Sanders v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, No. 2006-CA-002282-MR (Ky. App. 5/30/2008)
| Decision Date | 30 May 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 2006-CA-002282-MR.,No. 2006-CA-002283-MR,2006-CA-002282-MR.,2006-CA-002283-MR |
| Parties | Juan Leotis SANDERS, Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, Appellee and Cecilia Sanders, Appellant v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Appellee. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
Maureen Sullivan, Louisville, Kentucky, Brief for Appellant Juan Leotis Sanders.
Maureen Sullivan, Louisville, Kentucky, Brief for Appellant. Cecilia Sanders,
Gregory D. Stumbo, Attorney General, Louis F. Mathias, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Frankfort, Kentucky, Brief for Appellee,
Before: KELLER, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
On October 6, 2006, in the Jefferson County Circuit Court, Juan Leotis Sanders (Juan) and Cecilia Sanders (Cecilia) were convicted of Planting, Cultivating or Harvesting with Intent to Sell Marijuana and Illegal Use or Possession of Drug Paraphernalia pursuant to KRS 218A.1423, Complicity pursuant to KRS 502.020, and Illegal Use or Possession of Drug Paraphernalia pursuant to KRS 218A.500. Juan was also convicted as a Persistent Felony Offender in the second degree pursuant to KRS 532.080. Juan and Cecilia appeal their convictions. This Court consolidated their appeals which raise the following issues: (1) whether the trial court incorrectly overruled Juan and Cecilia's motions to suppress evidence; (2) whether Juan and Cecilia were denied a fair trial because the prosecution was allowed to refer to them as "Drug Dealers"; (3) whether the trial court incorrectly allowed the prosecution to place marijuana into evidence without testing it or without charging the defendants with a crime related to it; (4) whether the trial court erred in denying Juan's motion for directed verdict; (5) whether the trial court erred by allowing Cecilia's counsel to make remarks against Juan; and (6) whether Juan was denied due process of law and a fair trial when Cecilia's counsel allowed the prosecution to inject information relating to collateral criminal activity. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
This case has a rather convoluted factual background, which we must set out to more fully explain the issues in this appeal. Juan's multiple residential addresses, set forth below, are particularly important in evaluating whether he was in constructive possession of the marijuana. Juan had previously been convicted of manslaughter, but was free on bond pending his appeal of this conviction. His address listed on the appeal bond was 3902 Vantage Place Louisville, Kentucky. On August 22, 2002, his conviction was affirmed by the Kentucky Court of Appeals and his appeal bond was revoked. Subsequently, a warrant was issued for his arrest listing his address as 4910 Shumake Way or 5307 Regent Way, both in Louisville, Kentucky. Juan was also a suspect in an unrelated shooting incident that occurred on October 28, 2002. On October 29, 2002, a confidential informant notified the police that Juan was located at 3902 Vantage Place, and police began surveillance of that residence.
On October 29, 2002, at 10:20 a.m., Juan was arrested in the driveway of 3902 Vantage Place after leaving the house and attempting to enter a Lincoln Navigator. Apparently unaware that Juan was in custody, an officer was in the process of obtaining a search warrant for the 3902 Vantage Place residence, seeking Juan and any evidence linking him to the unrelated shooting incident. A Jefferson Circuit Court judge issued that warrant at approximately 3:00 p.m.
Subsequently, police officers searched the 3902 Vantage Place residence, but did not find any evidence relating to the shooting. Instead, they discovered sixty-five marijuana plants, grow lights, potting soil, fertilizer, and large sums of money. The officers also found a small amount of marijuana in a bedroom and a marijuana leaf in the Lincoln Navigator. An officer then obtained a second warrant from a different judge relating to the marijuana and drug paraphernalia, and the officers seized these items, as well as the Lincoln Navigator and another vehicle.
