Sanders v. Allenbrooke Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC
| Decision Date | 22 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:20-cv-02001,2:20-cv-02001 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
| Parties | CATHERINE SANDERS, surviving spouse of Charles E. Sanders, deceased, and on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries of Charles E. Sanders, Plaintiff, v. ALLENBROOKE NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC, d/b/a ALLENBROOKE NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER; AURORA CARES, LLC; DTD HC, LLC; D&N, LLC; DONALD T. DENZ; and NORBERT A. BENNETT, Defendants. |
This is a health care liability suit alleging wrongful death. Before the Court is Defendants Aurora Cares, LLC ("Aurora Cares"); DTD HC, LLC ("DTD"); D&N, LLC ("D&N"); Donald T. Denz; and Norbert A. Bennett's (collectively, the "Non-Facility Defendants") March 6, 2020 Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 16.) Plaintiff Catherine Sanders ("Catherine" or "Sanders"), surviving spouse of Charles E. Sanders, and on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries of Charles E. Sanders, responded on April 3, 2020. (ECF No. 27.) Non-Facility Defendants replied on April 17, 2020. (ECF No. 32.)
For the following reasons, Non-Facility Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
Allenbrooke Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC ("Allenbrooke") is a nursing home facility in Memphis, Tennessee and is a Tennessee limited liability company (an "LLC"). (ECF No. 44 ¶ 6.) Aurora Cares is a New York LLC. (Id. ¶ 8.) The members of Allenbrooke and Aurora Cares are DTD and D&N. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 9.) DTD and D&N are New York LLCs. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 13.) Donald T. Denz is a member of DTD. (Id. ¶ 14.) Norbert A. Bennett is a member of D&N. (Id. ¶ 11.)
Charles E. Sanders ("Charles") was a resident of Allenbrooke from about December 7, 2018, to January 2, 2019. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 2.) On or around January 2, 2019, Charles was transferred from Allenbrooke to St. Francis Hospital. (Id.) On January 4, 2019, Charles died at the hospital. (Id.)
On January 3, 2020, Catherine filed the Complaint in this action. (ECF No. 1.) As Charles's surviving spouse, and on behalf of Charles's wrongful death beneficiaries, Catherine asserts claims against Defendants for statutory negligence under the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act ("THCLA"), Tenn. CodeAnn. §§ 29-26-101, et seq.; common law negligence; and survival and wrongful death. (See id. ¶¶ 40-63.)
On March 6, 2020, Non-Facility Defendants filed the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 16.) Non-Facility Defendants assert that the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over them. (ECF No. 16-1 at 7-13.) Non-Facility Defendants also assert that Sanders fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted because: (1) the THCLA prohibits Sanders from pursuing health care liability claims against Non-Facility Defendants; (2) the Tennessee courts have established that DTD, D&N, Denz, and Bennett cannot be held directly or vicariously liable for the actions of Aurora Cares or Allenbrooke; (3) there can be no personal liability for an owner, officer, or member of a Tennessee LLC; and (4) there can be no personal liability for a member or agent of a New York LLC. (Id. at 13-20.)
The Court has diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Sanders seeks compensatory and punitive damages for negligence and survival and wrongful death claims against multiple defendants. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 46, 56, 58-66.)
