Sanderson Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 1 CA-CV 02-0588.

• Decision Date: 29 April 2003
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-CV 02-0588.,1 CA-CV 02-0588.
• Citation: 205 Ariz. 202,68 P.3d 428
• Parties: SANDERSON LINCOLN MERCURY, INC., an Arizona corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a foreign corporation; the State of Arizona; the Arizona Department of Transportation and its Director, Victor Mendez, in his capacity as Director of the Arizona Department of Transportation, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

68 P.3d 428

205 Ariz. 202

SANDERSON LINCOLN MERCURY, INC., an Arizona corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a foreign corporation; the State of Arizona; the Arizona Department of Transportation and its Director, Victor Mendez, in his capacity as Director of the Arizona Department of Transportation, Defendants-Appellees.

No. -0588.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department D.

April 29, 2003.

Sacks Tierney P.A. By Marvin S. Cohen and Stephen P. Linzer, Scottsdale, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Berkowitz Stanton Brandt Williams & Shaw LLP By Kurt D. Williams, Kansas City, MO, and Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P. By Martha E. Gibbs, Phoenix, Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee Ford Motor Company.

Janet Napolitano, Former Attorney General, Terry Goddard, Attorney General By John C. Dutton, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees State of Arizona, Arizona Department of Transportation and its Director.

OPINION

EHRLICH, Judge.

¶ 1 Sanderson Lincoln Mercury, Inc. ("Sanderson") appeals a judgment affirming the decision of the Arizona Department of Transportation and its director (together "ADOT") that Sanderson lacked standing to object to the plans of Ford Motor Company ("Ford") to establish an additional Lincoln Mercury dealership on a county island within the exterior boundaries of the incorporated City of Phoenix ("City"). For reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 Arizona Revised Statutes section ("A.R.S. §") 28-4453(A) (Supp.2002) provides that an entity such as Ford that intends to establish a new motor-vehicle franchise must notify ADOT of its intent.¹ ADOT then must notify existing franchisees of the same line-make in the community or within ten miles of the proposed dealership. A.R.S. § 28-4453 (B).² "Community" is defined as the "relevant market area," which in turn is defined as "the incorporated city or town in which the franchise is located." A.R.S. § 28-4301(5)(Supp.2002). A dealership meeting the statutory criteria may file a written objection with ADOT. A.R.S. § 28-4454 (Supp. 2002).³ If ADOT agrees that the objecting party has met the elements of being a franchisee of the same line-make in the relevant area, evidence is submitted, and a hearing and determination of standing ensue. A.R.S. § 28-4455(A)(1998), § 28-4456 (Supp.2002).

¶ 3 In accordance with the statutory scheme, Ford notified ADOT of its intention to establish a new Lincoln Mercury dealership in the Phoenix metropolitan area. The dealership would be located within the external boundaries of the City but on a county island in an area called Chauncey Ranch, which is the subject of a development and pre-annexation agreement with the City. In its letter to ADOT, Ford identified five Lincoln Mercury dealerships in the area, one of which was Sanderson. Ford also asked to be advised when ADOT had sent the statutory notices.

¶ 4 Sanderson filed an objection, claiming that it was within the same community as the proposed dealership. On the same date, Ford wrote ADOT, asserting that, because the new dealership would be located on a county island, no existing dealership was entitled to notice or had a right to object. Ford then moved to dismiss Sanderson's objection on the basis that Sanderson is neither in the same community nor within ten miles of the proposed dealership. It maintained that, because Sanderson is within the City, Sanderson did not have standing to object and, likewise, that ADOT did not have jurisdiction to consider the objection.

¶ 5 Sanderson conceded that it is not within ten miles of the location of the new dealership and that the new location is not within the City in any but an intuited geographic sense because the new location is on a county island within the exterior boundaries of the City.⁴ It argued, however, that the administrative hearing on the matter should be focused on the definition of "relevant market area" and apply a geographic perspective, recognizing that the site is within the Phoenix metropolitan area, although not within the City, and that a new dealership in the Chauncey Ranch development would have an adverse impact on Sanderson's business. Sanderson contended also that the location of the new dealership should be considered part of the City as a practical matter because the Chauncey Ranch development is the subject of a pre-annexation agreement and expected to be joined to the City in the future.

¶ 6 Sanderson's arguments were rejected, and Ford's motion to dismiss was granted. The ADOT administrative law judge found that Sanderson did not have standing to object because it is not within the same community as the proposed new dealership as "community" is defined by the applicable statutes.

