Sandoval v. Rattikin, 124

• Decision Date: 17 October 1966
• Docket Number: No. 124,124
• Citation: 385 U.S. 901,17 L.Ed.2d 132,87 S.Ct. 199
• Parties: Matias SANDOVAL et ux., petitioners, v. Jack RATTIKIN, Trustee
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

385 U.S. 901

87 S.Ct. 199

17 L.Ed.2d 132

Matias SANDOVAL et ux., petitioners,

v Jack RATTIKIN, Trustee.

No. 124.

Supreme Court of the United States

October 17, 1966

Rehearing Denied Nov. 21, 1966.

See 385 U.S. 964, 87 S.Ct. 389.

Roger Butler, Luther E. Jones, Jr., and John D. Cofer, for petitioners.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Thirteenth Supreme Judicial District.

Denied.

Dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice FORTAS with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS joins:

In my judgment, this petition presents important issues as to the scope of the requirement, derived from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that state courts in civil actions must afford to each litigant a 'proper opportunity to present his evidence.' Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. 317, 319, 37 S.Ct. 638, 639, 61 L.Ed. 1163 (1917). Cf. Western & Atl. R. Co. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639, 49 S.Ct. 445, 73 L.Ed. 884 (1929); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965); Mullane v. Central Hanover, Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950).

Petitioners are illiterate indigents. They speak only Spanish. They and their five children have lived for many years on the meager homestead involved in this case. Petitioners executed a deed to the homestead. Respondent is assignee of this deed. Respondent brought this action and obtained a judgment confirming his title and possessory rights to the property under the deed. Petitioners seek review of the judgment of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals which affirmed this judgment.

At the trial, petitioners were represented by a Legal Aid attorney. The trial was perfunctory. After judgment was entered for respondent, petitioners obtained new counsel who filed a timely motion for new trial. This motion alleged that petitioners had a good and sufficient defense to the action: namely, that the 'deed' was in truth a mortgage given to secure a debt and that respondent took with notice of this fact. The motion alleged that this defense was not adduced at trial because of the default of petitioners' Legal Aid counsel.

The trial court held an elaborate hearing on the motion for new trial. The Legal Aid lawyer who had represented petitioners at the trial testified candidly that he had not had adequate time to prepare the case, and that he was further handicapped by his inability to speak or understand Spanish.

Petitioners' counsel in this Court urge that, in the circumstances of this case,...