Sardonis v. Sardonis

• Decision Date: 22 January 1970
• Docket Number: No. 723-A,723-A
• Citation: 106 R.I. 469,261 A.2d 22
• Parties: Opal Marlene SARDONIS v. Barnum Louis SARDONIS. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 22

261 A.2d 22

106 R.I. 469

Opal Marlene SARDONIS v. Barnum Louis SARDONIS.

No. 723-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Jan. 22, 1970.

[106 R.I. 474] Friedman, Kramer & Kessler, Stephen A. Gordon, Pearlman & Pearlman, Thomas W. Pearlman, Providence, for petitioner-appellee.

Andrew A. Bucci, Providence, for respondent-appellant.

OPINION

JOSLIN, Justice.

The petitioner invokes the Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (G.L.1956, chap. 11 of title 15) to obtain support for her two children both of whom are under the age of 18. A Family Court justice found that she and the respondent were validly married at common law and that he was the father of her two children. The respondent was ordered to pay $40 a week for the children's support and he appealed. He argues initially that the Family Court lacked jurisdiction under the Act to decide questions relating either to the validity of the common-law marriage or to the parenthood of the children. Assuming jurisdiction, he contends alternatively that the facts do not establish a common-law marriage. We decide that the Family Court had jurisdiction, and that the trial justice did not err in finding a valid common-law marriage.

The jurisdictional argument poses no problem. Even a brief reference to the Act's pertinent provisions makes it obvious that proof of the existence of a marriage ¹ and the fact of parenthood are indispensable conditions to the court's power to order support payments. Thus, the Act imposes upon parents possessed of sufficient means or able to earn such means the duty to provide a fair and reasonable sum for those children under the age of 18. The obligation is primarily that of the husband and the father ( § 15-11-5), and the mother becomes responsible only if the father is dead or cannot be found or is incapable of providing full support ( § 15-11-6). Jurisdiction is vested in the Family Court ( § 15-11-15, as amended by P.L.1962, chap. 111, sec. 1), and the support obligation is enforceable even in those situations where both the person responsible for support and the one claiming it are to be found in this State. ²

The respondent misconceives the true meaning of the term 'jurisdiction' when he argues that the court lacks authority to decide questions relating to the validity of a marriage and parenthood of the children for whom support is sought. That term has been defined by this Court in the following manner:

"The word 'jurisdiction' (jus dicere) is a term of large and comprehensive import, and embraces every kind of judicial action upon the subject-matter * * *. To have jurisdiction is to have power to inquire into the fact, to apply the law, and to declare the punishment, in a regular course of judicial proceeding.' Shaw, C.J., in Hopkins v. Commonwealth, 3 Met. 462. 'Jurisdiction in courts is the power and authority to declare the law. The very word in its origin imports as much. It is derived from juris and dico-I speak by the law-and that sentence ought to be inscribed in living light on every tribunal of criminal power. It is the right of administering justice through the laws by the means which the law has provided for that purpose.' Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa.St. 627, 630.' State v. Smith, 29 R.I. 513, 521-522, 72 A. 710, 714.

Viewing 'jurisdiction' in this sense it is axiomatic that the Court possessed it here. Obviously, prerequisites to any application and declaration of the law under the Act, viz., a support order, were findings that the parties were married and that respondent was the father of the children. That the marriage acquired its validity under common-law principles, rather than by compliance with the statutory provisions relative to the licensing and solemnization of marriages, is without significance. See Alvernes v. Alvernes, 75 R.I. 325, 66 A.2d 373, 11 A.L.R.2d 1036. So, too, is it without consequence that the Family Court may also have the power to decide the question of paternity in bastardy proceedings. In those proceedings its jurisdiction would be to determine who is the putative father of an illegitimate child, whereas in support cases under the Act what is important is not only who is the father, but also whether the child was born while he was married to the mother, or whether, even conceding that conception took place during an illicit relationship, ³ the child was subsequently legitimatized under the principles only recently enunciated in Bernier v. Bernier, supra, note 1.

Apart from the jurisdictional questions, respondent attacks the trial justice's finding that he and petitioner were validly married at common law. Such a marriage has long been recognized in this state. Holgate v. United Electric Rys., 47 R.I. 337, 133 A. 243. It can be established by clear and convincing evidence that the parties seriously intended to enter into the husband-wife relationship, Ibello v. Sweet, 47 R.I. 480, 482, 133 A. 801, and that their conduct was of such a character as to lead to a belief in the community that they were married, Williams v....