Satterfield v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 26 January 2018
• Docket Number: No. CIV–17–1263–W,CIV–17–1263–W
• Parties: Chanelle SATTERFIELD, Plaintiff, v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

287 F.Supp.3d 1285

Chanelle SATTERFIELD, Plaintiff,

v.GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.

No. CIV–17–1263–W

United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma.

Signed January 26, 2018

Rick W. Bisher, Riley M. Bisher, Ryan Bisher Ryan & Simons, Oklahoma City, OK, for Plaintiff.

Jace T. White, Gerard F. Pignato, Pignato Cooper Kolker & Roberson PC, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendant.

ORDER

LEE R. WEST, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On June 22, 2016, plaintiff Chanelle Satterfield filed suit in the District Court for Garfield County, Oklahoma, against Kailee Taylor. See Doc. 1–2. Satterfield alleged that she was a passenger in an automobile that was struck by an automobile driven by Taylor and as a result of Taylor's negligent operation of her vehicle, she (Satterfield) sustained injury. See id.

Satterfield and Taylor "settled all issues[,]" Doc. 1–7, between them, and on June 21, 2017, Satterfield dismissed her claim against Taylor with prejudice. See Doc. 1–9. On July 18, 2017, Satterfield, with leave of court, filed an amended petition and named as defendant, her insurer, Government Employees Insurance Company ("GEICO").See Doc. 1–10.

In her second amended petition filed on November 22, 2017, see Doc. 1–12, Satterfield alleged that on July 24, 2014, the date of the accident, she was insured by GEICO under an automobile policy, No. 4163–72–30–10 ("Policy"), which provided uninsured/underinsured motorist ("UM") benefits¹ and that she made a claim for such benefits. Satterfield further alleged that GEICO failed to reasonably and properly investigate and evaluate her claim,² and when it determined that she was not entitled to UM coverage,³ GEICO not only breached the terms of the Policy, but also breached its implied duty to deal fairly and to act in good faith with its insured.

GEICO removed the action on November 22, 2017, see Doc. 1, and asserted in the Notice of Removal that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction under title 28, section 1332 of the United States Code because the citizenship of the parties is diverse⁴ and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. See Doc. 1 at 5; Doc. 1–12 at 8.

The matter now comes before the Court on GEICO's Motion to Dismiss. Satterfield has responded, and GEICO has filed a reply in support of its argument that dismissal of this action is warranted under

Rules 12(b)(2) 5

and 12(b)(3), F.R.Civ.P., and title 28, section 1406(a) of the United States Code because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over GEICO and venue is improper and in support of its alternate argument that transfer of this matter is warranted under title 28, section 1404(a) of the United States Code.

"[J]urisdiction of the person traditionally has been analyzed in terms of two different elements[.]" 1 R. Casad & W. Richman, Jurisdiction in Civil Actions at 6, § 1–1[2][a] (3d ed. 1998)("JCA"). The first element—process—pertains to the "officially prescribed procedural steps [that] must be taken to connect the party to the [C]ourt's authority[,]" Id. at 8, § 1–1 [2][b]; "[t]he act of performing the prescribed steps [constitutes] ... service of process." Id. (emphasis deleted). That is to say, " ‘service of process ... provides the mechanism by which [this] ... [C]ourt having ... jurisdiction over the subject matter of [the] ... action asserts jurisdiction over the person of the party served.’ " Hukill v. Oklahoma Native American Domestic Violence Coalition, 542 F.3d 794, 797 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Oklahoma Radio Associates v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 969 F.2d 940, 943 (10th Cir. 1992) ).

Because there is no issue regarding whether GEICO has been properly served in this case, see Doc. 1–13, the Court has considered the second element of jurisdiction over the person—basis, e.g., JCA at 6, § 1–1 [2][a], which refers to "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation ...." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977).