On November 6, 2002, Juan and Cecilia were both indicted for Planting, Cultivating, or Harvesting with Intent to Sell Marijuana, Complicity, and Illegal Use or Possession of Marijuana. Juan was also indicted for being a Persistent Felony Offender in the Second Degree. On January 21, 2003, Juan moved, through counsel, to suppress all items seized from the Lincoln Navigator due to lack of probable cause. Then, on January 23, 2003, Cecilia moved to suppress all items from the residence and vehicle related to drug activity due to lack of probable cause. The trial court denied both Juan and Cecilia's motions to suppress on October 27, 2003, finding that there was probable cause for both warrants.
On December 29, 2003, Juan filed a pro se motion to suppress evidence of the alleged illegal search of the 3902 Vantage Place residence and requested a hearing, pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), arguing that the warrant was based on materially false information. On March 2, 2004, Juan then filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him because there was no probable cause for the search warrant. The trial court denied Juan's motion and denied his request for a hearing on July 21, 2004. Juan later filed a motion, by counsel, for the court to reconsider his motion to suppress, but the trial court denied the motion. On August 11, 2004, Cecilia moved to adopt Juan's motion to set aside the order denying the motion to suppress. The motion to adopt was granted; however, the trial court denied the motion to reconsider.
Juan and Cecilia were tried together before a jury beginning on August 9, 2006. The trial court continued to deny any suppression of evidence seized during the search of the Vantage Place residence and the vehicles. Both Juan and Cecilia were convicted of Planting, Cultivating or Harvesting with Intent to Sell Marijuana, Complicity, and Illegal Use or Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. Juan's sentence was enhanced by his PFO II status. The trial court entered judgments consistent with the jury's verdicts and it is from those judgments that Juan and Cecilia appeal.
Both Juan and Cecilia claim that the trial court erred in overruling their motions to suppress evidence and assert that the Vantage Place residence was searched and evidence was seized without probable cause. The standard of review of a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress is two-fold. Adcock v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998). First, the Court must determine whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Id. If the findings are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive and will not be disturbed. Id. Second, the Court will conduct a de novo review of the trial court's application of the law to the established facts to determine whether the ruling was correct as a matter of law. Id.
It is important to note that the actual record from the suppression hearing that occurred on March 21, 2003 is not before this court. However, after reviewing the record of the case in its totality, we conclude that the trial court's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Juan had a valid warrant issued for his arrest, which had been issued when his appeal bond was revoked after his manslaughter conviction was affirmed. A confidential informant informed the police that Juan could be located at the Vantage Place residence and the police corroborated this information with extensive surveillance. An officer acquired a valid search warrant based on the warrant relating to Juan's previous conviction, information from the confidential informant, police surveillance, and Juan's status as a suspect in a separate shooting incident. Therefore, substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings of fact. Accordingly, this Court must next determine whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts.
Both Juan and Cecilia contend that the Vantage Place residence was searched and evidence was seized when no probable cause existed in support of the issuance of the first search warrant. Cecilia specifically claims that there was insufficient probable cause to support the search warrant because it was based on the information of an unnamed confidential informant that Juan was located at the Vantage Place residence. Juan also contends that he was illegally arrested and charged with contraband found at the Vantage Place residence because this was his estranged wife's home; thus, he was not in constructive possession of the marijuana. This Court disagrees with Juan's assertion that he was not in constructive possession of the marijuana, and that issue will be discussed more thoroughly below.
Officers are required to "seek a warrant based on probable cause when they have a belief in advance that they will find contraband or evidence of a crime." United States v. Chambers, 395 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2005). Probable cause to arrest exists when there are reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe there is a fair probability that the suspect is committing or has committed an offense. Maryland v Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003). Furthermore, the determination of whether probable cause exists does not rest on isolated facts, but rather the cumulative effect of the facts in the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Everroad, 704 F.2d 403 (8th Cir. 1983).
Applying the law to the instant case, we conclude that the affidavits provided in support of obtaining both search warrants sufficiently stated grounds that justified issuing both warrants. The first search warrant provides facts sufficient to establish probable cause because it clearly expresses that Juan was wanted on a previous...
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