Santana v. Registrars of Voters of Worcester

• Decision Date: 01 September 1981
• Citation: 425 N.E.2d 745,384 Mass. 487
• Parties: Mayra SANTANA et al. 1 v. REGISTRARS OF VOTERS OF WORCESTER et al. 2
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 745

425 N.E.2d 745

384 Mass. 487

Mayra SANTANA et al. ¹ v. REGISTRARS OF VOTERS OF WORCESTER et al. ²

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Argued May 4, 1981.

Decided Sept. 1, 1981.

Hal R. Lieberman, Worcester (John Reinstein, Boston, with him), for plaintiffs.

William F. Scannell, Jr., Asst. City Sol., for defendants.

David E. Sullivan, Cambridge, for Secretary of the Commonwealth, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and LYNCH, JJ.

NOLAN, Justice.

This case reviews a Superior Court order dismissing an action brought by three Worcester voters on behalf of themselves and a class of others similarly situated, ³ seeking legal and equitable relief against the city of Worcester and its Registrars of Voters (registrars). We hold that the action was improperly dismissed, and we reverse.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to comply with certain mandatory State election laws. Specifically, the plaintiffs assert that G. L. c. 51, § 10A, obligates the registrars to collect the names of residents of multidwelling units from owners of such units for the purpose of compiling the annual street listing. Additionally, the plaintiffs contend that under G. L. c. 51, § 59, a person whose name does not appear on a voting list may vote by certificate at the polling place if his right to vote can be ascertained. Alleging that the defendants did not comply with these statutory requirements, the plaintiffs claim they were improperly removed from the city's voting lists, and unlawfully deprived of their right to vote, in violation of Part I, art. 9, of the Massachusetts Constitution and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The plaintiffs alleged facts as follows. Each of the named plaintiffs Mayra Santana, Rosa Maldonado, and Jeffrey Jenkins is a resident of a multidwelling unit in the city of Worcester. Each one registered to vote in Worcester, and each one continues to live at the address given at the time of registration. Both Santana and Maldonado registered to vote in Worcester in 1977. Neither one received notice that she was not currently registered to vote. ⁴ When each person went to her local polling place to vote in the March 4, 1980, presidential primary election, she was told by an official that her name was not on the voting list, that she would not be allowed to vote, and that she would have to register at city hall in order to vote in future elections. In neither case did the official ask the voter to present current identification. The official at Santana's voting place did communicate with the registrars concerning her right to vote, ⁵ and was informed that she was not so entitled. As a result, neither Santana nor Maldonado voted in the election.

The third named plaintiff, Jeffrey Jenkins, registered to vote in 1975 and voted in elections in 1975 and 1977. When he went to his local polling place to vote in the November 6, 1979, local election, he was told by an official that his name was not on the voting list, that he would not be allowed to vote, and that he would have to go to city hall for further assistance or information. He had received no notice that he had been removed from the voting list. At no time did the official ask Jenkins to present current identification or attempt to communicate with the registrars concerning his right to vote.

Furthermore, Jenkins went to the office of the registrars at city hall that same day. After a colloquy with the clerk, in which Jenkins indicated that he had not moved since his original registration, that he had not received any "drop" notice, and insisted on his right to vote in the current election, he was escorted from city hall by a security guard summoned by the clerk. Consequently, Jenkins did not vote in the election.

The defendants responded to the plaintiffs' complaint by filing a motion to dismiss, accompanied by two affidavits from one of the defendants, Robert J. O'Keefe, clerk of the board of registrars for the city of Worcester. The affidavits stated, inter alia, that prior to instituting the action, plaintiffs' attorney had refused to disclose to the registrars the names of persons allegedly dropped from the voting list. Additionally, one of the affidavits stated that the plaintiffs, Santana and Maldonado, had registered since the last election. Accordingly, in support of their motion to dismiss, the defendants asserted mootness with respect to the claims of the plaintiffs who had reregistered and failure to exhaust administrative remedies as to the third plaintiff.

