Sandy v. Schriro

• Decision Date: 20 March 2001
• Citation: 39 S.W.3d 853
• Parties: (Mo.App. W.D. 2001) Christopher L. Sandy, Appellant v. Dora Schriro, Director, Missouri Department of Corrections, Respondent. WD58844 0
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

39 S.W.3d 853 (Mo.App. W.D. 2001)

Christopher L. Sandy, Appellant v. Dora Schriro, Director, Missouri Department of Corrections, Respondent.

WD58844

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District

03/20/2001

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Cole County, Hon. Thomas J. Brown, III

Counsel for Appellant: Richard L. Beaver

Counsel for Respondent: Troy G. Allen and Stephen D. Hawke

Opinion Summary: Christopher L. Sandy, who is serving a life sentence with the possibility of parole, applied for good time credit under section 558.041 RSMo Cum. Supp. 1999. Pursuant to 14 C.S.R. 10-5.010, his application was denied because he was serving a life sentence. He then filed a petition for declaratory relief and an injunction, alleging that the Department of Corrections exceeded the authority granted by the legislature in promulgating and implementing its policy under which he was denied the good time credit. He also alleged the policy violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. After the St. Louis County Circuit Court granted respondent's motion for change of venue to Cole County, the Cole County Circuit Court dismissed Mr. Sandy's petition for failure to state a claim. He then filed this appeal.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.

Division Two holds: (1) The judgment dismissing appellant's petition for failure to state a claim improperly decided appellant's claim in favor of respondent on the merits. This was procedurally contradictory; i.e., the court cannot dismiss appellant's petition for failure to state a claim by finding in favor of respondent on the merits.

(2) Appellant waived any challenge he may have had to the change of venue.

Victor C. Howard, Judge

Christopher L. Sandy (hereinafter "appellant") appeals from the circuit court's judgment dismissing his declaratory judgment action for failure to state a claim. He raises two points on appeal.

First, he asserts that he properly stated a claim upon which relief could be granted in alleging that: the Department of Corrections (hereinafter "respondent") was not within its authority granted by the legislature when it enacted its department policy, D5-8.1 as codified at 14 C.S.R. 10-5.010¹ (hereinafter "the policy"), under which he was denied good time credit because he was serving a life sentence; the policy violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws; and he had a right to be considered for the good time credit under section 558.041,² which right was denied due to respondent's unauthorized policy. Thus, he asserts dismissal was improper. In his second point, appellant asserts that the Circuit Court of St. Louis County erred in transferring venue to Cole County.

The change of venue is affirmed. However, we reverse the dismissal for failure to state a claim and remand the case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Background

On July 3, 1986, a jury convicted appellant of second-degree murder, Mo. Rev. Stat. section 565.021 (Supp. 1984). The court then sentenced him to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.

In June of 1999, the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole apparently³ granted appellant a parole release date of September 2002. section 217.690. Pursuant to section 558.041, appellant then filed an application for good time credit. Gene Stubblefield, the Superintendent of the Missouri Eastern Correctional Center, denied appellant's application, stating by letter as follows:

I have received your request for Good Time Credit. In accordance with Department Policy D5-8.1, persons serving a life sentence are not eligible for Time Credit. Therefore, I am returning your packet to you.

I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge your many accomplishments during your period of incarceration. I encourage you to continue your efforts at self-growth.

In response to this denial, on October 4, 1999, appellant filed a petition in the St. Louis County Circuit Court seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. He alleged that respondent's promulgation and implementation of the policy under which his application for good time credit was denied exceeded the authority granted by the Missouri Legislature under section 558.041 and was an ex post facto policy. He sought a declaratory judgment that he was entitled to be considered for good time credit and also sought an injunction.

On January 13, 2000, respondent moved to dismiss appellant's cause for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Respondent filed a motion for a change of venue, to which appellant did not respond. The case was then transferred to the Circuit Court of Cole County. Appellant responded to respondent's motion to dismiss and also moved for summary judgment while the case was still pending in the St. Louis County Circuit Court. After the case was transferred, he moved for a judgment on the pleadings and filed his supplemental response to respondent's motion to dismiss in Cole County.

