to his house on that Wednesday morning. He said that he told the deceased that there was no more work for him because he was afraid that the deceased would kill him from behind.

According to appellant's testimony the deceased got on the truck with the other hands, though he was told by appellant not to do so.

Appellant's version of the killing was that he approached the deceased as he sat with Sofia and told him to get up so that he could check the baskets. That the deceased refused to get off the baskets, and began to curse appellant, and then attacked appellant with the knife which he had for cutting beets. That the deceased twice struck at him with the knife, and then appellant for the first time remembered that he had a knife which he carried to replace one that a laborer might lose or break, and he stabbed the deceased in defense of his life.

The State offered in evidence the confession of appellant, in which he gave as the reason for the killing, the deceased's attention to Sofia and his refusal to get away from the girl when appellant ordered him to do so.

Appellant offered proof of his good reputation, and filed a plea for suspension of sentence in the event of conviction. The jury disposed of such plea by their verdict assessing a 20-year term in the penitentiary.

Appellant relies for reversal upon seven bills of exception.

Bills Nos. 1, 2 and 3 he contends show error though he concedes that neither of such bills standing alone are of such nature as to require reversal.

Bill No. 1 complains that Ben S. Zamora was permitted, over the protest of appellant, to act as interpreter, though a witness the State expected to use in their proof of the voluntary character of the confession.

When it was made known to the trial judge that Zamora had acted as interpreter in the taking of appellant's written confession, and that the defense would seek to impeach the interpretation of such confession, another interpreter who was available should have been used.

The question of the use of the witness as interpreter has, however, been held to be one which rests in the discretion of the trial court. See Martinez v. State, 96 Tex.Cr.R. 138, 256 S.W. 289, 291, wherein the court made the following observations: 'The record before us reflects no supporting proof of unfairness on the part of Tepfer (the interpreter), but, in view of the fact that it is shown that other interpreters were available, and further that there was a sharp clash betweeen the testimony of the appellant and Tepfer on the issue of * * appellant's statements, which constituted the alleged confession, we suggest that on another trial under similar facts another interpreter be used. The state should avoid any imputation of unfairness, and especially is this true in dealing with those who are ignorant of our language and customs.'

It may be observed that no issue was submitted to the jury regarding the correctness of the interpretation of the confession, and no request was made therefor.

Bill No. 2 relates to the manner of interrogation of the witnesses and the asking of leading questions, and questions calling for conclusions of the witnesses, while Bill No. 3 complains that the district attorney was permitted to testify as a witness in narrative form in response to questions of general form.

Appellant correctly concedes that such matters are within the discretion of the court.

Bills of Exception Nos. 4, 5 and 6 relate to matters of procedure in regard to the introduction of the confession.

Appellant complains that the court refused to permit counsel for appellant to see the statement for the purpose of cross-examination of the witnesses testifying before the court in the jury's absence.

Appellant says that though the witnesses were permitted to examine the statement in order to refresh their memory, appellant's counsel were denied the privilege of seeing the statement after the witnesses' memory had been refreshed.

And appellant insists that the court erred in allowing the confession to be read to the jury without proof being first made before the jury of its admissibility.

As we understand the record, it was made known to the court that appellant would contest the admissibility of the written confession. Before it had been offered, or exhibited, and before objection was...