The Superior Court judge granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, treating it as one for summary judgment. ⁶ He found that the plaintiffs had not asserted a valid claim for compensatory or punitive damages. Additionally, he held that the complaint did not set forth an "actual controversy." We granted direct appellate review. ⁷

1. Motion to dismiss. The judge erred in granting the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. The rule in appraising the sufficiency of a complaint is that it "should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief," taking all of its allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98, 360 N.E.2d 870 (1977), quoting from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). See Haggerty v. Globe Newspaper Co., --- Mass. ----, ---- ^a, 419 N.E.2d 844 (1981). A complaint is sufficient "if it appears that the plaintiff may be entitled to any form of relief, even though the particular relief he has demanded and the theory on which he seems to rely may not be appropriate." Nader v. Citron, supra at 104, 360 N.E.2d 870.

The complaint in these cases meets these minimal requirements. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants have violated two Massachusetts election laws, that these violations were committed in bad faith and in disregard of the plaintiffs' rights, and that the defendants thereby caused the plaintiffs wrongfully to be denied their right to vote. These allegations adequately state a claim for damages.

Without indulging in premature analysis, we note that the plain language of G. L. c. 51, §§ 10A & 59, as well as the regulation promulgated by the Secretary of the Commonwealth under authority of G. L. c. 54, § 37, construing § 59, support the plaintiffs' interpretation of the two statutes. See 950 Code Mass.Regs. § 51.03(5) (1979).

We note further our strong tradition of resolving voting disputes, where at all possible, in favor of the voter. " 'The object of election laws is to secure the rights of duly qualified electors, and not to defeat them.' This must be borne in mind in the construction of such statutes, and the presumption is that they are enacted to prevent fraud and to secure freedom of choice, and not by technical obstructions to make the right of voting insecure." Swift v. Registrars of Voters of Quincy, 281 Mass. 271, 277, 183 N.E. 730 (1932), quoting from Blackmer v. Hildreth, 181 Mass. 29, 31, 63 N.E. 14 (1902). See Kane v. Registrars of Voters of Fall River, 328 Mass. 511, 518, 105 N.E.2d 212 (1952); Parrott v. Plunkett, 268 Mass. 202, 205, 167 N.E. 329 (1929).

2. Cause of action. In their complaint, the plaintiffs have stated a well-recognized and appropriate cause of action for damages. Massachusetts has long recognized a cause of action for damages for wrongful deprivation of the right to vote. This is true even in the absence of any claim of malice or deliberate wrongdoing on the part of election officials. Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350 (1814). See Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass. 497, 11 N.E. 916 (1887); Kilham v. Ward, 2 Mass. 236 (1806), citing Gardner v. Ward, 2 Mass. 244 (1805).

Additionally, the plaintiffs cite 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) ⁸ in their claim for relief. Claims under § 1983 are fully cognizable in our State courts. Rzeznik v. Chief of Police of Southampton, 374 Mass. 475, 484 n.8, 373 N.E.2d 1128 (1978). Undeniably, the Constitution of the United States protects the rights of citizens who are qualified under State law to vote in State as well as in Federal elections. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1377, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). Without commenting on the merits of the contention, we cannot say that the plaintiffs' allegation of the defendants' systematic and wilful violation of two election laws, resulting in the deprivation of the plaintiffs' right to vote, fails to state a cause of action under § 1983. ⁹ See Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1978); Williams v. Sclafani, 444 F.Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom. Williams v. Velez, 580 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1978); Ury v. Santee, 303 F.Supp. 119 (N.D.Ill.1969). Cf. Young v. Gardner, 497 F.Supp. 396 (D.N.H.1980).

The plaintiffs are entitled to an opportunity to prove the allegations which support their claims.

3. Actual controversy. In order for a court to entertain a petition for declaratory relief, an "actual controversy" must appear on the pleadings. G. L. c. 231A, § 1. A case should not be dismissed at the pleadings stage simply because the judge does not agree with the proposition for which the plaintiff contends. See Johnson v. Framingham, 354 Mass. 750, 754, 242 N.E.2d 420 (1968). Instead, an appropriate decree should be entered. Dukes County v. New Bedford, Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket Steamship Auth., 333 Mass. 405, 406, 131 N.E.2d 206 (1956).

Assuming that a plaintiff has proper standing to bring the action, a dispute over an official interpretation of a statute constitutes a justiciable controversy for purposes of declaratory relief. Massachusetts Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents & Brokers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Ins., 373 Mass. 290, 293, 367...