Sanders v. State Personnel Com'n

• Decision Date: 02 June 2009
• Docket Number: No. COA08-1179.,COA08-1179.
• Citation: 677 S.E.2d 182
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Lula SANDERS, Cynthia Eure, Angeline McInerny, Joseph C. Mobley, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. STATE PERSONNEL COMMISSION, a body politic, Office of State Personnel, a body politic; Thomas H. Wright, State Personnel Director (in his official capacity); Teachers' and State Employees' Retirement System of North Carolina, a body politic and corporate; Michael Williamson, Director of the Retirement System Division and Deputy Treasurer of the State of North Carolina (in his official capacity); Richard H. Moore, Treasurer of the State of North Carolina and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Retirement System (in his official capacity); Temporary Solutions, a subdivision of the Office of State Personnel, and State of North Carolina, Defendants.

677 S.E.2d 182

Lula SANDERS, Cynthia Eure, Angeline McInerny, Joseph C. Mobley, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. STATE PERSONNEL COMMISSION, a body politic, Office of State Personnel, a body politic; Thomas H. Wright, State Personnel Director (in his official capacity); Teachers' and State Employees' Retirement System of North Carolina, a body politic and corporate; Michael Williamson, Director of the Retirement System Division and Deputy Treasurer of the State of North Carolina (in his official capacity); Richard H. Moore, Treasurer of the State of North Carolina and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Retirement System (in his official capacity); Temporary Solutions, a subdivision of the Office of State Personnel, and State of North Carolina, Defendants.

No. COA08-1179.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

June 2, 2009.

Appeal by plaintiffs from judgment entered 5 March 2008 by Judge Clarence E. Horton, Jr., in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 March 2009.

Kilpatrick Stockton, LLP, by Jim Kelly and Gregg E. McDougal; and Jack Holtzman, Raleigh, for plaintiff-appellants.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorneys General Norma S. Harrell and Lars F. Nance, for defendant-appellees.

General Counsel Thomas A. Harris, Raleigh, for State Employees Association of North Carolina, Inc., amicus curiae.

HUNTER, JR., ROBERT N., Judge.

Plaintiffs, who worked for the State as "temporary" employees for periods exceeding twelve months, assert that they have been wrongfully denied employment benefits and seek relief for breach of contract and violations of the North Carolina Constitution Article I, sections 1, 19, and 35. In a 5 March 2008 order, the trial court (Horton, Jr., J.) dismissed plaintiffs' claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) (2007). Because plaintiffs stated a valid claim for breach of contract, we reverse as to that claim and remand. Plaintiffs failed to state valid claims under the equal protection or fruits of their labor clauses of the North Carolina Constitution; we therefore affirm as to those claims.

I. Background

Plaintiffs Lula Sanders and Cynthia Eure filed suit in the Superior Court of Wake County on 1 April 2005 against the State of North Carolina, the State Personnel Commission ("SPC"), the Office of State Personnel, Temporary Solutions, and the Teachers' and State Employees' Retirement System, as well as against the State Personnel Director (Thomas H. Wright), the State Treasurer (Richard H. Moore), and the Director of the Retirement Systems Division of the Department of State Treasurer (Michael Williamson), in their official capacities (collectively, "defendants"). In a second amended complaint filed 23 June 2005, Sanders and Eure were joined by Angeline McInerny and Joseph C. Mobley (collectively, "plaintiffs") and complained that they and "other class members have been wrongfully denied the employee rights, compensation, benefits, and status to which they are entitled by law." Plaintiffs seek class certification which has not yet been heard. Specifically, plaintiffs contended that because they and "proposed class members worked or upon information and belief are working for the state for periods exceeding 12 consecutive months without benefits," the State "misclassified" them and "illegally denied them the benefits provided to similarly-situated permanent or time-limited permanent State employees." Based on the facts alleged in the complaint, plaintiffs sought redress for violations of the North Carolina Administrative Code, breach of contract, and violations of the North Carolina Constitution.