¶ 7 Sanderson appealed the administrative decision to the superior court. A.R.S. § 28-4456(G)(Supp.2002), § 12-904 (Supp.2002), § 12-905 (1992). The court affirmed the decision based on the administrative record and briefing by the parties. It found, as had ADOT, that the legislature had unambiguously defined "community" and that the location of the new dealership is not within the City. Sanderson then appealed to this court. A.R.S. § 12-2101(B) (1994).

DISCUSSION

¶ 8 In reviewing an administrative decision, we determine whether the order "is not supported by substantial evidence, is contrary to law, is arbitrary and capricious or is an abuse of discretion." A.R.S. § 12-910(E); see also Romo v. Kirschner, 181 Ariz. 239, 240, 889 P.2d 32, 33 (App.1995)

. There is no question of the evidence in this case, and, while we give great weight to an agency's interpretation of the statutes applicable to it, Capitol Castings, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 171 Ariz. 57, 60, 828 P.2d 781, 784 (App.1992), when the agency's interpretation is inconsistent with the legislature's intent, we do not defer to the agency. Foster v. Anable, 199 Ariz. 489, 491 ¶ 5, 19 P.3d 630, 632 (App.2001). We review the application of the law de novo. Lake Havasu City v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Serv., 202 Ariz. 549, 551 ¶ 4, 48 P.3d 499, 501 (App.2002).

¶ 9 To reiterate, to have a standing to object to the establishment of a new dealership in the context of Ford's proposal, Sanderson must be located within the same "community" as the new dealership. "Community" is "the relevant market area," defined as "the incorporated city or town in which the franchise is located." A.R.S. § 28-4301(5).

¶ 10 Sanderson insists, though, that the statutory definition of "community" is ambiguous. It contends that the statutory reference to "city" can mean either a political entity or a geographic entity and that the use of the phrase "relevant market area" indicates a legislative intent to apply the broader geographic interpretation. Sanderson further maintains that, with such an interpretation, the exterior boundaries of the City would define the geographic location and, therefore, the Chauncey Ranch development, although a county island, would be part of the "relevant market area."

¶ 11 A disagreement with a law is not appropriately argued to a judicial tribunal if the words of the law are plain and express; such arguments must be reserved for legislative consideration. See United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 389, 2 L.Ed. 304 (1805)

. "The primary rule of statutory construction is to find and give effect to legislative intent." Mail Boxes, Etc., U.S.A. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz., 181 Ariz. 119, 121, 888 P.2d 777, 779 (1995). To determine that intent, we look first to the language of the statute, and we presume that the legislature has said what it means. Canon Sch. Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S. Constr. Co., Inc., 177 Ariz. 526, 529, 869 P.2d 500, 503 (1994); see also Janson v. Christensen, 167 Ariz. 470, 471, 808 P.2d 1222, 1223 (1991)(If the statutory language is unambiguous, we give effect to the language and do not use other rules of statutory construction in interpretation.); A.R.S. § 1-213 (2002)("Words and phrases shall be construed according to the common and approved use of the language."). Only if the legislative intent is not clear from the statute do we consider other factors such as the statute's context, subject matter, historical context, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose. Wyatt v. Wehmueller, 167 Ariz. 281, 284, 806 P.2d 870, 873 (1991).

¶ 12 The statutory scheme at issue is not ambiguous. The legislature defined "community" as "relevant market area," which it further defined as "the incorporated city or town in which the franchise is located." A.R.S. § 28-4301(5). The phrase "incorporated city" necessarily contemplates a locality defined by its metes and bounds. A.R.S. § 9-101(A) (Supp.2002).⁵ It follows that an area excluded from the defined area of incorporation is not part of the "city," as is true of a county island. Accordingly, Sanderson, although located within the incorporated City of Phoenix, is nonetheless not in the same community as the new dealership, the location of which is not part of the incorporated City. Sanderson, therefore, is without standing to object to the new dealership.

¶ 13 Despite the express definition in the statute, Sanderson argues that the use of the phrase "relevant market area" demonstrates a legislative intent to overlay trade regulation concerns on the statute, which in turn requires that we interpret the statute as applying geographic rather than political boundaries. It contends that, by defining "community" as "relevant market area," the legislature indicated that "community" was to be read consistently with relevant market concepts under antitrust principles.

¶ 14 We discern no such demonstrable legislative purpose but, instead, the contrary purpose in the legislature's specific definition of "relevant market area." Indeed, nothing in the statutory language supports Sanderson's position that principles of antitrust law should be superimposed on the statutory scheme to alter the express...