Sardinia v. State

• Decision Date: 12 November 1964
• Docket Number: No. 33455,33455
• Citation: 168 So.2d 674
• Parties: Lionel Stanley SARDINIA, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 674

168 So.2d 674

Lionel Stanley SARDINIA, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 33455.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Nov. 12, 1964.

Robert L. Koeppel, Public Defender, W. Eugene Neill, and Patrick A. Podsaid, Asst. Public Defenders, for petitioner.

James W. Kynes, Atty. Gen., Leonard R. Mellon and Victor V. Andreevsky, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent.

THORNAL, Acting Chief Justice.

By petition for a writ of certiorari we are requested to review a decision of the Court of Appeal, Third District, which has been certified to us as passing upon a question of great public interest. Sardinia v. State, Fla.App., 162 So.2d 328; Article V. Section 4, Florida Constitution, F.S.A.

We must decide whether one charged with a felony in Florida is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at his arraignment and, if so, whether the right was waived in the instant case.

Sardinia was informed against for the crimes of breaking and entering and petty larceny. The former is a felony. On May 29, 1961, he was arraigned in Criminal Court of Record of Dade County. Without the assistance of counsel he entered a plea of guilty. There was no evidence of a waiver of counsel at this time. On June 1, 1964, he was brought on for trial. Pursuant to the plea of guilty he was convicted and sentenced to a term in the state prison. At the trial and sentencing the petitioner was assisted by privately employed counsel who appeared with him in court.

On August 16, 1964, Sardinia, pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule 1, F.S.A. ch. 924 Appendix, moved to vacate the conviction and sentence. He alleged that at the time of arraignment he was a pauper, could not employ a lawyer, and that he entered the guilty plea without the assistance of counsel. The trial judge denied the motion to vacate. The ruling was appealed to the Court of Appeal, Third District. That court appointed a public defender to represent the accused in the appellate proceeding. The District Court was of the view that Sardinia's failure to move to set aside the plea of guilty when he appeared for trial with the aid of counsel, constituted a waiver of any organic defect in the arraignment. It is this decision which is now submitted for review.

Initially, the petitioner attempted to establish jurisdiction here on the basis of alleged conflicts between the instant decision and the decision of the Court of Appeal, Second District, in Hall v. State, 160 So.2d 527, and the decision of the Court of Appeal, First District, in Conley v. State, 160 So.2d 752. Any possible concern over jurisdiction has been alleviated by the fact that the Court of Appeal has certified its decision to us as being one which passes on a question of great public interest. We may, therefore, proceed directly to a consideration of the merits. Susco Car Rental System of Florida v. Leonard, Fla., 112 So.2d 832; James v. Keene, 133 So.2d 297.

Petitioner contends that our judgment should be influenced by the decision in Hall v. State, supra, where 'arraignment' was apparently considered to constitute a part of the 'trial'. However, Hall, the accused, was convicted and sentenced without the assistance of counsel pursuant to a plea of guilty which was likewise entered without counsel. Petitioner's reliance upon Conley v. State, supra, is also ill-grounded. In Conley there was no lawyer at the arraignment. The trial judge, with district court affirmance, held that the accused waived counsel when, pursuant to inquiry, he specifically stated that he did not desire the assistance of counsel. Both Hall and Conley are, therefore, inapposite to our present problem.

The essential substance of Sardinia's claim is that in Florida an arraignment now constitutes a critical stage in a felony prosecution. Hence, he concludes that the assistance of counsel at the arraignment is an essential of due process. He supports his position by reliance upon Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, and Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114. Gideon does require the assistance of counsel at every critical stage of a felony prosecution unless such assistance is properly waived. Hamilton required the assistance of counsel at arraignment because it was concluded that, under Alabama law, arraignment constitutes a critical step in the proceeding. There certain defenses are waived if not asserted before or at arraignment. They cannot later be advanced except in the discretion of the trial judge whose discretion was held to be 'not revisalbe' by an Alabama Appellate Court. In Hamilton it was held that the Alabama arraignment constitutes an effective barrier to the subsequent assertion of certain defenses. Hence, it was determined that the assistance of counsel at that stage was vital. The situation in Florida is substantially different.

In Ex Parte Jeffcoat, 109 Fla. 207, 146 So. 827, it was held that an arraignment at that time was merely a formal preliminary step and not a critical stage in a criminal prosecution. In view of subsequent legislation we find it necessary to re-examine the Jeffcoat rule. That case was decided in 1933. Chapter 19554, Florida's Criminal Procedure Act, was enacted in 1939. Chapters 908-909, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. derive from various sections of Chapter 19554, supra.

Under the 1939 statute, an accused in Florida does run the risk of losing the benefit of certain defenses if he fails to assert them at or before arraignment. For example, under Section 909.17, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the defense of insanity must be announced at arraignment or prior thereto. Regardless of this, under Section 909.17(3), the trial judge may permit evidence of the defense upon a showing of good cause. Under Section 909.06, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., a motion to quash an indictment must be filed before the accused pleads guilty thereto. Nevertheless, the trial judge has the power to extend the time under Section 909.01, Florida Statutes.

Consequently, in Florida, while the defendant is required to take certain action at or prior to arraignment, he can still obtain relief by applying to the trial judge at a later stage. Unlike the Alabama rule, in Florida the exercise of discretion by the trial judge is subject to appellate review. This Court has consistently insisted that great liberality be extended by trial judges in favor of a trial on the merits of a criminal case.

In cases where defendants have pleaded guilty at arraignment, the Florida Rule is that a subsequent request to withdraw the plea should by favorably received 'in any case' where it is 'the least evident' that the ends of justice would be served. Canada v. State, 144 Fla. 633, 198 So. 220; Asbey v. State, Fla.App., 102 So.2d 407; Morgan v. State, Fla.App., 142 So.2d 308; Roberts v. State, Fla.App., 142 So.2d 152; Rubenstein v. State, Fla.App., 50 So.2d 708. Thus, if a defendant pleads guilty to a felony without the assistance of counsel at his arraignment, a subsequent ...