Sartin v. Moran-Buckner Co.
| Decision Date | 21 November 1939 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 29033 |
| Citation | 114 P.2d 938,1939 OK 511,189 Okla. 178 |
| Parties | SARTIN v. MORAN-BUCKNER CO. et al. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
¶0 1. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION--Industrial Commission not court but administrative body with quasi-judicial powers.
The State Industrial Commission is not a court, but is an administrative body clothed with quasi-judicial powers in the administration of relief under the Workmen's Compensation Law.
2. SAME--Claim for compensation not "action" but special proceeding.
A claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law is not an action, but is a special proceeding.
3. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS--Time for bringing action for personal injuries not extended by dismissal of claim by Industrial Commission.
An action for personal injury is distinct and separate from the relief provided by the Workmen's Compensation Law, and the dismissal of a claim by the State Industrial Commission does not extend the time in which the action for personal injury may be brought.
4. SAME--Demurrer properly sustained to petition disclosing action barred.
When a petition shows on its face that the action upon which recovery is sought is barred by the statute of limitations, a demurrer thereto may be properly sustained.
Appeal from District Court, Muskogee County; O. H. P. Brewer, Judge.
Action for personal injury by Earl Sartin against Moran-Buckner Company, a copartnership, and Moran Buckner Company, a corporation. Separate demurrers were sustained and judgment entered for the defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
C. A. Ambrister, of Muskogee, and F. A. Greene, of Eufala, for plaintiff in error.
Brower Broaddus and Julian B. Fite both of Muskogee, for defendants in error.
¶1 The plaintiff in error hereafter referred to as plaintiff, sustained an accidental personal injury on January 23, 1936, and attempted to recover compensation therefor under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law from the defendant in error Moran-Buckner Company, a corporation, hereafter referred to as the corporation. Due to the inability of the plaintiff to show the existence of the relationship of master and servant, a first prerequisite to an award under such act (Mastin v. Black, 176+ Okla. 46, 54 P.2d 399), the State Industrial Commission dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction to entertain it. On review this court sustained the Industrial Commission (Sartin v. State Industrial Commission, 183 Okla. 268, 81 P.2d 306). On January 21, 1938, the plaintiff filed in the district court of Muskogee county a petition wherein he sought to recover damages for his injury from the defendant in error Moran-Buckner Company, a copartnership, hereafter referred to as the partnership. The corporation was subsequently made a party to the action. Separate demurrers of the respective defendants to an amended petition of the plaintiff were sustained, that of the corporation for the reason that the petition showed on its face that the action had not been brought within the period limited by statute and that of the partnership on account of failure of plaintiff to state facts in his petition sufficient to state a cause of action against it. Motion for new trial was overruled, and the plaintiff has prosecuted this appeal.
¶2 The plaintiff contends that the proceeding before the State Industrial Commission was an action, which entitled him upon a failure thereof, otherwise than upon the merits, to commence a new action within the time limited by section 106, O. S. 1931, 12 Okla. St. Ann. § 100, which provides as follows:
"If any action be commenced within due time, and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff be reversed, or if the plaintiff fail in such action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited for the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or, if he die, and the cause of action survive, his representatives may commence a new action within one year after the reversal or failure."
¶3 An "action" is defined by statute (section 9, O. S. 1931, 12 Okla. St. Ann. 4), as follows:
"An action is an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice by which a party prosecutes another party for the enforcement or protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense."
And by section 10, O. S. 1931, 12 Okla. St. Ann. § 5, it is provided:
"Every other remedy is a special proceeding."
¶4 The plaintiff urges that since by section 1 of article 7 of the Constitution it is provided judicial power shall be vested in commissions and boards, as well as courts, that the State Industrial Commission must be held to be vested with judicial power, and consequently to be a court. This contention cannot be entertained, since it is no longer an open question in this jurisdiction that the State Industrial Commission is not a court, but is merely an administrative body clothed with quasi-judicial power for the purpose of administering relief under the Workmen's Compensation Law. See Union Indemnity Co. v. Saling, 166 Okla. 133, 26 P.2d 217; Wilson Drilling Co. v. Beyer, 138 Okla. 248, 280 P. 846. Since this is true, it follows that a proceeding before the Industrial Commission cannot be an action within the definition given, by statute...
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