Sangaree v. Hamlin

• Decision Date: 13 May 1970
• Docket Number: No. 39488,39488
• Citation: 235 So.2d 729
• Parties: Lawrence G. SANGAREE, Jr., Petitioner, v. Raymond HAMLIN, Sheriff of Leon County, Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 729

235 So.2d 729

Lawrence G. SANGAREE, Jr., Petitioner, v. Raymond HAMLIN, Sheriff of Leon County, Florida, Respondent.

No. 39488.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 13, 1970.

Rehearing Denied June 23, 1970.

William F. Daniel, of Cotten, Shivers, Gwynn & Daniel, Tallahassee, for petitioner.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Reeves Bowen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

ADKINS, Justice.

In an original proceeding, petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus releasing him from custody on the ground no preliminary hearing was granted petitioner prior to the return of an indictment charging him with murder in the first degree.

Petitioner alleges that he was arrested at 1:00 a.m., on Monday, February 2, 1970, in Franklin County, Florida, and was interrogated repeatedly for a number of hours in Franklin County and Leon County without benefit of counsel and without benefit of warning of his constitutional right to remain silent. Petitioner admitted at oral argument that an indictment was returned by the Grand Jury on Friday, February 6, 1970.

The complaints of petitioner are quite similar to those of Palmieri in Palmieri v. State, 198 So.2d 633 (Fla.1967), where the Court held that detention of a defendant for ten days upon an arrest without a warrant and without being taken before a magistrate was improper, but reversal of his conviction was not required under the circumstances.

The purpose of Fla.Stat. § 901.23, F.S.A., is to require an officer, after arrest and without unnecessary delay, to make or cause to be made an affidavit before a magistrate upon which a warrant should issue, or give the prosecuting attorney sufficient evidence upon which an information can be filed. The custom of making arrests without warrant and confining a prisoner in jail for an indefinite time before applying for and obtaining the issuance of a warrant is condemned. See Milton v. Cochran, 147 So.2d 137 (Fla.1962).

However, a preliminary hearing is not a step in due process of law and is not a prerequisite to a criminal prosecution or the filing of an indictment or information. Baugus v. State, 141 So.2d 264 (Fla.1962), cert den.,371 U.S. 879, 83 S.Ct. 153, 9 L.Ed.2d 117.

The delay between an arrest without warrant and the appointment of counsel could have an important bearing upon the admissibility of an ad interim confession. The questions raised by the petition for writ of habeas corpus are more appropriately raised during the trial of the case for review upon appeal in the event of a verdict adverse to the petitioner. Under the principles set forth in Palmieri v. State, supra, the allegations of the petition are insufficient. The petition is, therefore,

Denied.

CARLTON and BOYD, JJ., concur.

THORNAL, J., concurs in opinion and judgment with opinion.

ERVIN, C.J., dissents with opinion.

THORNAL, Justice (concurring).

I concur in the opinion prepared by Justice Adkins because of his holding that the asserted remedy by habeas corpus is an inappropriate procedural approach to the relief sought. I do not thereby preclude a re-valuation of the problem should it arise by a motion to quash or an objection at the trial to evidence or the fruits of evidence illegally obtained.

ERVIN, Chief Justice (dissenting).

For reasons indicated below, I do not believe questions presented by this habeas corpus proceeding, and relief appropriately fashioned in accordance with resolution thereof, must necessarily be deferred to the trial stage.

In addition to the allegations described in the majority opinion, Petitioner in an amendment to his petition alleges:

'That Petitioner was unlawfully arrested, unlawfully interrogated following arrest without benefit of counsel or warning of his right to remain silent, unlawfully detained in Leon County Jail and unlawfully subjected to a 'planted' jail-cell police companion disguised as a prisoner, who 'pumped' him verbally for information and turned the information over to the State.

