Sannmann v. Dep't of Justice
| Decision Date | 20 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | D075600 |
| Citation | 47 Cal.App.5th 676,260 Cal.Rptr.3d 894 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Frederic Carl SANNMANN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Defendant and Appellant. |
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Assistant Attorney General, Anthony R. Hakl and Maureen C. Onyeagbako, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Appellant.
Paul H. Neuharth, Jr., San Diego, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 1997, Frederic Sannmann pleaded guilty to felony robbery ( Pen. Code, § 211 ),1 which rendered him ineligible to own firearms (former § 12021, now § 29800). In 2003, he successfully moved under section 1203.4, subdivision (a) (hereafter § 1203.4(a)) to set aside his conviction for most purposes. By statute, this relief did not restore Sannmann's right to own firearms. (§ 1203.4(a).) In 2011, Sannmann successfully moved—with the prosecutor's concurrence—to set aside the earlier set-aside order, to withdraw his 1997 felony guilty plea, and to instead plead guilty to misdemeanor theft (§ 487) nunc pro tunc to the date of his original plea. Sannmann immediately notified the California Department of Justice (DOJ) of these changes and the DOJ eventually updated its records accordingly. However, six years later, when Sannmann tried to buy a shotgun from a gun store, the DOJ blocked the purchase based on Sannmann's original 1997 felony conviction.
Sannmann filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking an order directing the DOJ to release any holds on his ability to purchase firearms based on the 1997 felony conviction. The trial court believed it lacked the authority to determine the validity of the 2011 set-aside order entered by another superior court judge. Thus, finding Sannmann's record in the criminal case disclosed only a misdemeanor conviction (by virtue of the 2011 set-aside order), the court entered judgment for Sannmann and ordered the DOJ to release its hold on Sannmann's purchase.
On appeal, the DOJ contends the trial court erred by awarding mandamus relief based on the 2011 set-aside order because the 2011 order was an unauthorized act in excess of the superior court's jurisdiction. The DOJ does not otherwise seek in this appeal to invalidate the 2011 set-aside order. For reasons we will explain, on the narrow issue before us, we agree the trial court erred by granting mandamus relief based on the 2011 set-aside order and reverse the judgment.
In 1997, Sannmann pleaded guilty in case number SCD129922 (the criminal case) to robbery under section 211, a "straight felony."2 He was placed on three years' probation, subject to serving 365 days in jail and paying a fine.
In 2003, after completing his term of probation, Sannmann moved under section 1203.4(a) to set aside his 1997 guilty plea and conviction. As it then existed, section 1203.4(a) stated in pertinent part:
The court granted Sannmann's motion, set aside his 1997 guilty plea, entered a plea of not guilty, and dismissed the accusatory pleading. Tracking the language of the statute, the court's order clarified that it "does not permit the defendant to own, possess, or have custody or control of any firearm capable of being concealed upon the person, and it does not prevent conviction of the defendant under [former section] 12021."
In 2011, Sannmann filed another motion in the criminal case seeking to (1) set aside the 2003 set-aside order (thereby reinstating his 1997 robbery conviction by guilty plea); (2) withdraw his guilty plea to the robbery charge; and (3) enter a guilty plea to misdemeanor grand theft (§ 487) instead of robbery, nunc pro tunc to the original plea date in 1997. The prosecutor concurred in Sannmann's motion.
The court granted Sannmann's motion and entered a minute order stating the following: 4
Two days after the court entered the 2011 set-aside order, Sannmann (through counsel) sent a letter to the DOJ's "Records Review Unit" enclosing and summarizing the order and requesting that the DOJ "update [its] records as appropriate." The letter did not indicate Sannmann was seeking to update his criminal history so that he could purchase a firearm.
After several exchanges of correspondence, none of which discussed firearms, the DOJ advised Sannmann in March 2012 that his "criminal history record [was] being amended to reflect the subsequent court dismissal" of the felony robbery conviction and the subsequent misdemeanor "conviction of the [ section 487 ] charge." The DOJ provided Sannmann a copy of his amended criminal history reflecting these changes.
