Sanford v. Rockefeller
| Decision Date | 19 December 1974 |
| Parties | , 324 N.E.2d 113, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2189, 76 Lab.Cas. P 53,589 In the Matter of Thomas J. SANFORD, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellant, v. Nelson A. ROCKEFELLER, as Governor of the State of New York, et al., Respondents. In the Matter of Shirley L. SPLATT, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellant, v. Nelson A. ROCKEFELLER, as Governor of the State of New York, et al., Respondents. In the Matter of James WINKOWSKI, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellant, v. Nelson A. ROCKEFELLER, as Governor of the State of New York, et al., Respondents. In the Matter of Mack GODBEE, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellant, v. Nelson A. ROCKEFELLER, as Governor of the State of New York, et al., Respondents. In the Matter of Richard COLLINS, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellant, v. Nelson A. ROCKEFELLER, as Governor of the State of New York, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Richard R. Rowley and Jeffrey G. Plant, Albany, for Richard Collins and another, appellants.
John T. DeGraff, William H. Allen, Washington, D.C., John C. Rice and Samule Jacobs, Albany, for Thomas J. Sanford and remaining appellants, appellants.
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (John Q. Driscoll and Ruth Kessler Toch, Albany, of counsel), for respondents.
Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon, New York City, for Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of the City of New York, Inc., amicus curiae.
These cases are again before us as a result of the United States Supreme Court's vacatur of our prior decision, Sanford v. Wilson, 416 U.S. 977, 94 S.Ct. 2377, 40 L.Ed.2d 755, accompanied by the direction to reconsider the issues in light of Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 40 L.Ed.2d 15. The issues, to be more narrowly defined hereinafter, concern the adequacy of the procedural safeguards contained in section 210 of the Civil Service Law, Consol.Laws, c. 7, often referred to as the Taylor Law, which, in summary, provides that a public employee, found by an executive officer to have engaged in a strike, may be summarily penalized by the imposition of a fine and placement on one year's probationary status with the right, however, thereafter to file an objection which, depending upon evaluation by the reviewing officer, could result in reinstatement of tenure and the restoration of the money exacted under the fine, or the holding of a hearing if the reviewing officer discerns the existence of fact questions, or summary rejection where the officer determines that there is no substance to the objection (Civil Service Law, § 210, subd. 2).
Briefly stated, subdivision 1 of the section prohibits strikes by public employees. The main issue presented in these cases in whether due process is afforded in disciplining of public employees who are charged with having engaged in a strike contrary to the injunctive provision of section 210.
We conclude that the statutory procedures relating to notice, hearing, penalties and review are entirely adequate as affording the required degree of due process. In order to place the issue in proper focus, it is well to here set out fully the appropriate mandates of the section as they relate to the procedures to be followed: Paragraph (d) of subdivison 2 states as follows: ; and paragraph (e) states:
We now turn to the all-important paragraph (h) of the subdivision which we deem to adequately cloak the employee with the right to review fully the determination made by the chief executive officer. It provides:
Analysis of these statutory requirements discloses that provision is made for the following procedures:
An initial determination is made by the chief executive officer of the government involved 'on the basis of such investigation and affidavits as he may deem appropriate'. He may determine either that there has been no violation or that a violation has occurred. If it be the latter, he then determines, 'on the basis of such further investigation and affidavits as he may deem appropriate', the names of the employees and the dates of violation. Notice in person or by certified mail is then given to each employee charged, together with advice of his right to object to the initial determination. Within 20 days thereafter each employee charged may file a writtn objection with the chief executive officer. Such objection shall consist of the employee's sworn affidavit containing a short and plain statement of the facts on which he relies to show that such determination was incorrect, supported by available documentary proof. The chief executive officer is then presented with three options: (1) if he determines that the proof establishes that the employee did not violate the subdivision, he shall sustain the objection; (2) if he determines that beyond any question of fact the proof fails to establish that the employee did not violate the subdivision he shall dismiss the objection and so notify the employee; or (3) if he determines that the proof raises a question of fact which if resolved in favor of the employee, would establish that the employee did not violate the subdivision he shall appoint a hearing officer to determine in fact whether there was a violation.
The hearing officer shall conduct a hearing which will serve as the vehicle for making his determination. Although the statute does not make explicit provision with respect thereto, this would be an evidentiary hearing at which the employee would be accorded all his due process rights (Matter of Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.2d 421), following which the hearing officer determines whether there has been a violation. As noted above the statute provides that the burden of proof at such hearing shall be borne by the employee and that a determination in his favor must be based on a preponderance of the evidence.
At this point the employee, if necessary and if he be so advised, becomes entitled to a full-blown article 78 judicial review of the hearing officer's determination. On the one hand, if the chief executive officer has determined that without question of fact the employee is guilty of the violation charged, that determination may be called up for review. No evidentiary hearing having been had, the issues will be whether the chief officer proceeded without or in excess of jurisdiction, whether his determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, or whether it was affected by an...
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