Sandland v. Safeway Stores Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 May 2011
• Docket Number: No. 65043-2-I,65043-2-I
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: MARLENE SANDLAND, Appellant, v. SAFEWAY STORES, INC.; and DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondents.

MARLENE SANDLAND, Appellant,

v. SAFEWAY STORES, INC.;and DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ANDINDUSTRIES OF THE STATE OFWASHINGTON, Respondents.

No. 65043-2-I

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE

FILED: May 31, 2011

UNPUBLISHED

Cox, J. — In this workers' compensation case, Marlene Sandland challenges the validity of orders issued approximately thirty years ago by the Department of Labor & Industries (the Department) closing her two industrial injury claims. The essence of her challenge is that the Department, the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (the Board), and the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide these matters. We hold that these entities had subject matter jurisdiction, despite any errors of law they might have committed. We further conclude that she may not challenge the validity of any original closing orders where, as here, she failed to appeal subsequent final Department orders denying applications to reopen the claims. We affirm.

In 1978, Marlene Sandland filed two separate workers' compensation claims with the Department related to injuries she sustained while working as aSafeway employee.

(1) Ammonia Exposure Claim

Sandland was exposed to an ammonia leak on March 29, 1978. Her workers' compensation claim was allowed for medical treatment benefits. The Department issued an order on May 22, 1978 closing the claim. Sandland did not appeal.

More than a decade later, in 1989, Sandland filed a motion to reopen her claim, alleging that she had a developed a psychological impairment caused by the exposure to ammonia. On May 19, 1989, the Department issued an order denying the motion to reopen and declaring that the "claim remains closed." Sandland did not protest or appeal that order.

Thirteen years later, in 2002, Sandland filed a second application to reopen her claim. The Department denied her application, and following Sandland's protest, affirmed its order denying the application to reopen on December 19, 2003. Sandland appealed the Department's 2003 order to the Board.

(2) Foot Injury Claim

Shortly after the ammonia exposure incident, Sandland returned to workand sustained an injury to her right foot on April 10, 1978. Her workers' compensation claim was allowed and time loss benefits were paid through October 1982. On July 29, 1983, the Department issued an order closing the claim. Sandland did not appeal.

A year later, Sandland filed an application to reopen her claim, and as with her ammonia exposure claim, she maintained that she had developed a psychological impairment caused by her injury. The Department issued an order denying her application to reopen declaring that her claim would "remain closed". Sandland timely protested, and the Department affirmed its denial in a November 20, 1984, order. Sandland did not appeal the final order. The Department denied another application to reopen in 1989 and Sandland did not appeal. Finally, more than a decade later, in 2004, Sandland filed another motion to reopen. The Department again denied the application and Sandland appealed to the Board.

(3) Current Appeals of Most Recent Applications to Reopen

The two appeals stemming from Sandland's 2002 and 2004 applications to reopen her claims were consolidated and a lengthy hearing process followed.

During this process, in 2007, Sandland claimed, for the first time, that the Board lacked subject matter jurisdiction over her appeals because the Department's original orders in 1978 and 1983 closing her claims were nevercommunicated to her. Therefore, because there were no valid final orders closing her claims, she asserted that all of the Board's subsequent orders were void. Invalidating the Department's subsequent orders would avoid application of the over-seven provision, RCW 51.32.160, which acts as a bar in most cases to the receipt of disability benefits for claims that have been closed for more than seven years.

On April 1, 2009, the Board issued a decision and order affirming the Department's orders denying Sandland's applications to reopen both claims. The Board determined that with respect to the ammonia exposure claim, Sandland failed to establish that she did not receive the original 1978 order closing the claim. Thus, that order became final.

With respect to the foot injury claim, the Board concluded that Sandland met her burden of proving that she never received the Department's 1983 order closing her claim. Nonetheless, the Board determined that although the Department later erroneously adjudicated Sandland's 1984 application to reopen in the absence of a final order closing the claim, this error did not result in a jurisdictional defect. The Board concluded that the unappealed November 20, 1984, order denying Sandland's first application to reopen and confirming that her claim remained closed became the final closing order and was entitled to res judicata effect.