Over five years later, in October 2017, Sannmann attempted to buy a shotgun at a gun store. While his purchase was pending approval, Sannmann received a letter from the DOJ's Bureau of Firearms stating his "purchase application is being denied" based on a prior felony conviction.
Shortly after his purchase was blocked, Sannmann filed a petition for writ of mandate, the operative iteration of which sought an order "directing ... that [the DOJ] release any holds upon [Sannmann]'s ability to purchase or own firearms that are based upon the [criminal case]."5
After the parties briefed the matter, the trial court heard and granted Sannmann's petition. The trial court explained, The court refused to invalidate the 2011 set-aside order for several reasons.
First, the court found it lacked the authority "to determine the correctness of another Superior Court judge's order."
Second, to the extent the court addressed the merits of the 2011 set-aside order, the court observed that Sannmann's 2011 set-aside motion "was brought under [section] 17," which authorizes trial courts to grant relief even after a case has been "dismissed" under a section 1203.4 set-aside order "[b]ecause ‘a conviction which has been [set aside under section 1203.4] still exists for limited purposes, including ... the denial of the right to carry a concealable weapon ....’ " The trial court did not address the fact (discussed post ) that section 17 applies only to wobbler offenses, and not to straight felonies.
Finally, after taking judicial notice of the file for the criminal case,6 the trial court observed that the prosecutor "concur[red] with the defendant's plea," and "agreed with" and did "not appeal the Order."
The court later entered judgment in Sannmann's favor and ordered the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus commanding the DOJ "to release any hold upon ... Sannmann's ability to purchase or own firearms that are based upon [the criminal case]."
The narrow issue before us is the DOJ's contention that the trial court erred by issuing mandamus relief based on the 2011 set-aside order, which the DOJ maintains was an unauthorized act in excess of the superior court's jurisdiction in the criminal case. As so framed, we agree.
"[E]ntitlement to postconviction relief" from "a final judgment of conviction ... is governed by statute." (See Mendez, supra , 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 1778, 286 Cal.Rptr. 216 ; People v. Barraza (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 114, 120-121, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 377.) Generally speaking, section 1203.4 "is the only postconviction relief from the consequences of a valid criminal conviction available to a defendant" who was convicted of a felony and successfully completed probation. ( Barraza , at pp. 120-121, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 ; see People v. Chavez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 771, 788, 231 Cal.Rptr.3d 634, 415 P.3d 707.)
Sannmann properly acknowledges the 2003 order granting him relief under section 1203.4(a) "did not restore his right to own a firearm." (See Frawley, supra , 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 797, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 555 [].) Thus, for Sannmann's firearm rights to have been restored, the trial court, in issuing mandamus relief, must have correctly concluded that the 2011 set-aside order validly set aside the section 1203.4(a) relief and reduced Sannmann's felony robbery conviction to a misdemeanor theft conviction. We conclude the trial court erred in reaching this conclusion.7
The superior court's 2011 set-aside order purports to be based on two authorities:
section 17, subdivision (b)(4) and the court's inherent authority to modify orders "nunc pro tunc." Neither ground authorized the superior court's order.
Section 17, subdivision (b) specifies the circumstances under which wobbler offenses are...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Jason V. (In re Jason V.)
...clerical errors, but not judicial errors. ( People v. Kim (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 117, 124 .)" ( Sannmann v. Department of Justice (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 676, 683, 260 Cal.Rptr.3d 894 ( Sannmann ).)"An order made nunc pro tunc should correct clerical error by placing on the record what was ac......
- Amgen Inc. v. Health Care Servs.
-
People v. Raymundo M. (In re Raymundo M.)
...have the authority to reduce straight felonies to misdemeanors; courts can only reduce wobblers. (See Sannmann v. Department of Justice (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 676, 683, 260 Cal.Rptr.3d 894.) Raymundo argues that because the court's consideration of the wobbler issue arose in response to his ......
-
Williams v. Barnes (In re Barnes)
... ... consideration of the matters contained in the appellate ... record.'" ( Sannmann v. Department of ... Justice (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 676, 684.) A second is ... that ... duty[, ] the claim is forfeited." ( Oak Valley ... Hospital Dist. v. State Dept. of Health Care Services ... (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 212, 237; see Estes v. Eaton ... ...