On June 22, 2000, the Cole County Circuit Court entered its "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment Granting Respondent's Motion to Dismiss." The court dismissed appellant's petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. This appeal followed.

Point I -- Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim

Appellant's first point concerns the circuit court's dismissal of his petition.

Standard of Review

In reviewing the court's dismissal of appellant's declaratory judgment action, we deem all facts pleaded to be true, liberally construe the petition's averments, and draw all reasonable and fair inferences therefrom. Roy v. Missouri Dep't of Corr., 23 S.W.3d 738, 742 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000). We review the allegations set forth in the petition in order to determine whether principles of substantive law are invoked, which, if proved, would entitle petitioner to declaratory relief. Id. If so, then the petition is sufficient and cannot be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Id. In other words, if the petition contains facts, not mere conclusions, supporting its allegations, and those facts demonstrate a justiciable controversy, then we will reverse the court's dismissal and remand the cause to the court for a determination of the parties' rights. Id. at 742-43.

Dismissal of Declaratory Judgment Action

The facts and reasonable inferences therefrom as pled in appellant's petition are summarily set forth above. On these facts, the circuit court found in relevant part as follows:

5. To ultimately prevail, [appellant] must show that 14 CSR 10-5.010 is "unreasonable and plainly inconsistent" with section 558.041, RSMo.

6. Underlying administrative law is the concept that "administrative agencies -- legislative creations -- possess only those powers expressly conferred or necessarily implied by statute." Under the express language of section 558.041.3, RSMo, the Department "shall issue a policy for awarding credit." This policy is contained in 14 CSR 10-5.010.

7. On careful review of section 558.041 and 14 CSR 10-5.010, it is clear that petitioner fails to state a claim for relief. In promulgating 14 CSR 10-5.010, which, in relevant part, makes those inmates with life sentences ineligible for good time credit, the Department adhered to the language and legislative intent of section 558.041, RSMo.

* * *

10. Lastly, [appellant] argues that 14 CSR 10-5.010 violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. "The ex post facto provision prohibits any law that provides for punishment for an act that was not punishable when it was committed or that imposes an additional punishment to that in effect at the time the act was committed." "Two elements are necessary for a law to be ex post facto: it must be retrospective, and it must disadvantage the affected offender."

11. [Appellant] argues that application of 14 CSR 10-5.010 "depriv[es] him of his liberty for an additional 15 months." That regulation, however, is not penal in nature. The regulation does not increase the punishment for [appellant]'s 1986 conviction: [appellant] is still sentenced to life imprisonment. As such, [appellant] is not "disadvantaged" by 14 CSR 10-5.010.

(Citations omitted.) The circuit court essentially ruled on the merits of appellant's claim in dismissing it. In so doing, the court implicitly acknowledged that appellant stated a claim in his petition. This is procedurally contradictory; i.e., the court cannot dismiss appellant's petition for failure to state a claim by finding in favor of respondent on the merits. Thus, dismissal for failure to state a claim was not appropriate. See City of St. Peters v. Concrete Holding Co., 896 S.W.2d 501, 503 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995) (holding "[i]t is improper for a trial court to decide the merits of a properly pleaded declaratory relief action by dismissal").

In holding that the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's petition for failure to state a claim in City of Creve Coeur v. Creve Coeur Fire Protection Dist., 355 S.W.2d 857, 859-60 (Mo. 1962), the Missouri Supreme Court explained:

[I]t is not the function of the trial court on a motion to dismiss or of this court on appeal from a judgment of dismissal to make an analysis of the law under which the rights are claimed or to construe the statutes in question or to determine on the merits whether [appellant] is entitled to [ ] declaratory relief.

Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the circuit court does not address the merits of the claim, rather, it determines whether the...