Sanders v. N.M. Corr. Dep't
| Decision Date | 28 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | A-1-CA-36256 |
| Parties | MAUREEN A. SANDERS, as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF KATHERINE PAQUIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW MEXICO CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT, GREGG MARCANTEL and CATHLEEN CATANACH, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY Valerie Huling District Judge
Kennedy Kennedy & Ives Adam C. Flores Laura Schauer Ives Albuquerque, NM for Appellant
Butt Thornton & Baehr, P.C. Agnes Fuentevilla Padilla Felicia Boyd Rheba Rutkowski Sarah L. Shore Albuquerque, NM for Appellees
{¶1} Plaintiff Maureen A. Sanders brought a wrongful death lawsuit as personal representative of the Estate of Katherine Paquin after Paquin was killed by Christopher Blattner, an inmate who had been erroneously released from custody. Plaintiff sued the New Mexico Corrections Department (NMCD), NMCD Secretary Gregg Marcantel, and Bureau Records Chief Cathleen Catanach (collectively, Defendants) on the theory that Defendants had negligently released Blattner before he had completed the full term of his sentence-approximately three years early, according to Plaintiff. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing they were immune from suit under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (TCA), NMSA 1978, §§ 41-4-1 to -30 (1976, as amended through 2020). Plaintiff argued that her claims for Defendants' negligence were actionable under two of the TCA's waivers of immunity (1) the building waiver, § 41-4-6(A), and (2) the law enforcement waiver, § 41-4-12.[1] The district court granted Defendants' motion.
{¶2} We reverse the district court's ruling as to the building waiver but affirm the court's ruling as to the law enforcement waiver.
{¶3} Plaintiff alleged in her amended complaint that "Paquin's killing was the direct result of errors made by [NMCD] and . . . [its] employees, resulting in the premature release of a dangerous inmate named Christopher Blattner." Blattner began serving time in 2009 for drug trafficking convictions and should have remained incarcerated until the fall of 2015. He was instead released in February 2012. Once released, he connected with Paquin, who was sixty-two years old and suffered from mental health issues. Paquin's neighbors reported seeing Blattner at Paquin's home frequently. In August 2012, approximately six months following Blattner's release, a missing person report was filed for Paquin. In the days that followed, Blattner made numerous withdrawals from Paquin's bank account totaling approximately $63,000. Police officers obtained arrest warrants for Blattner and his wife, and after a standoff, arrested Blattner. Eventually, Blattner's wife told police that Blattner had killed Paquin and hid her body. Blattner later pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter for Paquin's death.
{¶4} Plaintiff alleged that shortly after Paquin's death, "NMCD officials conceded there had been an error and . . . Blattner had been released early." Plaintiff also alleged that in July 2012-approximately one month before Paquin was killed- NMCD Secretary Marcantel acknowledged that NMCD had a problem with accounting for inmate sentences and stated there would be a statewide audit of inmate records to evaluate NMCD's procedures. In a later statement, Secretary Marcantel allegedly reported that the audit had revealed a more significant issue than was previously known and characterized the deficient recordkeeping as "a public safety issue."
{¶5} Plaintiff brought two claims against Defendants under the TCA, one under Section 41-4-6(A) for negligent operation of the NMCD facility from which Blattner had been released, and another under Section 41-4-12 for negligence of law enforcement officers.[2] Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing they were immune from suit under the TCA. They asserted that the building waiver was inapplicable because the conduct at issue amounted to the negligent performance of an administrative function for which there is no waiver. They also asserted that the law enforcement waiver was inapplicable because Defendants were not "law enforcement officers." In response, Plaintiff argued that the building waiver applied because Defendants' failure to follow statutes and policies governing inmate release resulted in the early release of violent inmates from NMCD before they had served the full measure of their sentence, which created a dangerous condition for the public at large. Plaintiff maintains that this conduct constituted negligence in the operation of a correctional facility and was therefore sufficient to establish a waiver under Section 41-4-6(A). Plaintiff also argued that a claim under the law enforcement waiver, § 41-4-12, was actionable against NMCD.
{¶6} The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on both issues. Addressing Plaintiff's first argument, the district court stated that Regarding Plaintiff's second argument, the district court agreed with Defendants that Plaintiff had not shown that a negligent NMCD employee was a "law enforcement officer" as required to establish waiver under Section 41-4-12. Plaintiff appeals.
{¶7} "Summary judgment is proper if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Roth v. Thompson, 1992-NMSC-011, ¶ 17, 113 N.M. 331, 825 P.2d 1241. Upton v. Clovis Mun. Sch. Dist., 2006-NMSC-040, ¶ 7, 140 N.M. 205, 141 P.3d 1259 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).
{¶8} "The TCA grants all government entities and their employees general immunity from actions in tort, but waives that immunity in certain specified circumstances." Id. ¶ 8. The specific waivers of immunity are contained in Sections 41-4-5 to -12 of the TCA. See Encinias v. Whitener Law Firm, P.A., 2013-NMSC-045 ¶ 9, 310 P.3d 611. Plaintiff's wrongful death suit invoked two of the TCA's waiver provisions: Section 41-4-6 (the building waiver), which waives the state's immunity for injuries resulting from the negligent operation or maintenance of state buildings, and Section 41-4-12 (), which waives the state's immunity for injuries arising from the negligence of law enforcement officers under certain circumstances. In this appeal, we review the district court's conclusion that neither waiver is applicable.
{¶9} The building waiver in Section 41-4-6(A) permits tort claims against governmental entities for "damages resulting from . . . wrongful death . . . caused by the negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of their duties in the operation or maintenance of any building." See Upton, 2006-NMSC-040, ¶ 8. This Section has been termed "a 'premises liability' statute," Encinias, 2013-NMSC-045, ¶ 9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and has historically been interpreted broadly to waive immunity where "an injury arises from an unsafe, dangerous, or defective condition on property owned and operated by the government." Id. ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has made clear that "[t]he waiver applies to more than the operation or maintenance of the physical aspects of the building," and includes failures to follow appropriate safety protocols. Upton, 2006-NMSC-040, ¶¶ 9, 12-13.
{¶10} In the proceedings below, Plaintiff grounded her building waiver claim in the theory that Defendants negligently operated the prison facilities that housed Blattner by failing to follow statutes and policies governing the release of prisoners, thereby creating a dangerous condition-the early release of dangerous inmates-that affected the public at large. When Defendants moved for summary judgment, they argued that "calculating and managing an inmate's term of confinement" are administrative functions for which Section 41-4-6(A) does not waive immunity. The district court did not address the parties' arguments on the building waiver. Instead, the court concluded that Section 41-4-6(A) does not waive Defendants' immunity as a matter of law because the wrongful death did not occur on or adjacent to property owned or controlled by NMCD.
{¶11} For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Section 41-4-6(A) does not limit the waiver to claims for injuries occurring on or adjacent to government-controlled property. We reverse the district court's contrary conclusion, and, as we explain, decline Defendants' invitation to affirm the district court as right for any reason on the basis that Blattner's release was the result of a discrete administrative decision for which there is no waiver.
{¶12} The first issue is narrow: whether, as a matter of law, there is no waiver under Section 41-4-6(A) ...
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