Sanson v. Pullum
| Decision Date | 13 July 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-77,81-77 |
| Parties | Bill SANSON and Vick Brown, Appellants, v. Kenneth PULLUM and Patricia Pullum, Appellees. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Guy H. Jones, Phil Stratton, Guy Jones, Jr., and Casey Jones by Guy H. Jones, Conway, for appellants.
Matthews & Sanders by Roy Gene Sanders, Little Rock, for appellees.
This action for personal injuries and property damage comes to this court under Rule 29(1)(o). On September 30, 1975, the plaintiff Patricia Pullum was driving her husband's car on a highway in Faulkner county. The defendant Vick Brown, driving a farm tractor owned by his alleged employer, the defendant Bill Sanson, entered the highway from Mrs. Pullum's left and crossed in her path, pulling a load of silage behind the tractor. Mrs. Pullum testified that she did not have time to stop and struck the tractor just before it completed its crossing, with the farm trailer still blocking the highway. This appeal is from a verdict and judgment awarding Mrs. Pullum $29,000 for her injuries and her husband $2,000 for the damage to the car. Four points for reversal are argued.
First, at the close of the plaintiffs' proof Sanson moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the proof did not show Brown to have been acting as Sanson's employee on the day of the accident. The motion was overruled. Sanson then introduced testimony and did not renew his motion at the end of the trial. Any error was therefore waived. Granite Mountain Rest Home v. Schwarz, 236 Ark. 46, 364 S.W.2d 306 (1963).
Sanson is mistaken in arguing that our settled rule on this point was changed by ARCP, Rule 50(a). That Rule states that a party may move for a directed verdict at the close of his opponent's evidence without reserving the right to offer evidence if the motion is not granted. It also states that a party may move for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence. Neither statement changes pre-existing Arkansas practice. The reason underlying the Granite Mountain decision exists without regard to the new Rule. If the defendant could introduce evidence without waiving his first motion for a directed verdict, he could supply the very defect complained of and still obtain a new trial after having speculated upon the possibility of a favorable verdict upon all the proof. In fact, that is what would happen here, for Sanson later testified that he had given Brown a check for wages on the very day of the accident. If counsel thought there was still no proof of Brown's status as an employee when the accident occurred, the motion for a directed verdict could easily have been renewed. That was not done; so the point was waived.
Second, it is argued that the plaintiffs should not have been permitted to introduce medical bills and records "in a bundle" without having laid a proper foundation. Two instances are mentioned. Mrs. Pullum first identified a package containing her medical bills, copies of which defense counsel had had ever since her discovery deposition was taken. Counsel's objection, that she should first be required to show that all the bills after 1976 were for treatments attributable to the 1975 accident, was proper overruled. Mrs. Pullum had already described her injuries, had said that she had back pain and a fracture in her neck, and had explained that she had had to return to the hospital in 1978 and again in 1979. If defense counsel wanted to further develop the connection between the accident and the medical bills, that was a proper matter for cross examination. In the second instance complained of, medical and hospital records were apparently introduced as exhibits to Dr. Banister's deposition. There was only a general objection, and inasmuch as the exhibits have not been abstracted we cannot say that anything in them was either inadmissible or prejudicial. Counsel rely upon Henry v. Landreth, 254 Ark. 483, 494 S.W.2d 114 (1973),...
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Miles v. State
...of Rule 606(b) to impeach a jury's verdict is improper. Garner v. Finch, 272 Ark. 151, 612 S.W.2d 304 (1981); Sanson v. Pullum, 273 Ark. 325, 619 S.W.2d 641 (1981). Nonetheless, Miles challenges the constitutionality of Ark. R. Evid 606(b) "to the extent that [it] bars consideration of the ......
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Waterfield v. Quimby, 82-130
...see Martin v. Blackmon, 277 Ark. 190, 640 S.W.2d 435 (1982); Ashby v. State, 271 Ark. 239, 607 S.W.2d 675 (1980); Sanson v. Pullum, 273 Ark. 325, 619 S.W.2d 641 (1981); and Veasey v. State, 276 Ark. 457, 637 S.W.2d 545 (1982). Since this affidavit is inadmissible, there is no evidence of ju......
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Martin v. Blackmon
...influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror." Ashby v. State, 271 Ark. 239, 607 S.W.2d 675 (1980); Sanson v. Pullum, 273 Ark. 325, 619 S.W.2d 641 (1981); Veasey v. State, 276 Ark. 457, 637 S.W.2d 545 (1982). This is in contrast to the previous Arkansas statute, which allowed que......
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$735 in U.S. Currency v. State
... ... or to go forward with the production of additional evidence, in which case he has waived any further reliance upon the former motion.[1] See Sanson ... 222 S.W.3d 212 ... v. Pullum, 273 Ark. 325, 619 S.W.2d 641 (1981); Granite Mountain Rest Home v. Schwarz, 236 Ark. 46, 364 S.W.2d 306 (1963) ... ...