Satcher v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc.

• Decision Date: 26 January 1942
• Docket Number: 15357.
• Citation: 18 S.E.2d 523,199 S.C. 59
• Parties: SATCHER v. WOODMEN OF THE WORLD LIFE INS. SOC.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

18 S.E.2d 523

199 S.C. 59

SATCHER v. WOODMEN OF THE WORLD LIFE INS. SOC.

No. 15357.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

January 26, 1942

Williams & Busbee, of Aiken, for appellant.

T B. Greneker, of Edgefield, for respondent.

G DUNCAN BELLINGER, Acting Associate Justice.

The respondent instituted this action in the Court below alleging that he had become totally and permanently disabled and that by reason of the provisions in his benefit certificate or policy of life insurance, issued to him by the Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World, he was entitled to certain benefits which the appellant had refused to pay.

The respondent alleged that on September 21, 1938, he became totally and permanently disabled to the extent that he could no longer do the customary tasks and work which he had been trained and equipped to do, and would be wholly prevented from performing any work for compensation or profit, or engaging in a gainful occupation. The respondent is under the age of sixty years, and was, at the time he became insured with the appellant, a member of Camp No. 195, Johnston, S. C., of Woodmen of the World. The appellant, Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society, is the successor to the Sovereign Camp of Woodmen of the World, which was organized in the year 1890. On September 1, 1937, the original corporate name of the Society was changed from Sovereign Camp of Woodmen of the World to Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society. The rights, benefits, and privileges of the members of the Society, and their benefit certificates, or insurance policies, issued by Sovereign Camp of Woodmen of the World, were in nowise affected by the change in the name of the Society.

It is not necessary to set forth in this opinion the form of the certificate or policy of insurance, or the constitution, laws and by-laws of the Society, for the reason that all of these instruments are set forth in detail and their provisions fully construed in the very recent case of Palmer v. Sovereign Camp of Woodmen of the World, 197 S.C. 379, 15 S.E.2d 655.

The appellant, by its answer, interposed a general denial, and by way of further defense alleged that at the time respondent was injured, on September 21, 1938, he had been suspended from appellant's Society for failure to pay his assessments for the month of August, 1938, and was not in good standing when he undertook to reinstate his certificate on the 27th day of September, 1938; that by virtue of this delinquency the beneficiary certificate, under the constitution, laws and by-laws of the Society, became void, and his contract with the Society completely terminated and ended. The appellant had made the respondent a loan on the certificate in controversy on December 6, 1938, in the sum of $89.04, being the amount of the loan applied for after deducting interest, and in its answer the appellant counterclaimed for this sum. At the conclusion of all of the testimony the appellant moved for a directed verdict in its favor upon the same grounds embodied in the exceptions, as follows:

"The trial judge erred in refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant upon the grounds set out in defendant's motion for a directed verdict, namely, that the only reasonable inferences to be drawn from the testimony are:

"'(a) That the plaintiff failed to pay his installment of Seven and 78/100 ($7.78) Dollars for the month of August, 1938, on or before the last day of the month, and thereby became suspended, his beneficiary certificate void, and his contract with defendant thereby completely terminated and ended, prior to his alleged injury and disability.'

"The error being that the trial judge should have found and held from the testimony that there was no other reasonable inference than that plaintiff failed to pay his installment of $7.78 for the month of August, 1938, on or before the last day of the month, and thereby became suspended, his beneficiary certificate void, and his contract with defendant thereby completely terminated and ended, prior to his alleged disability, and a verdict should have been directed for defendant.

"'(b) That the plaintiff was not in good health when he attempted to reinstate his policy by paying the installment premium for the month of August, 1938, on the 27th day of September, 1938, and did not remain in good health for a period of thirty days thereafter.'

"The error being that the trial judge should have held that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the testimony was that plaintiff was not in good health when he attempted to reinstate his policy by paying his installment premium for the month of August, 1938, on the 27th day of September, 1938, and did not remain in good health for a period of thirty days thereafter, and in failing to direct a verdict for the defendant upon this ground."

The motion for a directed verdict was refused and the entire case submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for the respondent, awarding the amount claimed by him, less the sum of the counterclaim interposed by the appellant.

The appellant submits that its exceptions raise but one question for the determination of this Court, that being: Did the trial judge err in refusing to direct a verdict for the appellant?

For the proper disposition of the question presented, it becomes necessary to review in somewhat chronological order the pertinent facts as shown by the testimony. None of the testimony developing the facts referred to herein was objected to by the appellant upon its introduction, nor was any motion made at any time to strike out that testimony.

October 31, 1935, the beneficiary certificate, or policy of insurance, was issued to respondent. The assessments, or premiums, on this certificate were required to be paid on or before the last day of each month. There was introduced in evidence a number of receipts issued to the respondent by the appellant for monthly assessments on the certificate. These receipts issued began with the assessment of March, 1936, and ended with the one issued for March, 1939. All of the receipts issued by the appellant to the respondent for the monthly assessments were not introduced in evidence, a number of these receipts being missing. The receipts introduced in evidence show that none of the payments evidenced thereby were made before the last day of the month they became due, but they represented assessments overdue from two to thirty days. The respondent testified without objection or contradiction that he had from the time he received his certificate, and until April 21, 1939, when he received notice from the Society that his certificate had been permanently lapsed, paid his assessments the month following the period that they were due, and that no objection had been raised by the Society or its representative to the irregularity of these payments.

September 12, 1938, W. J. Hatcher, the financial secretary of the local Camp, of which the respondent was a member, filed his report with the home office of the Society, showing respondent to be delinquent in his assessments by placing after respondent's name on the report in red ink the letter "D".

September 21, 1938, the respondent received severe injuries to his foot and leg while operating farm machinery and was confined for several weeks in a hospital as the result of the injuries, and was there visited by W. J. Hatcher, Financial Secretary of the local Camp. The testimony clearly shows that as a result of these injuries the respondent became totally and permanently disabled.

Upon respondent's return to his home from the hospital, W. J. Hatcher, the Financial Secretary of the local Camp, visited him often and could easily observe his physical condition.

September 27, 1938, the Financial Secretary of the local Camp issued to respondent a receipt for his assessment due for the month of August, 1938.

December 2, 1938, the respondent applied to appellant for a loan on his benefit certificate or policy of insurance. It was necessary to execute certain papers in connection with the loan, and to have them properly witnessed. Hatcher, the Financial Secretary of the local Camp, went to the home of respondent where he was confined to bed as the result of his injuries, and aided respondent in...