The parties are completely diverse. Catherine Sanders is a resident citizen of Tennessee. (ECF No. 44 ¶ 2.) None of the Defendants is a citizen of Tennessee. Allenbrooke is a TennesseeLLC. (Id. ¶ 6.) Aurora Cares is a New York LLC. (Id. ¶ 8.) For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, LLCs have the citizenship of each of their members. Americold Realty Tr. v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1015 (2016) (citing Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195-96 (1990)); accord Delay v. Rosenthal Collins Grp., LLC, 585 F.3d 1003, 1005 (6th Cir. 2009). The members of Allenbrooke and Aurora Cares are DTD and D&N. (ECF No. 44 ¶¶ 7, 9.) DTD and D&N are New York LLCs. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 13.) DTD's members are Donald T. Denz and the Donald T. Denz Irrevocable Trust. (Id. ¶ 14.) Donald T. Denz is a resident citizen of New York. (Id. ¶ 17.) The citizenship of a traditional trust is that of its trustee. See GBForefront, L.P. v. Forefront Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 888 F.3d 29, 38-40 (3d Cir. 2018). The trustee of the Donald T. Denz Irrevocable Trust is Martin Clifford, who is a resident citizen of New York. (ECF No. 44 ¶ 15.) D&N's members are Norbert A. Bennett, the Norbert A. Bennett Children's Trust, and the Norbert A. Bennett Grandchildren's Trust. (Id. ¶ 11.) Norbert A. Bennett is a resident citizen of New York. (Id. ¶ 17.) The trustee of the Norbert A. Bennett Children's Trust and the Norbert A. Bennett Grandchildren's Trust is Ronald Bennett, who is a resident citizen of New York. (Id. ¶ 12.)
The Court has diversity jurisdiction because the parties are completely diverse and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Federal courts sitting in diversity apply state law to issues of substantive law and federal law to procedural issues. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938); see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). When there is no dispute that a certain state's substantive law applies, the court need not conduct a choice-of-law analysis sua sponte. See GJB Corp. v. E. Ohio Paving Co., 139 F.3d 1080, 1085 (6th Cir. 1998). The parties assume that Tennessee substantive law governs Sanders's claims. The Court applies Tennessee substantive law.
When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of making a prima facie showing of the court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant." Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 615 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Malone v. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc., 965 F.3d 499, 504 (6th Cir. 2020). A plaintiff "can meet this burden by 'establishing with reasonable particularity sufficient contacts between [defendants] and the forum state to support jurisdiction.'"Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 887 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Provident Nat'l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n, 819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir. 1987)). If the plaintiff meets her burden, the motion to dismiss should be denied, "'notwithstanding any controverting presentation by the moving party.'" Serras v. First Tenn. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 875 F.2d 1212, 1214 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1981)). Because the Court is relying solely on written submissions to resolve the Motion to Dismiss, rather than an evidentiary hearing or jurisdictional discovery, Sanders's burden to establish a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction is "'relatively slight.'" Air Prods. & Controls, Inc. v. Safetech Int'l, Inc., 503 F.3d 544, 549 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Am. Greetings Corp. v. Cohn, 839 F.2d 1164, 1169 (6th Cir. 1988)); see also Dean v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., 134 F.3d 1269, 1272 (6th Cir. 1998) ("relatively light"). The Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to Sanders. See Air Prods., 503 F.3d at 549.
When considering a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a federal court looks first to the long-arm statute of the state in which it sits to determine the state's limitations on personal jurisdiction. Aristech Chem. Int'l Ltd. v. Acrylic Fabricators Ltd., 138 F.3d 624, 627 (6th Cir. 1998). The court then assesses whether the exercise of personaljurisdiction would be appropriate under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 871 (6th Cir. 2002); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996). If the exercise of jurisdiction is not appropriate under the Due Process Clause, the exercise of jurisdiction is "foreclose[d] . . . even where a properly construed provision of the long-arm statute would otherwise permit it." Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1459 (6th Cir. 1991).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows dismissal of a complaint that "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." A Rule 12(b)(6) motion permits the "defendant to test whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief even if everything alleged in the complaint is true." Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Nishiyama v. Dickson Cnty., 814 F.2d 277, 279 (6th Cir. 1987)). A motion to dismiss tests only whether the plaintiff has pled a cognizable claim and allows the court to dismiss meritless cases that would waste judicial resources and result in unnecessary discovery. See Brown v. City of Memphis, 440 F. Supp. 2d 868, 872 (W.D. Tenn. 2006).
When evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must determine whether the complaint alleges"sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The "'[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above [a] speculative level.'" Ass'n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
A claim is plausible on its face if "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations. However, a plaintiff's "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.
"When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the district court may not consider matters...
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