As to the merits of both applications to reopen, the Board upheld theDepartment's denials, concluding that Sandland failed to establish aggravation or worsening of a condition caused by either workplace injury. Therefore, she was not entitled to further medical benefits.

Sandland appealed the Board's decision to the superior court. She did not challenge the Board's determination on the merits of reopening her claims. Instead, she challenged only the Board's ruling that it had jurisdiction over her appeals and its factual finding that she received the Department's 1978 order closing her ammonia exposure claim.

Following a de novo review of the record before the Board, the superior court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law affirming the Board's ruling in its entirety. Sandland appeals.

The Industrial Insurance Act, chapter 51.52 RCW, provides for de novo superior court review of the Board's determination.¹ On review to the superior court, the Board's decision is prima facie correct, and the burden of proof is on the party challenging the decision.²

This court's review is governed by RCW 51.52.140 which provides that an "[a]ppeal shall lie from the judgment of the superior court as in other civil cases." We do not sit in the same position as the superior court and review only"'whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's factual findings and then review, de novo, whether the trial court's conclusions of law flow from the findings.'"³ Where, as here, stipulated facts are filed with the Board, we look to the stipulated facts rather than the findings of the Board.⁴

Sandland's position on appeal is premised on her argument that the Department's original orders in 1978 and 1983 closing her claims were never communicated to her. She argues that because she did not receive those orders by mail, the Department, the Board, and the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate her applications to reopen. She is mistaken.

Sandland misconstrues the concept of subject matter jurisdiction. "A tribunal lacks subject matter jurisdiction when it attempts to decide a type of controversy over which it has no authority to adjudicate."⁵ As our supreme court observed in Marley v. Department of Labor & Industries:

The focus must be on the words 'type of controversy.' If the type of controversy is within the subject matter jurisdiction, then all other defects or errors go to something other than subject matter jurisdiction.⁶

A determination to close a claim or to adjudicate an application to reopen a claim falls squarely within the Department's authority to decide claims for workers' compensation and the Board's authority to review Department actions.⁷ "A court or agency does not lack subject matter jurisdiction solely because it may lack authority to enter a given order."⁸

The Department may not adjudicate an application to reopen a claim until there is a final order closing a claim.⁹ Thus, with respect to Sandland's foot injury claim, and arguably also with respect to her ammonia exposure claim, the court erred as a matter of law in adjudicating her application to reopen in the absence of a final binding closing order. But neither Reid nor Marley supports the proposition that the Department's erroneous adjudication affects the parameters of its subject matter jurisdiction.

In Marley, the Board determined that Marley was not entitled to widow's benefits because she was separated from her husband at the time of his death. Marley did not appeal this decision within the 60-day appeal period. Nearlyseven years later, Marley attempted to appeal the decision, arguing that the decision was void. The supreme court concluded that even where the decision by the Department may have been erroneous as a matter of law, the unappealed decision was final and binding.¹⁰

Thus, Marley stands for the broad proposition that where an aggrieved party has not appealed a final Department order deciding a claim within the applicable appeal period, that party is precluded from rearguing the merits of the claim unless the order was void when entered. A Department order is not void unless the Department lacked personal jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. An erroneous adjudication does not deprive the Department of jurisdiction because it has broad subject matter jurisdiction to decide all claims for workers compensation benefits.¹¹

This court rejected a similar assertion of a jurisdictional defect in Shafer v. Department of Labor & Industries.¹² In that case, the claimant challenged the final closing order on the basis that the attending physician did not receive a copy of the closing order as required by statute. She argued that the absence of a final order closing her claim deprived the court of jurisdiction to rule on her subsequent application to reopen. We concluded that the error did not affect thejurisdiction of the Department or the Board.¹³

But unlike Sandland, Shafer challenged the validity of the original order closing her claim by appealing the...