Sarkis v. Pafford Oil Co., Inc.
| Decision Date | 23 April 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-973,96-973 |
| Citation | 697 So.2d 524 |
| Parties | RICO Bus.Disp.Guide 9279, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1049 Nader W. SARKIS and Nazih W. Sarkis, Appellants, v. PAFFORD OIL COMPANY, INC., a Florida Corporation, James Pafford, Lesley Pafford, and Amoco Oil Company, a Maryland Corporation, and Richard Langston, Appellees, |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Gene D. Brown, Tallahassee, for Appellants.
William R. Mabile, III, and Marjorie M. Cain of Fuller, Johnson & Farrell, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellees.
The plaintiffs, Nader and Nazih Sarkis, appeal a final order dismissing their second amended complaint against the defendants, Richard Langston and Amoco Oil Company, with prejudice. Among the claims remaining at issue in the appeal, we conclude that the trial judge correctly dismissed five but incorrectly dismissed two others. Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for further proceedings in the trial court.
On September 1, 1993, the plaintiffs signed an agreement with Pafford Oil Company to lease a service station and convenience store known as the Capital Hills Amoco Station. As a part of the lease, the plaintiffs also agreed to purchase 60,000 gallons of gasoline per month from Pafford Oil, a local distributor of Amoco products. The plaintiffs alleged that during the term of the lease Pafford Oil delivered inferior grades of gasoline produced by companies other than Amoco and sold it to them for the price of higher grades of Amoco gasoline.
When the plaintiffs discovered that they were purchasing inferior gasoline at the price of higher quality Amoco gasoline, they notified Richard Langston, the Amoco representative for North Florida. According to the complaint, Langston investigated the plaintiffs' claim but then covered up their allegation by conducting false tests showing that the plaintiffs had actually received the Amoco gasoline for which they were paying. This practice of delivering falsely marketed gasoline was said to have continued throughout the course of the lease between the plaintiffs and Pafford Oil Company.
The second amended complaint alleges that Richard Langston and Amoco Oil Company conspired to commit a fraud on the plaintiffs (Counts XVII and XVIII, respectively), and it includes four other claims against Amoco Oil, a violation of the Florida Motor Fuel Marketing Practices Act, sections 526.301-526.3135, Florida Statutes, (Count XIX), conspiracy to interfere with plaintiffs' business relationship with their customers (Count XX), a violation of the Florida Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, sections 501.201-501.213, Florida Statutes,(Count XX1), an action for civil theft pursuant to section 812.035, Florida Statutes, (Count XXII), and a violation of the Florida Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, sections 895.01-895.06, Florida Statutes, (Count XXIII). The plaintiffs also asserted a variety of claims against Pafford Oil and its representatives, but these claims were settled.
Langston and Amoco filed a motion to dismiss contending that the action for interference with a business relationship could not be based on an alleged interference with unidentified customers, that the Motor Fuel Marketing Practices Act did not apply in the absence of a contract between the parties, and that the remaining claims were barred by the economic loss rule. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the second amended complaint with prejudice. This appeal followed.
We begin our analysis with a statement of the applicable standards in the trial court and in this court. When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the trial court must accept the allegations of a complaint as true. Snow v. Byron, 580 So.2d 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Shahid v. Campbell, 552 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Likewise, the appellate court must accept the facts alleged in a complaint as true when reviewing an order that determines the sufficiency of the complaint. Higgs v. Florida Department of Corrections, 647 So.2d 962 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); McKinney-Green Inc. v. Davis, 606 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Whether a complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action is an issue of law. Consequently, a ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is reviewable on appeal by the de novo standard of review.
Applying these standards, we conclude that the trial court correctly dismissed the claim that Amoco interfered with a business relationship between the plaintiffs and their customers (Count XX). The amended complaint does not identify the customers who were the subject of the alleged interference. As the supreme court said in Ethan Allen Inc., v. Georgetown Manor Inc., 647 So.2d 812 (Fla.1994), an action for tortious interference with a business relationship generally requires "a business relationship evidenced by an actual and identifiable understanding or agreement which in all probability would have been completed if the defendant had not interfered." Id. at 815. The court added in Ferguson Transportation Inc. v. North American Van Lines, 687 So.2d 821 (Fla.1996), that a claim of tortious interference with a business relationship requires proof that the plaintiff had a business relationship with "identifiable customers." Id. The cause of action cannot be established by proof that the defendant interfered with a relationship between the plaintiff and the public at large, yet that is precisely the basis of the claim asserted in this case. The plaintiffs alleged that the conduct in question resulted in a general loss of business, but even if that could be proven, it would not amount to a tortious interference with a business relationship as defined in Ethan Allen and Ferguson. Because the interference alleged here is not specific, this claim must fail.
Four other claims were properly dismissed as a matter of law on the ground that they were barred by the economic loss rule. These are the fraud claim against Langston (Count XVIII), and the claims of fraud, civil theft, and civil racketeering, (Count XVII, Count XXII, and Count XXIII, respectively) against Amoco. In the absence of personal injury or property damage, a party is generally not entitled to initiate an action in tort to recover an economic loss. Casa Clara Condominium Association, Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So.2d 1244 (Fla.1993); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 510 So.2d 899 (Fla.1987). This rule is based on the premise that parties to a contractual relationship have allocated their respective rights and remedies and consequently it is inappropriate to introduce tort remedies. Strickland-Collins Construction v. Barnett Bank of Naples, 545 So.2d 476 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
The fraud claims against Amoco and Langston are based on a general allegation that these defendants conspired to deliver inferior grades of fuel and to conceal this fact from the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs contend that these claims are not barred by the economic loss rule because the plaintiffs had only a "garden variety" lease which did not provide an adequate contract remedy. This argument must fail, however. The agreement between the plaintiffs and Pafford Oil not only required the plaintiffs to lease the premises, it also required the plaintiffs to purchase 60,000 gallons of motor vehicle fuel per month. If the plaintiffs incurred a risk of obtaining inferior fuel, that was a risk they could have addressed when they negotiated the contract. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse.
Fraud in the inducement to make a contract is not barred by the economic loss rule. As the supreme court explained in HTP, Ltd., v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So.2d 1238 (Fla.1996), fraud in the inducement is an independent tort that requires proof of facts that are distinct from the allegations of a breach of contract. In the present case, however, the plaintiffs' claim of fraud is based entirely on an allegation that the defendants...
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