Sanders v. Miller

• Decision Date: 15 October 1881
• Citation: 3 Ky.L.Rptr. 295,79 Ky. 517
• Parties: Sanders, & c., v. Miller, & c.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

79 Ky. 517

3 Ky.L.Rptr. 295

Sanders, & c., v. Miller, & c.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

October 15, 1881

1. A settlement made in good faith by the husband upon his wife in the execution of an antenuptial contract, in writing although void at law, will be sustained by the chancellor.

2. Marriage is a good consideration for such a contract and settlement, and if made in good faith, the settlement will not be disturbed at the instance of creditors.

APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT.

L. A WEAKLEY AND W. LINDSAY FOR APPELLANTS.

1. Marriage is a good consideration for the antenuptial contract in this case, and the settlement by the husband upon the wife being in good faith, ought to be sustained.

2. The pleading of appellees cannot be construed as charging fraud against the wife. (Thompson v. Heffner, 11 Bush 353; Parsons on Contracts, vol. 1,431; 3 Cowen's Reports, 537; Johnson's Ch'y, 537; 11 Leigh, 136; 5 Allen, 348; 7 Peters, 389; Civil Code subsec. ??4, sec. 113; Gen. Stat., chap. 44, art. 1, sec. 1; Beadles v. Miller, 9 Bush, 405; Maraman v. Maraman, 4 Met., 76; Bump on Fraudulent Conveyances 290; Ib., 296; 17 Vesey, 264; Roper on Property, 303; 13 B. Mon., 496; 37 Iowa 517; 5 B. Mon., 274; 4 Met., 59; 65 Maine, 279; 63 Ib., 328; 115 Mass. 507.)

CALDWELL & HARWOOD FOR APPELLEES.

1. If such a contract as is alleged was made, it was a fraud upon creditors, and should be sustained.

2. The settlement is wholly disproportionate to husband's means, and is void for fraud.

3. It is clear that to the extent the husband used his wife's property and its proceeds in the settlement, it was fraudulent. It was personalty, and became his by the marriage. (Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, 202; Simpson v. Graves, Riley's Ch'y, 232.)

OPINION

HARGIS, JUDGE:

This case involves the validity of a settlement made in pursuance of a written antenuptial contract executed by the appellants on the 8th of February, 1878, in this language:

" An article of agreement entered into between J. B. Sanders of the first part, and Orra A Davis of the second part. The said James B. Sanders agrees to give Orra A. Davis (provided she marries him) as good a house, to have and to hold forever, as her sister, Helen M. Stout had, or a sum of money equivalent to the same, five thousand dollars. "

Not long after this writing was made they intermarried.

At that time he owned a farm, and one horse and buggy, and was indebted in the sum of about $750 as principal, and near five thousand dollars as surety; and she owned 42 acres of land, worth $1,000, a horse, and had " $600 loaned out."

He sold his land on the 15th of July, 1878, for the sum of $8,556.55; but before doing so, he obtained his wife's relinquishment of her contingent right of dower by executing and delivering to her a paper reciting the substance and purpose of the antenuptial contract, and agreeing to pay to her five thousand dollars so soon as he should collect " the money" for which he sold his farm.

This paper would be of little weight in the absence of the antenuptial contract, because of the ease and security with which it might have been fabricated; but in view of all the facts of this case it is freed from suspicion, and based upon a valuable consideration.

She was not bound or compellable to relinquish her dower right, and would doubtless have refused to do so had her husband declined to give her a written assurance of his good faith and purpose to execute the marriage settlement which he had agreed to make upon her as a part of the marriage contract, but had not done.

Her relinquishment was a valuable consideration (Hall v. Plummer, 6 Indiana, 121), and that fact should be given its full weight in view of the antenuptial agreement.

While contracts made between husband and wife, as a general rule?? are void, still if a husband voluntarily enter into a contract to make, or he does make, a settlement upon his wife in discharge of an obligation arising out of the reception of her property under an agreement made before its receipt or reduction to possession, such as the chancellor would, on her application, make upon her, neither the contract nor the settlement would be regarded as fraudulent against creditors. And with much greater reason it can be said that such a contract is possessed of vital force when preceded by a bona fide antenuptial contract and supported by a valuable consideration (relinquishment of dower), moving from her to him at the instant of its execution. (Latimer v. Glenn, 2 Bush; Campbell v. Campbell's trustee, MS. Op., 1881; Miller v. Edwards, 7 Bush, 397; Lyne, & c., v. Bank of Kentucky, 5 J. J. Mar., 550.)

But passing from the meritorious character of the second writing, and adverting to the antenuptial contract, we find upon both law and fact ample authority in its support.

The case of Magniac and others v. Thompson, 7 Peters, 393, cited by appellants' counsel, contains the doctrine of the text-books and decided cases in this country and England upon the issue involved in this case. We cite the following extract from it with hearty approval, as stating with perspicuity the rule and its reasons:

" Nothing can be clearer, both upon principle and authority, than the doctrine that to make an antenuptial settlement void as a fraud upon creditors, it is necessary that both parties should concur in, or have cognizance of, the intended fraud.

If the settler alone intended a fraud, and the other party have no notice of it, but is innocent of it, she is not and cannot be affected by it.

Marriage in contemplation of law is not only a valuable consideration to support such a settlement, but is a consideration of the highest value; and, from motives of the soundest policy, is upheld...