Satter v. Satter, 96-2651
Decision Date | 15 April 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 96-2651,96-2651 |
Citation | 709 So.2d 617 |
Parties | 23 Fla. L. Weekly D966 Jack SATTER, Appellant, v. Nancy Bernard SATTER, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
We grant rehearing, withdraw the opinion originally filed in this case, and reverse the judgment awarding attorney's fees. It appearing that our decision today does not conflict with any prior decision of this court, we deny rehearing en banc.
The question presented by this appeal is whether a former spouse can be required under section 61.16 1 to reimburse the other former spouse for all or part of her attorney's fees incurred in post judgment proceedings where the recipient has demonstrated no need for such fees. The facts show that the net worth of each former spouse exceeds $1 million. 2 The fees awarded, $24,000, constitute 2/1000ths of the payor's net worth and 2/100ths of the recipient's. Thus illustrated, the nub of the problem is whether the statute was ever intended to operate where neither party has any real financial need for fees from the other party. Because we do not understand the statute to apply in this unique circumstance, we reverse the award of fees in this case.
In originally denying the former wife's motion for attorney's fees, the trial court stated:
[emphasis supplied]
Order of May 2, 1996. 3 Later when the trial judge changed his mind on rehearing, he explained:
The trial court thereupon entered a final order fixing the amount and requiring appellant to pay part of appellee's fees.
As the claim to attorney's fees is based on a statute, we look to its text for entitlement. Section 61.16 provides that the court:
"may from time to time, after considering the financial resources of both parties, order a party to pay a reasonable amount for attorney's fees ... to the other party [for] maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter." [emphasis supplied]
Precisely what the operative term "financial resources of both parties" was intended to mean could have led to differing judicial constructions. For example, giving these words their ordinary meaning, one reasonable construction might have been that the relative financial resources would determine entitlement to fees--i.e., if one party had greater financial resources than the other, the former could be required to pay the fees of the latter.
As it happened, however, the supreme court decided that the statutory term was intended to focus on "need"--in other words, the necessity for some financial assistance to engage an attorney and pay attorney fees--and a corresponding ability to pay such fees by the other. Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So.2d 134, 136 (Fla.1976) ( ); Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197, 1204 (Fla.1980) (same); Standard Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So.2d 828 (Fla.1990) ( ). To be sure, the court explained in Canakaris that "[i]t is not necessary that one spouse be completely unable to pay attorney's fees in order for the trial court to require the other spouse to pay these fees." 382 So.2d at 1205. But, as the court further stated in Quanstrom:
"A significant purpose of this fee-authorizing statute is to assure that one party is not limited in the type of representation he or she would receive because that party's financial position is so inferior to that of the other party."
555 So.2d at 835. And more recently in Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So.2d 697 (Fla.1997), the court added that:
"In other words, to ensure that both parties have similar access to competent legal counsel, the trial court must look to each spouse's need for suit money versus each spouse's respective ability to pay."
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