Plaintiff Sanders was hired by Temporary Solutions, employed in a temporary assignment in the Division of Emergency Management between September of 1999 and October of 2002 without receiving any benefits, and paid by Temporary Solutions with funds received from the agency with which she was placed. She became employed as a permanent State employee in June of 2004. Plaintiff Eure was hired by Temporary Solutions, employed in a temporary assignment in the Division of Emergency Management between December of 1999 and April of 2002 without receiving any benefits, and paid by Temporary Solutions with funds received from the agency with which she was placed. She has not been employed by the State since April 2002. Plaintiff McInerny was hired by Temporary Solutions, employed in a temporary assignment in the Division of Emergency Management between September of 2000 and April of 2003 without receiving any benefits, and paid by Temporary Solutions with funds received from the agency with which she was placed. She then held a time-limited appointment with the same employer from April of 2003 until September of 2004, later resigned, and has not since been employed by the State. Plaintiff Mobley was hired by Temporary Solutions, employed in a temporary assignment with the North Carolina Highway Patrol from January of 1998 until May of 2005 without receiving any benefits, and paid by Temporary Solutions with funds received from the agency with which he was placed.

In their prayer for relief, plaintiffs sought, among other things, monetary damages including benefits, compensation, attorneys' fees and expenses, and "all funds to which they and other class members are entitled"; Class certification pursuant to Rule 23 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure; injunctive relief "against retaliatory termination of Plaintiff Mobley"; a "permanent injunction ordering Defendants to comply with their legal and fiduciary duties to inform all class members of their rights to receive benefits in accordance with State regulations and applicable law"; and a "declaratory judgment pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1-253 holding that the Defendants' practices in denying compensation, rights, benefits and permanent employee status to Plaintiffs and class members violate the law."

On 22 July 2005, defendants answered and moved to dismiss the action as barred by principles of sovereign and/or qualified immunity and for a failure to state a claim for relief. Following a hearing on defendants' motion to dismiss argued solely as to sovereign immunity, the trial court (Allen, Jr., J.) dismissed the remaining four claims in an Order & Judgment entered on 22 September 2005. On appeal, this Court on 1 May 2007, affirmed the dismissal on the basis of sovereign immunity as to the claim for relief based on a violation of 25 NCAC 1C.0405 (2006) but reversed as to the dismissal of the claims for breach of contract and constitutional violations. Sanders v. State Personnel Comm'n, 183 N.C.App. 15, 644 S.E.2d 10 ("Sanders I"), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 696, 652 S.E.2d 653 (2007). In Sanders I, we stated that the trial court "declined to address defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)." Id. at 18, 644 S.E.2d at 13.

On remand, the Honorable Sarah Parker, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, designated the matter as an "exceptional" case to be heard pursuant to Rule 2.1 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts and assigned it to Special Superior Court Judge Clarence E. Horton, Jr. On 1 February 2008, defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) was heard as to all pending claims as was plaintiffs' motion for class certification. On 5 March 2008, the trial court stated that plaintiffs' "three surviving claims" did not "state a claim for relief," and granted defendants' motion to dismiss as to "plaintiffs' remaining claims for relief." The court then specified, "that is, for breach of contract and for violations of the `equal protection' and the `fruits of their own labor' clauses of the North Carolina Constitution[.]" On 1 April 2008, plaintiffs appealed. The record on appeal was settled by stipulation on 17 September 2008, filed in this Court on 22 September 2008, and docketed on 6 October 2008.

II. Issues

The issues presented in this appeal are whether, pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6), the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims for relief for: (1) breach of contract; (2) violation of the North Carolina Constitution Article I, Section 19; and (3) violation of the North Carolina Constitution Article I, Sections 1 and 35.

III. Standard of Review

Motion to Dismiss

This Court reviews the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Lea v. Grier, 156 N.C.App. 503, 507, 577 S.E.2d 411, 414 (2003). A motion to dismiss made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Harris v. NCNB, 85 N.C.App. 669, 670, 355 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1987). In order to withstand such a motion, the complaint must provide sufficient notice of the events and circumstances from which the claim arises and must state sufficient allegations to satisfy the substantive elements of at least some recognized claim. Hewes v. Johnston, 61 N.C.App. 603, 604, 301 S.E.2d 120, 121 (1983). The question for the Curt is whether, as a matter of law, the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal theory, whether properly labeled or not. See Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 185, 254 S.E.2d 611, 615 (1979). In general, "`a complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it appears to a certainty that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim.'" Id. (quoting 2A Moore's Federal Practice, § 12.08, pp. 2271-74 (2d ed. 1975)). Such a lack of merit may consist of the disclosure of facts which will necessarily defeat the claim as well as the absence of law or fact necessary to support a claim. Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 102-03, 176 S.E.2d 161, 166 (1970).

IV. Discussion

The SPC is a regulatory commission that is "responsible...