Sarja v. Iron Range Resources and Rehabilitation

Decision Date22 July 1966
Docket NumberNo. 39955,39955
Citation144 N.W.2d 377,274 Minn. 458
PartiesHenry J. SARJA, Relator, v. IRON RANGE RESOURCES & REHABILITATION and Department of Employment Security, Respondents.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. Where an employee of a state agency was temporarily suspended from his employment as a disciplinary measure under civil service rules, whether the separation from employment was a voluntary or involuntary act of the employee must be determined not by the immediate cause or motive for the act but by whether the employee directly or indirectly exercised free will or choice as to the performance or nonperformance of the act bringing on the suspension. If the act of employment separation is performed by an employee directly of his own free will, or indirectly by his act of vesting in another discretionary authority to act in his behalf, the ultimate resulting act is a voluntary one which disqualifies him for compensation during suspension.

2. The evidence produced at the administrative hearings is sufficient to sustain the decision of the commissioner.

Henry J. Sarja, pro se.

Robert W. Mattson, Atty. Gen., Joseph A. Coduti and Austin D. Ditzler, Spec. Asst. Attys. Gen., St. Paul, for respondents.

OPINION

NELSON, Justice.

Certiorari to review a decision of the commissioner of employment security approving and adopting a decision of the appeal tribunal of the Department of Employment Security denying appellant unemployment compensation during a 30-day suspension.

Appellant was employed as a mining engineer and supervisor in charge of the Mineral Research Division of the Department of Iron Range Resources and Rehabilitation (IRRR). His duties included planning, supervising, and interpreting geophysical surveys and mineral estimations and evaluations. He was directly responsible under civil service rules to the commissioner of IRRR, A. M. DeYoannes.

It appears from the record that there were a number of circumstances, beginning in the year 1962, which gave rise to a series of disagreements between appellant and DeYoannes. We do not find the transcript especially lucid as to the nature of appellant's demands and criticisms.

The appellant began writing a series of letters to the Civil Service Commission questioning the validity of the examination which he had taken for the position of assistant commissioner of IRRR and under which he had failed to qualify. In these letters he raised implications and inferences of irregularities and discrimination on the part of the IRRR commissioner, the Civil Service Commission, and the Examining Board. There were further disputes between appellant and the IRRR commissioner beginning in 1963, relevant to procedures prescribed by the commissioner in compliance with an order of the Department of Administration pertaining to the purchase of gasoline by IRRR employees. Following the issuing of these directives and orders by his superior, appellant wrote to the governor rather than follow the directives, stating that he did not feel that as a supervisor and professional engineer he should be required to service cars--this despite the fact that other department heads and commissioners actually performed similar services. It further appears that appellant was in conflict with the commissioner regarding the functions and responsibilities of the assistant commissioner of IRRR and that he wrote directly to the Civil Service Commission, communicating his objections to an alleged new position created without civil service announcement or competitive examination. He complained that he would be subjected, contrary to regulation, to the direction of the assistant commissioner, against whom he felt personal antagonism. He received assurances from the Civil Service Commission to the contrary.

On April 9, 1964, appellant again wrote the governor summarizing his dissatisfaction with IRRR policies and enclosing a copy of a letter to the IRRR commissioner alleging improprieties, irregularities, and wasteful acts, and charging the commissioner with discrimination against appellant and his staff. This letter was the culmination of complaints and criticisms of the commissioner over the previous 3 years. Feeling that the morale and efficiency of the department were adversely affected by appellant's actions, at this point the commissioner, in accordance with § 10.3 of the state Civil Service Rules, suspended appellant for 30 days without pay, effective April 27, 1964.

Appellant filed a claim for unemployment benefits on April 27, 1964, at the local office of the Department of Employment Security at Hibbing, and filed continued claims for unemployment benefits for benefit-weeks ending May 4 through May 26, 1964. On May 27, 1964, appellant completed serving his 30-day suspension and returned to his regular duties at IRRR.

On June 4, 1964, a claims deputy of the Department of Employment Security issued a determination that claimant was involuntarily separated from his employment for misconduct interfering with and adversely affecting his employer's interests. Appellant appealed from the foregoing determination under Minn.St. 268.10 to a regularly constituted appeal tribunal of the department, which after a hearing rendered a decision holding that appellant was involuntarily unemployed through his own fault and was therefore ineligible for unemployment benefits for the period of his suspension.

Appellant appealed from this decision to the commissioner of employment security. A hearing followed and the decision of the appeal tribunal was sustained. Thereupon appellant procured a writ of certiorari to obtain a review of the determination of the commissioner of employment security.

So far as we are able to ascertain, this case is one of first impression here. It involves the construction of Minn.St. 268.03 and Minn.St.1961, § 268.09, subd. 1(1).

Minn.St. 268.03 provides:

'As a guide to the interpretation and application of sections 268.03 to 268.24, the public policy of this state is declared to be as follows: Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this state. Involuntary unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest and concern which requires appropriate action by the legislature to prevent its spread and to lighten its burdens. This can be provided by encouraging employers to provide more stable employment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment to provide benefits for periods of unemployment, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social consequences of poor relief assistance. The legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of this state will be promoted by providing, under the police powers of the state for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own.'

Minn.St.1961, § 268.09, subd. 1, provides in part:

'An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

'(1) If such individual voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer discontinued his employment with such employer or was discharged for misconduct connected with his work or for misconduct which interferes with and adversely affects his employment, if so found by the commissioner, for not less than three nor more than seven weeks of unemployment in addition to and following the waiting period.'

The Department of Employment Security having refused to award ap...

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3 cases
  • Churchill Downs, Inc. v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Commission
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • May 1, 1970
    ...290, 203 A.2d 119; Dubinsky Bros. Inc. v. Industrial Commission of Missouri, Mo., 373 S.W.2d 9; and Sarja v. Iron Range Resources and Rehabilitation, 274 Minn. 458, 144 N.W.2d 377. The first four of the cited cases involved movie projectionists whose unemployment resulted from provisions of......
  • City of Melrose v. Klasen
    • United States
    • Minnesota Court of Appeals
    • September 2, 1986
    ...relation[ship]; he is, in fact, acting to continue the employment. The city relies upon language in Sarja v. Iron Range Resources and Rehabilitation, 274 Minn. 458, 144 N.W.2d 377 (1966) for the proposition that a person who agrees to a suspension should be disqualified from receiving unemp......
  • Schock v. Board of Review, Div. of Employment Security, Dept. of Labor and Industry
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • November 7, 1966
    ...for the majority of the Appellate Division. 89 N.J.Super. 118, 214 A.2d 40 (App.Div.1965). See also: Sarja v. Iron Range Resources & Rehabilitation, Minn., 144 N.W.2d 377 (1966). The Chief Justice and Justices Jacobs and Proctor dissent and vote to reverse for the reasons expressed in the d......

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