'That 4 days after his unlawful arrest, the State took all the illegal evidence, it had gathered, including statements by Petitioner, without benefit of counsel or warning of his right to remain silent, to the Leon County Grand Jury and got an illegal indictment against him for first degree murder. That if Petitioner had been promptly taken before a committing magistrate and had been given an immediate preliminary hearing as provided by law, the magistrate would have released him, or admitted him to bail because the evidence would not have been clear of his guilt or the presumption of guilt great under the evidence; and thereafter the State would not have obtained the illegal evidence it presented to the Grand Jury because of his unlawful arrest and unlawful detention. That the failure to grant him a preliminary hearing where the State would be required to establish a prima facie case to hold and detain him, has resulted in the gathering of illegal information and evidence after detention and the issuance of an illegal first degree murder indictment by the Grand Jury based on the fruit of the illegal tree.

'That the technique by the State of denying Petitioner a preliminary hearing before a committing magistrate is deliberate and is calculated to permit the State to unlawfully hold the accused without bond in order to gather evidence for an indictment or information after arrest, and which evidence they do not have at the time of arrest; and this represents an unreasonable and unconstitutional practice resulting in denial of due process of law, equal protection of the law and effective immediate benefit of legal counsel in the defense of Petitioner. * * *'

The foregoing allegations no doubt raise a questionable issue as to whether the authorities lawfully discharged their duty under F.S. § 901.23, F.S.A., to present Petitioner upon arrest before a committing magistrate without unnecessary delay. I readily agree with the majority opinion herein so far as it describes the purpose of § 901.23 as implementing a procedure designed to obviate the custom of confining a prisoner in jail for an indefinite time after arrest before applying for and obtaining the issuance of an arrest warrant. However, the fact that the presentation before a magistrate without unnecessary delay after an arrest With a warrant is also required (F.S. § 901.06, F.S.A.) strongly indicates that § 901.23 is not limited exclusively to the purpose described in the majority opinion.

Practically considered, the primary function of both § 901.06 and § 901.23 is to operate so as to timely trigger implementation of the procedural rights and requirements set out in Rule 1.122, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 33 F.S.A. Rule 1.122 specifically prescribes certain duties of a committing magistrate when a defendant is brought before him, either with or without an arrest warrant. Paragraph (a) of this rule is substantially the same as former F.S. § 902.01, F.S.A., and is patterned to a large extent after its Federal counterpart, Federal Criminal Procedure Rule 5(b).

When the requirements of § 901.06 and § 901.23 are complied with by arresting authorities, a canopy of procedural protection is afforded an accused by virtue of Rule 1.122. First, presentation of an accused person before a magistrate upon arrest insures that the accused 'will be advised of his constitutional rights by a judicial officer, rather than an enforcement officer, before running the gantlet of extensive and protracted interrogation at the hands of law enforcement authorities.' Perkins v. State, Fla., 228 So.2d 382, 391. Adherence to such a procedure no doubt amplifies the protective safeguards envisioned in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1066), and thereby serves to diminish the risk that an accused person will be duped or forced into making incriminating statements. Certainly, an accused person who, promptly after arrest, is fully advised by a judicial officer of the constitutional rights available to him, is less likely either unwillingly or unwittingly to supply incriminating information which, either in one form or another, may later prove to be the basis of his indictment and conviction.

The majority opinion herein appears to recognize the importance of the above-discussed procedures and their relationship to the admissibility of an 'ad interim' confession. However, the majority feels that such considerations are more appropriately deferred to the trial stage of the proceedings. Deferring such considerations to the trial stage does not in all cases, it seems to me, supply a remedial measure sufficient to cure the harmful effects arising from violation of the above described procedures. For example, in some situations the ad interim confession by an accused secured as a result of the failure to accord the procedural rights herein discussed may function as a lead to other incriminating evidence. an accused, of course, is entitled at trial to the exclusion of such tainted evidence provided the vital link establishing the tainted nature of such evidence can be demonstrated. The problem here lies in fact that by the time the trial stage is reached it is difficult, if...