"To obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a diversity action, a plaintiff must show that jurisdiction is legitimate under the laws of the forum state[.]" Far West Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1074 (10th Cir. 1995). In Oklahoma, a court may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only (1) if it is statutorily authorized to do so, and (2) if its exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. E .g., Rambo v. American Southern Insurance Co., 839 F.2d 1415, 1416 (10th Cir. 1988). See Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Continental Motors, Inc., 877 F.3d 895, 903 (10th Cir. 2017) (law of forum state and constitutional due process limitations govern personal jurisdiction in federal court); Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d 1503, 1506–07 (10th Cir. 1995) (court must initially determine whether exercise of jurisdiction is sanctioned by state's long-arm statute, which is question of state law, and then determine whether exercise of jurisdiction comports with Constitution's due process requirements).

Because the applicable Oklahoma statute provides that

[a] court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution[s] of this state and ... the United States,

12 O.S. § 2004(F), that two-part test has "collapse[d] into a single due process analysis[.]" Rambo, 839 F.2d at 1416 ; e.g., Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1779, 198 L.Ed.2d 395 (2017) (long established that personal jurisdiction subject to fourteenth amendment due process clause).

In this context, due process requires a nonresident defendant to "have certain minimum contacts with ... [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940) )(further citations omitted). Whether due process is satisfied in a given case depends upon "the quality and nature of," Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958), a nonresident defendant's " ‘contacts, ties, or relations[,]’ " Burger King Corporation v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319, 66 S.Ct. 154 ) (footnote omitted), with the forum state, and in evaluating a nonresident defendant's alleged " ‘contacts, ties, or relations[,]’ " id. the Court recognizes there are "two types of personal jurisdiction: ‘general’ (sometimes called ‘all-purpose’) jurisdiction and ‘specific’ (sometimes called ‘case-linked’) jurisdiction." Bristol–Myers, 137 S.Ct. at 1780 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011) ).

"Specific jurisdiction calls for a two-step inquiry: (a) whether the plaintiff has shown that the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state; and, if so, (b) whether the defendant has presented a ‘compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.’ " Old Republic Insurance, 877 F.3d at 904 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476–77, 105 S.Ct. 2174 )(further citation omitted). The first step—the minimum contacts test—itself "encompasses two distinct requirements: (i) that the defendant must have ‘purposefully directed its activities at residents of the forum state,’ [or ‘ "purposefully availed" itself of the privilege of conducting activities ... in the forum state[,]’ Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1071 (10th Cir. 2008),⁶ ] and (ii) that ‘the plaintiff's injuries must arise out of [the] defendant's forum-related activities.’ " Old Republic Insurance, 877 F.3d at 904 (quoting Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 2011) (further quotations omitted) )(further citation and footnote omitted).

Thus, critical to the Court's specific jurisdiction inquiry (and dispositive of that inquiry in this case) is "whether [Satterfield's] ... injuries ‘arise out of [GEICO's] ... forum-related activities."⁷ Id. at 908 ; e.g., Anzures v. Flagship Restaurant Group, 819 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2016) ; Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1071. "Specific jurisdiction ... depends on an ‘affiliation[n] between the forum and the underlying controversy,’ principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State⁸ and is therefore subject to the State's regulation.’ " Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846 (quotation and citation omitted); e.g., Old Republic Insurance, 877 F.3d at 908. For this reason, "specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of ‘issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.’ " Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846 (quotation omitted)(emphasis added).

Satterfield is not an Oklahoma resident; she resides in Virginia, see Doc. 1–2 at 2, ¶ 1; Doc. 13–2 at 5, and GEICO issued the Policy to Satterfield in that state. See Doc. 12–3. After Satterfield was injured in an automobile accident in Oklahoma,⁹ counsel retained in Oklahoma made a claim for UM benefits on her behalf by letter addressed to GEICO in Fredericksburg, Virginia. See Doc. 12–6. GEICO investigated and evaluated Satterfield's claim and ultimately determined that she was not entitled to UM benefits;¹⁰ despite Satterfield's speculations to the contrary, that investigation, evaluation and determination, which gives rise to Satterfield's causes of action, and the harm that has allegedly resulted therefrom,¹¹ and for which Satterfield seeks compensation in this lawsuit, did not occur in the forum state.¹²

Thus, while Satterfield's burden at this stage "is light[,]" Doe v. National Medical Services, 974 F.2d 143, 145 (10th Cir. 1992), the Court finds Satterfield has not...